Each card carries the governed distillate name from the database. Open the quoted anchor before relying on the interpretation.
claimallegation
Cyberlux and Schmidt respond to plaintiffs’ February 5 emergency-hearing request, filed February 7 at 9:29 AM and signed /s/ Pennetti. They
Cyberlux and Schmidt respond to plaintiffs’ February 5 emergency-hearing request, filed February 7 at 9:29 AM and signed /s/ Pennetti. They seek rejection or a hearing also addressing their own stay/security motion.
Read the anchor · page 1
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CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FEBRUARY 5, 2025
REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING
Atlantic Wave’s1 Request for Emergency Hearing uses snippets of correspondence to try
and create an issue that does not exist.
Notably, despite demanding an emergency hearing in Texas, Plaintiffs are currently
opposing the setting of a hearing on an emergent nature brought by Cyberlux, in Virginia. 2 This
illustrates Plaintiffs’ request to this Court is nothing more than an effort to coerce the Court to
forego reviewing the parties’ competing orders, refuse Cyberlux’s request for hearing on
Cyberlux’s pending Emergency Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative, Motion to Set Amount of
Security to Suspend, Turnover and Appointment of Receiver, and Motion Set Bond for Receiver
(“Motion to Stay or Set Bond”), and enter Plaintiffs’ overbroad order appointing a receiver.
Atlantic Wave’s efforts to obfuscate this matter at every turn should not be entertained, and
Plaintiffs request for emergency hearing should be refused.
1 “Atlantic Wave” refers to Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC.
2 See Exhibit A (e-mail correspondence between counsel for Cyberlux and counsel for Atlantic Wave).
2/7/2025 9:29 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 97103416
By: Maegan McGuire
Filed: 2/7/2025 9:29 AM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Defendants describe the July 30, 2024 foreign-judgment action, an October 28 hearing granting thirty days of stay and refusal to extend it.
Defendants describe the July 30, 2024 foreign-judgment action, an October 28 hearing granting thirty days of stay and refusal to extend it. They argue settlement and judgment enforcement require Virginia adjudication. The settlement, stay order and subsequent ruling are not included.
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- 2 -
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to the Texas UEFJA. Plaintiffs
contend the filing alone domesticated the Virginia Judgment immediately under the applicable
statutory authority. While in many cases this may be true, this particular case is unique because
the Virginia Judgment is part and parcel of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and, moreover,
because the parties’ Settlement Agreement—and therefore the Virginia Judgment—are subject to
ongoing litigation in Virginia. 3 Because of this, Cyberlux requested a stay of enforcement. This
Court heard that request on October 28, 2024, and granted a thirty-day stay of enforcement. The
Court’s automatic stay was lifted after thirty days, and the Court declined Cyberlux’s request to
extend the stay.
Even though the stay of this action was lifted at the end of November, Plaintiffs did not
request a writ of execution for almost forty five days, waiting until January 2, 2025. For an
unknown reason, exactly one week later and before the writ of execution was even issued (and
before the Harris County Constable even knew about this action), Plaintiffs filed their Application
for Turnover After Judgment and for Appointment of Receiver (the “Application”).
Plaintiffs’ Application was filed on January 9, 2025. According to the Court’s records, the
writ of execution was issued on January 15, 2025.
On January 16, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application and indicated that
the Court would appoint a receiver. Because the parties were still disputing the scope of the
receivership order when the hearing concluded, the Court directed the parties to confer and submit
3 In the Settlement Agreement, the parties stipulated that all such disputes must be adjudicated in Virginia. Further, the Settlement
Agreement provides that a Virginia court is to construe the Settlement Agreement and Judgment to determine whether a breach of
the Settlement Agreement has occurred, and such a determination is required before the Virginia Judgment may be enforced.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The response says plaintiffs waited until January 2, 2025 to request execution, filed for turnover/receiver January 9 before issuance, and t
The response says plaintiffs waited until January 2, 2025 to request execution, filed for turnover/receiver January 9 before issuance, and that court records show writ issuance January 15. These dates are counsel’s account; the actual requests and writ are absent.
Read the anchor · page 2
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RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to the Texas UEFJA. Plaintiffs
contend the filing alone domesticated the Virginia Judgment immediately under the applicable
statutory authority. While in many cases this may be true, this particular case is unique because
the Virginia Judgment is part and parcel of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and, moreover,
because the parties’ Settlement Agreement—and therefore the Virginia Judgment—are subject to
ongoing litigation in Virginia. 3 Because of this, Cyberlux requested a stay of enforcement. This
Court heard that request on October 28, 2024, and granted a thirty-day stay of enforcement. The
Court’s automatic stay was lifted after thirty days, and the Court declined Cyberlux’s request to
extend the stay.
Even though the stay of this action was lifted at the end of November, Plaintiffs did not
request a writ of execution for almost forty five days, waiting until January 2, 2025. For an
unknown reason, exactly one week later and before the writ of execution was even issued (and
before the Harris County Constable even knew about this action), Plaintiffs filed their Application
for Turnover After Judgment and for Appointment of Receiver (the “Application”).
Plaintiffs’ Application was filed on January 9, 2025. According to the Court’s records, the
writ of execution was issued on January 15, 2025.
On January 16, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application and indicated that
the Court would appoint a receiver. Because the parties were still disputing the scope of the
receivership order when the hearing concluded, the Court directed the parties to confer and submit
3 In the Settlement Agreement, the parties stipulated that all such disputes must be adjudicated in Virginia. Further, the Settlement
Agreement provides that a Virginia court is to construe the Settlement Agreement and Judgment to determine whether a breach of
the Settlement Agreement has occurred, and such a determination is required before the Virginia Judgment may be enforced.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
It describes a January 16 hearing at which the court indicated it would appoint a receiver, unresolved order scope, Berleth’s January 17 oat
It describes a January 16 hearing at which the court indicated it would appoint a receiver, unresolved order scope, Berleth’s January 17 oath before a signed appointment, plaintiffs’ January 20 proposed order and defendants’ January 21 competing order. The timing does not itself establish either the legal effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an oral appointment.
Read the anchor · page 2
- 2 -
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to the Texas UEFJA. Plaintiffs
contend the filing alone domesticated the Virginia Judgment immediately under the applicable
statutory authority. While in many cases this may be true, this particular case is unique because
the Virginia Judgment is part and parcel of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and, moreover,
because the parties’ Settlement Agreement—and therefore the Virginia Judgment—are subject to
ongoing litigation in Virginia. 3 Because of this, Cyberlux requested a stay of enforcement. This
Court heard that request on October 28, 2024, and granted a thirty-day stay of enforcement. The
Court’s automatic stay was lifted after thirty days, and the Court declined Cyberlux’s request to
extend the stay.
Even though the stay of this action was lifted at the end of November, Plaintiffs did not
request a writ of execution for almost forty five days, waiting until January 2, 2025. For an
unknown reason, exactly one week later and before the writ of execution was even issued (and
before the Harris County Constable even knew about this action), Plaintiffs filed their Application
for Turnover After Judgment and for Appointment of Receiver (the “Application”).
Plaintiffs’ Application was filed on January 9, 2025. According to the Court’s records, the
writ of execution was issued on January 15, 2025.
On January 16, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application and indicated that
the Court would appoint a receiver. Because the parties were still disputing the scope of the
receivership order when the hearing concluded, the Court directed the parties to confer and submit
3 In the Settlement Agreement, the parties stipulated that all such disputes must be adjudicated in Virginia. Further, the Settlement
Agreement provides that a Virginia court is to construe the Settlement Agreement and Judgment to determine whether a breach of
the Settlement Agreement has occurred, and such a determination is required before the Virginia Judgment may be enforced.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Counsel says the constable contacted them January 24 and they supplied the oath, hearing excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations February 3. The
Counsel says the constable contacted them January 24 and they supplied the oath, hearing excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations February 3. The footnote says counsel and Deputy Montgomery exchanged calls but had not spoken directly. Exhibits B–F said to contain correspondence and attachments are not embedded.
Read the anchor · page 3
- 3 -
an agreed order or two competing orders. On January 17, 2025, Robert Berleth filed an Oath of
Receiver even though the Court had not yet signed its order appointing a receiver.4
The parties could not agree and submitted their competing orders, Atlantic Wave
submitting to the Court on January 20, 2025 before Cyberlux could even provide its input.
Cyberlux submitted its competing order on January 21, 2025.
On January 24, 2025, the Harris County Constable’s office contacted the undersigned. On
February 3, 2025, the undersigned responded to the Harris County Constable’s office and provided
(1) a copy of the Oath of Receiver filed by Mr. Berleth; (2) an excerpt of the January 16, 2025
hearing transcript highlighting the Court’s indication that a receiver would be appointed; (3) the
Declaration of Charles Watts; and (4) the Declaration of United States Air Force Major General
(ret.) Cameron G. Holt. 5 On February 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Request for Emergency
Hearing.
ARGUMENT
1. Despite demanding an emergency hearing in Texas, Atlantic Wave is currently telling
the Virginia Court it is “not available” for an emergency hearing.
Plaintiffs’ Request for Emergency Hearing should be rejected out of hand because there is
not an emergency. If there was something emergent affecting Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs would not
currently be opposing Cyberlux’s request for hearing before a Virginia court. In fact, that Virginia
court offered the parties seven different dates on which an emergency motion could be heard,
including:
Tuesday, Feb. 4,
4 Confusingly, Berleth—who is supposed to be a court-appointed neutral—has already submitted a request on behalf of Atlantic
Wave urging his appointment through a written order.
5 A copy of the e-mail correspondence is attached as Exhibit B. Copies of the documents attached to the e-mail correspondence are
attached as Exhibits C-F.
The undersigned and Deputy Constable Montgomery of the Harris County Constable’s office have exchanged telephone calls but
have not spoken directly.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Defendants describe Virginia scheduling from January 29 through February 4, seven dates offered (February 4, 5 and 10–14), objections over n
Defendants describe Virginia scheduling from January 29 through February 4, seven dates offered (February 4, 5 and 10–14), objections over notice and evidentiary scope, and claimed lack of opposing availability. They infer obstruction and inconsistency with plaintiffs’ Texas emergency request. The two hearings concern potentially different issues; correspondence Exhibit A is absent and scheduling alone does not prove motive.
Read the anchor · page 3
- 3 -
an agreed order or two competing orders. On January 17, 2025, Robert Berleth filed an Oath of
Receiver even though the Court had not yet signed its order appointing a receiver.4
The parties could not agree and submitted their competing orders, Atlantic Wave
submitting to the Court on January 20, 2025 before Cyberlux could even provide its input.
Cyberlux submitted its competing order on January 21, 2025.
On January 24, 2025, the Harris County Constable’s office contacted the undersigned. On
February 3, 2025, the undersigned responded to the Harris County Constable’s office and provided
(1) a copy of the Oath of Receiver filed by Mr. Berleth; (2) an excerpt of the January 16, 2025
hearing transcript highlighting the Court’s indication that a receiver would be appointed; (3) the
Declaration of Charles Watts; and (4) the Declaration of United States Air Force Major General
(ret.) Cameron G. Holt. 5 On February 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Request for Emergency
Hearing.
ARGUMENT
1. Despite demanding an emergency hearing in Texas, Atlantic Wave is currently telling
the Virginia Court it is “not available” for an emergency hearing.
Plaintiffs’ Request for Emergency Hearing should be rejected out of hand because there is
not an emergency. If there was something emergent affecting Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs would not
currently be opposing Cyberlux’s request for hearing before a Virginia court. In fact, that Virginia
court offered the parties seven different dates on which an emergency motion could be heard,
including:
Tuesday, Feb. 4,
4 Confusingly, Berleth—who is supposed to be a court-appointed neutral—has already submitted a request on behalf of Atlantic
Wave urging his appointment through a written order.
5 A copy of the e-mail correspondence is attached as Exhibit B. Copies of the documents attached to the e-mail correspondence are
attached as Exhibits C-F.
The undersigned and Deputy Constable Montgomery of the Harris County Constable’s office have exchanged telephone calls but
have not spoken directly.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Defendants reject the allegation they interfered with execution, arguing informing the constable about anticipated receivership was proper a
Defendants reject the allegation they interfered with execution, arguing informing the constable about anticipated receivership was proper and duplicate seizure unnecessary. This is their legal and factual position, not an entered instruction staying a writ or a finding of no interference.
Read the anchor · page 5
- 5 -
Simply put, Atlantic Wave is on the one hand obstructing Cyberlux’s efforts to get a
hearing in Virginia, the proper venue set forth in the Settlement Agreement (and which this Court
has repeatedly expressed interest in gaining an understanding of the Virginia courts’ position on
the parties dispute) while, on the other hand, telling this Court that the sky is falling because no
progress is being made in Virginia. Atlantic Wave should not be permitted to continue its efforts
to dupe this Court as to why and how the delays in Virginia have occurred. Plaintiffs’ request for
emergency hearing should not be entertained unless the Court will also address Cyberlux’s Motion
to Stay or Set Bond for the receiver.
2. Plaintiffs’ conduct, not Cyberlux’s conduct, obviated the need for the Harris County
Constable to execute the writ.
Plaintiffs argue Cyberlux’s communications to the Harris County Constable have
“interfered with service” and that Cyberlux has been “making representations about Judgment
Creditor’s authority to act on a writ of execution.” That is nonsense. Not only does nothing in the
undersigned’s correspondence to the Harris County Constable not give such directive, but also it
defies logic to have a constable executing a writ to locate and seize the same exact property that
the Court indicated the receiver would be appointed to locate and over which to take custody.
It is especially difficult to understand Atlantic Wave’s suggestion that Cyberlux has given
the Harris County Constable’s office the excerpt of the 4-hour hearing’s transcript in which the
Court expressly stated it would appoint a receiver in this case. In any event, if the Harris County
Constable’s office disagrees with the Court’s directive, the Harris County Constable is free to seek
this Court’s guidance on the matter.
Atlantic Wave could—and perhaps should—have sought a writ of execution earlier. They
did not. When Atlantic Wave finally decided to seek a writ of execution, it almost immediately
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The prayer seeks an emergency hearing, stay of the proposed appointment/turnover order or suspension upon $100,000 security, and suspension
The prayer seeks an emergency hearing, stay of the proposed appointment/turnover order or suspension upon $100,000 security, and suspension until a receiver bond payable to defendants is fixed and plaintiffs ordered to post it. A footnote says the proposed receiver offered such a bond; no actual posting, bond instrument or order granting relief appears.
Read the anchor · page 6
- 6 -
changed its mind, filing its Application and seeking a receiver instead. This Court has indicated it
would appoint a receiver (giving Atlantic Wave exactly what it asked for), and the parties have
submitted competing orders for the Court’s consideration. There is no basis for Atlantic Wave to
say that Cyberlux has interfered with its collection efforts by informing the Harris County
Constable about the receiver, so this Court should reject Atlantic Wave’s request unless Atlantic
Wave no longer wishes to proceed with the appointment of the receiver.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants respectfully request the Court
hold an emergency hearing on Defendants’ Emergency Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative,
Motion to Set Amount of Security to Suspend, Turnover and Appointment of Receiver, and Motion
Set Bond for Receiver; issue a stay of the Court’s Proposed Order granting turnover and appointing
receiver, or alternatively, suspend said Proposed Order upon payment of a security bond in the
amount of $100,000.00; 13 and suspend the Proposed Order until the Court determines the
appropriate amount of the potential receiver’s bond payable to Defendants and orders that
Plaintiffs file such bond. Defendants further request any such relief at law or in equity to which
Defendants are entitled.
13 The proposed receiver has offered to post such a bond.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Counsel certifies February 7 electronic service. The automated certificate lists envelope 97103416, Frankie Huff filing for Katherine Clark,
Counsel certifies February 7 electronic service. The automated certificate lists envelope 97103416, Frankie Huff filing for Katherine Clark, twenty-one rows with SENT status at 9:29:07 AM and status report at 3:22 PM CST. Duplicated Grady and Martin rows are not distinct confirmations or proof of reading.
Read the anchor · page 8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on February 7, 2025, I had this document served on all counsel of record via
electronic service.
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Alexander James Pennetti
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
entityobservation
Alexander J. Pennetti
Read the anchor · page 7
- 7 -
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Dated: February 7, 2025
Katharine Battaia Clark
State Bar No. 24046712
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
kclark@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
inferenceinference
The response uses the anticipated receivership to answer the constable-interference allegation while simultaneously disputing the proposed o
The response uses the anticipated receivership to answer the constable-interference allegation while simultaneously disputing the proposed order’s scope and requesting security. The operative authority and actual instructions to the constable must be tested against the full hearing and communications.
omissiongap
Referenced Exhibits A–F, including scheduling exchanges, constable correspondence, oath, transcript excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations, are
Referenced Exhibits A–F, including scheduling exchanges, constable correspondence, oath, transcript excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations, are not embedded in the nine-page response and service packet.
Read the anchor · page 3
- 3 -
an agreed order or two competing orders. On January 17, 2025, Robert Berleth filed an Oath of
Receiver even though the Court had not yet signed its order appointing a receiver.4
The parties could not agree and submitted their competing orders, Atlantic Wave
submitting to the Court on January 20, 2025 before Cyberlux could even provide its input.
Cyberlux submitted its competing order on January 21, 2025.
On January 24, 2025, the Harris County Constable’s office contacted the undersigned. On
February 3, 2025, the undersigned responded to the Harris County Constable’s office and provided
(1) a copy of the Oath of Receiver filed by Mr. Berleth; (2) an excerpt of the January 16, 2025
hearing transcript highlighting the Court’s indication that a receiver would be appointed; (3) the
Declaration of Charles Watts; and (4) the Declaration of United States Air Force Major General
(ret.) Cameron G. Holt. 5 On February 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Request for Emergency
Hearing.
ARGUMENT
1. Despite demanding an emergency hearing in Texas, Atlantic Wave is currently telling
the Virginia Court it is “not available” for an emergency hearing.
Plaintiffs’ Request for Emergency Hearing should be rejected out of hand because there is
not an emergency. If there was something emergent affecting Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs would not
currently be opposing Cyberlux’s request for hearing before a Virginia court. In fact, that Virginia
court offered the parties seven different dates on which an emergency motion could be heard,
including:
Tuesday, Feb. 4,
4 Confusingly, Berleth—who is supposed to be a court-appointed neutral—has already submitted a request on behalf of Atlantic
Wave urging his appointment through a written order.
5 A copy of the e-mail correspondence is attached as Exhibit B. Copies of the documents attached to the e-mail correspondence are
attached as Exhibits C-F.
The undersigned and Deputy Constable Montgomery of the Harris County Constable’s office have exchanged telephone calls but
have not spoken directly.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
otherattribution
Complete supplied 9-page source reviewed at SHA-256 101d35f7b8de904db7ca4bf6513aa473658645be5da006a9836231f7255e5aef. Source assertions, ori
Complete supplied 9-page source reviewed at SHA-256 101d35f7b8de904db7ca4bf6513aa473658645be5da006a9836231f7255e5aef. Source assertions, original visual features, filing/communication context and identified missing attachments are retained. Full nine-page reading of version_a81062e187fa4a3eb1affa2731ea2f4b, SHA256 101d35f7b8de904db7ca4bf6513aa473658645be5da006a9836231f7255e5aef; signature and service table visually checked; source bytes and extraction retained.
Read the anchor · page 1
- 1 -
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FEBRUARY 5, 2025
REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING
Atlantic Wave’s1 Request for Emergency Hearing uses snippets of correspondence to try
and create an issue that does not exist.
Notably, despite demanding an emergency hearing in Texas, Plaintiffs are currently
opposing the setting of a hearing on an emergent nature brought by Cyberlux, in Virginia. 2 This
illustrates Plaintiffs’ request to this Court is nothing more than an effort to coerce the Court to
forego reviewing the parties’ competing orders, refuse Cyberlux’s request for hearing on
Cyberlux’s pending Emergency Motion to Stay, or in the Alternative, Motion to Set Amount of
Security to Suspend, Turnover and Appointment of Receiver, and Motion Set Bond for Receiver
(“Motion to Stay or Set Bond”), and enter Plaintiffs’ overbroad order appointing a receiver.
Atlantic Wave’s efforts to obfuscate this matter at every turn should not be entertained, and
Plaintiffs request for emergency hearing should be refused.
1 “Atlantic Wave” refers to Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC.
2 See Exhibit A (e-mail correspondence between counsel for Cyberlux and counsel for Atlantic Wave).
2/7/2025 9:29 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 97103416
By: Maegan McGuire
Filed: 2/7/2025 9:29 AM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
questionquestion
What did the constable actually receive and do, and what authority or stay existed at that time?
questionquestion
Do the complete Virginia scheduling exchanges establish unjustified delay, or different notice and evidentiary requirements for the two hear
Do the complete Virginia scheduling exchanges establish unjustified delay, or different notice and evidentiary requirements for the two hearings?
questionquestion
What execution requests explain the asserted January 2 date, and do the underlying docket and writ establish the sequence?
distillateobservation
CONNECT
Reviewed relationships
The canvas follows the database: source to DISTIL record, DISTIL record to knowledge object, then reviewed relationship. Position alone means nothing.
The objections list competing amounts: $1,572,500 at July 30 enforcement, $1,760,363.69 in a December 2 execution request, and $1,430,551.30 in the January 9 application as of December 31. These are counsel’s descriptions of different records and dates, not one reconciled balance.qualifiesThe response says plaintiffs waited until January 2, 2025 to request execution, filed for turnover/receiver January 9 before issuance, and that court records show writ issuance January 15. These dates are counsel’s account; the actual requests and writ are absent.
This later filing identifies a December 2 writ request, while February response says January 2; separate or renewed requests may explain the difference, so underlying docket required.
The response says plaintiffs waited until January 2, 2025 to request execution, filed for turnover/receiver January 9 before issuance, and that court records show writ issuance January 15. These dates are counsel’s account; the actual requests and writ are absent.supportsWhat execution requests explain the asserted January 2 date, and do the underlying docket and writ establish the sequence?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants describe Virginia scheduling from January 29 through February 4, seven dates offered (February 4, 5 and 10–14), objections over notice and evidentiary scope, and claimed lack of opposing availability. They infer obstruction and inconsistency with plaintiffs’ Texas emergency request. The two hearings concern potentially different issues; correspondence Exhibit A is absent and scheduling alone does not prove motive.supportsDo the complete Virginia scheduling exchanges establish unjustified delay, or different notice and evidentiary requirements for the two hearings?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The prayer seeks an emergency hearing, stay of the proposed appointment/turnover order or suspension upon $100,000 security, and suspension until a receiver bond payable to defendants is fixed and plaintiffs ordered to post it. A footnote says the proposed receiver offered such a bond; no actual posting, bond instrument or order granting relief appears.supportsDid this response stay execution or establish a $100,000 bond?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Counsel says the constable contacted them January 24 and they supplied the oath, hearing excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations February 3. The footnote says counsel and Deputy Montgomery exchanged calls but had not spoken directly. Exhibits B–F said to contain correspondence and attachments are not embedded.supportsReferenced Exhibits A–F, including scheduling exchanges, constable correspondence, oath, transcript excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations, are not embedded in the nine-page response and service packet.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants describe Virginia scheduling from January 29 through February 4, seven dates offered (February 4, 5 and 10–14), objections over notice and evidentiary scope, and claimed lack of opposing availability. They infer obstruction and inconsistency with plaintiffs’ Texas emergency request. The two hearings concern potentially different issues; correspondence Exhibit A is absent and scheduling alone does not prove motive.supportsReferenced Exhibits A–F, including scheduling exchanges, constable correspondence, oath, transcript excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations, are not embedded in the nine-page response and service packet.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants reject the allegation they interfered with execution, arguing informing the constable about anticipated receivership was proper and duplicate seizure unnecessary. This is their legal and factual position, not an entered instruction staying a writ or a finding of no interference.supportsThe response uses the anticipated receivership to answer the constable-interference allegation while simultaneously disputing the proposed order’s scope and requesting security. The operative authority and actual instructions to the constable must be tested against the full hearing and communications.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants reject the allegation they interfered with execution, arguing informing the constable about anticipated receivership was proper and duplicate seizure unnecessary. This is their legal and factual position, not an entered instruction staying a writ or a finding of no interference.supportsDid this response stay execution or establish a $100,000 bond?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants reject the allegation they interfered with execution, arguing informing the constable about anticipated receivership was proper and duplicate seizure unnecessary. This is their legal and factual position, not an entered instruction staying a writ or a finding of no interference.supportsWhat did the constable actually receive and do, and what authority or stay existed at that time?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
It describes a January 16 hearing at which the court indicated it would appoint a receiver, unresolved order scope, Berleth’s January 17 oath before a signed appointment, plaintiffs’ January 20 proposed order and defendants’ January 21 competing order. The timing does not itself establish either the legal effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an oral appointment.supportsThe response uses the anticipated receivership to answer the constable-interference allegation while simultaneously disputing the proposed order’s scope and requesting security. The operative authority and actual instructions to the constable must be tested against the full hearing and communications.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Counsel says the constable contacted them January 24 and they supplied the oath, hearing excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations February 3. The footnote says counsel and Deputy Montgomery exchanged calls but had not spoken directly. Exhibits B–F said to contain correspondence and attachments are not embedded.supportsWhat did the constable actually receive and do, and what authority or stay existed at that time?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The prayer seeks an emergency hearing, stay of the proposed appointment/turnover order or suspension upon $100,000 security, and suspension until a receiver bond payable to defendants is fixed and plaintiffs ordered to post it. A footnote says the proposed receiver offered such a bond; no actual posting, bond instrument or order granting relief appears.supportsThe response uses the anticipated receivership to answer the constable-interference allegation while simultaneously disputing the proposed order’s scope and requesting security. The operative authority and actual instructions to the constable must be tested against the full hearing and communications.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
It describes a January 16 hearing at which the court indicated it would appoint a receiver, unresolved order scope, Berleth’s January 17 oath before a signed appointment, plaintiffs’ January 20 proposed order and defendants’ January 21 competing order. The timing does not itself establish either the legal effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an oral appointment.supportsWhat did the constable actually receive and do, and what authority or stay existed at that time?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Counsel says the constable contacted them January 24 and they supplied the oath, hearing excerpt and Watts/Holt declarations February 3. The footnote says counsel and Deputy Montgomery exchanged calls but had not spoken directly. Exhibits B–F said to contain correspondence and attachments are not embedded.supportsThe response uses the anticipated receivership to answer the constable-interference allegation while simultaneously disputing the proposed order’s scope and requesting security. The operative authority and actual instructions to the constable must be tested against the full hearing and communications.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
WEIGH
Explained weighting
A score appears only when its components and change threshold are published.
No published WEIGH run
The active Website Edition contains no applied score snapshot for this source or its connected objects. That means not assessed—not zero.