Each card carries the governed distillate name from the database. Open the quoted anchor before relying on the interpretation.
quotationattribution
Defence expressly treats receiver acquisition of3083639.75dollars around11June2025 as undisputed.
Read the anchor · page 10
9
reasonableness of the requesting party’s fees); Mora v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.,
No. 2:08-CV-100, 2011 WL 13286042, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2011) (comparing other
federal circuits to the Fifth Circuit and finding that the “costs incurred by defense counsel,
which may include trips to meet with clients and other expenses particular to the posture
of the defense attorneys and their clients, has no relevance to the reasonableness of the
costs incurred by plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Harkless v. Sweeny I.S.D., 608
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Distribution of Funds should be denied and/or abated until
Plaintiffs produce evidence to support their demand for attorneys’ fees. 8 Defendants’
request that the Court provide Plaintiffs a deadline to produce such evidence, including all
billing statements upon which Plaintiffs rely, and if evidence is not produced by that
deadline, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
There is no good-faith basis for Plaintiffs’ refusal to mediate, and Plaintiffs cannot
recover any attorneys’ fees or costs without providing actual evidence to both the Court
and Defendants. The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Distribution and
compel Plaintiffs to mediate on or before February 13, 2026, in accordance with the Court’s
December 8, 2025 bench ruling.
The Court should also require Plaintiffs to produce, at least 48 hours prior to
mediation, unredacted documentary evidence that supports the attorneys’ fees they seek to
8 There is no dispute that the Receiver obtained $3,083,639.75 on or about June 11, 2025.
Plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees incurred after that date. See Thomas v. Thomas ,
917 S.W.2d 425, 438 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Plaintiffs may only recover
attorneys’ fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief. Feldman, 586 S.W.3d at 596.
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observationobservation
HarrisCounty2024-48085 response22January2026; requested fees857734.19 and asserted prior Texas fees173763.59.
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EXHIBIT 15
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2820
EDVA175-17 filed15April2026 reproduces HarrisCounty2024-48085 defendants response filed22January2026 at10:39AM. AlexanderJ.Pennetti signs /s/ for Cyberlux and Schmidt and certifies22January service; eleven-page response follows exhibit cover.
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EXHIBIT 15
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2820
claimallegation
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and cross-examination rights, and turnover-only recovery under section31.002. They contend their own lawyers billing cannot substitute for plaintiffs proof. These are litigated positions, not findings.
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1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiffs/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, AND
MOTION TO ABATE
Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC’s Second
Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds (“Motion”) should be denied because (1)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s order to mediate the issue of attorneys’ fees,
which is the only issue set out in their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds;
and (2) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to support the $857,734.19 attorneys’
fees and costs1 they seek to recover.
Plaintiffs cannot recover any of their attorneys’ fees without documentary evidence
of those fees, which Plaintiffs have not provided to either Defendants or this Court. Even
if Plaintiffs adduce documentation to support their fee demand, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 31.002(e) limits Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees to the attorneys’
fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief , and under no circumstance may Plaintiffs
1 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this figure is a gross overstatement of the fees Plaintiffs’
actually incurred in this matter. Plaintiffs informed the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, only a few weeks ago that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59.
1/22/2026 10:39 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 110345798
By: Alyssa Henderson
Filed: 1/22/2026 10:39 AM
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claimallegation
Defence says8December2025 bench ruling ordered parties and receiver to mediate by15January2026. It recounts unanswered23/30December and6Janu
Defence says8December2025 bench ruling ordered parties and receiver to mediate by15January2026. It recounts unanswered23/30December and6January inquiries,9January receiver refusal pending counsel withdrawal, earliest withdrawal hearing2March2026, and continued counsel status until withdrawal granted. It alleges7January demand for12January mediation conflicted with mediator availability beginning21January. Referenced correspondence, declaration and orders are absent.
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2
recover their attorneys’ fees for other Texas matters or matters pending in other
jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
On December 8, 2025, this Court ordered the Parties and Receiver Robert W.
Berleth to conduct mediation of the remaining issues in this matter no later than January
15, 2026, which includes the amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees, if any,
that Plaintiffs may recover under § 31.002.
On December 23, 2025, Defendants’ counsel contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel and
counsel for the Receiver regarding their availability for mediation. Plaintiffs’ counsel and
Receiver’s counsel did not respond. Exhibit B.2
On December 30, 2025, Defendants’ counsel followed up with Plaintiffs’ counsel
and Receiver’s counsel regarding their availability for mediation. Plaintiffs’ counsel and
Receiver’s counsel did not respond. Id.
On January 6, 2026, Defendants’ counsel followed up with Plaintiffs’ counsel and
Receiver’s counsel regarding their availability for mediation. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not
respond. Receiver’s counsel responded and asked to schedule a call to discuss Defendants’
counsel’s motions to withdraw, filed on January 5, 2026. Id.
Defendants’ counsel and Receiver’s counsel held a teleconference on January 9,
2026. See Exhibit A. During that call, Receiver’s counsel indicated he and Receiver would
not participate in mediation until Thompson Coburn LLP’s Motion to Withdraw was
decided. Id. Defendants’ counsel responded that: (1) compliance with the Court’s
mediation order was mandatory; (2) the motions to withdraw had no bearing on the Court’s
2 The Declaration of Alexander J. Pennetti is attached as Exhibit A.
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claimallegation
Defence describes unsuccessful twelve-hour5December2025 mediation, receiver complaint of exclusion, later agreement to RussellLloyd as media
Defence describes unsuccessful twelve-hour5December2025 mediation, receiver complaint of exclusion, later agreement to RussellLloyd as mediator and plaintiffs proposal for a settlement conference. It rejects that conference as inadequate and accuses plaintiffs and receiver of noncompliance. This does not independently establish who caused failure or what an operative order required.
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3
mediation order; (3) Thompson Coburn LLP remained counsel of record for Defendants
until the Court grants the firm’s request to withdraw; and (5) the Court’s earliest
availability provided to Defendants’ counsel to hear the motion to withdraw was March 2,
2026. Id.
Although the Parties and Receiver have agreed that Hon. Russell Lloyd is a suitable
mediator for this matter, neither Plaintiffs nor the Receiver have provided their availability
for mediation for any of the dates provided by Judge Lloyd’s case manager. Id.
ARGUMENT
A. The Motion should be denied because Plaintiffs have refused to schedule the
court-ordered mediation of the issues identified in the Motion.
At the hearing on December 8, 2025, the Receiver indicated he did not wish to
proceed on his own motion to supplement his powers. Receiver’s counsel asserted that the
Receiver had improperly been denied the opportunity to attend the Parties’ mediation that
was limited by the Court of Appeals to only the parties and that mediation occurred on
December 5, 2025.3
The Parties discussed this issue with the Court, and Plaintiffs and Defendants
indicated they were not opposed to conducting a second mediation. Based on that
discussion, the Court ordered the Parties and the Receiver to mediate all outstanding issues
in this matter—including the issues of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees—on or before January 15,
2026.
3 Plaintiffs and Defendants participated in mediation on that date for 12 hours, but the
parties did not reach a settlement.
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claimallegation
Defence contrasts an initial806400.96dollar distribution request with current857734.19, and alleges prior versions falsely described a fee s
Defence contrasts an initial806400.96dollar distribution request with current857734.19, and alleges prior versions falsely described a fee stipulation or receiver reasonableness finding. It says an October2025 Fairfax chart put Texas fees at173763.59 and all Texas/California/Virginia fees at749014.03, including underlying fees/sanctions. Original chart and prior motions are not attached.
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5
In short, neither Plaintiffs nor the Receiver has complied with this Court’s prior
order that the Parties and the Receiver mediate the remaining issues in this matter, and it
appears that they are unwilling to do so.
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied because Plaintiffs –without any
evidentiary support --grossly misrepresented the total amount of fees incurred
in Texas.
Eight days after this Court issued its order to mediate from the bench after all
Parties and the Receiver agreed to mediate all remaining issues (including the issue of
whether—and how much—attorneys’ fees Plaintiffs may recover), Plaintiffs filed their
Motion for Distribution of Funds. The original Motion for Distribution of Funds asked this
Court to distribute $806,400.96 to Plaintiffs, a figure Plaintiffs said represented their
“reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost [sic] in this Texas enforcement proceeding and the
other related proceedings in Texas.” 5 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Distribution of Funds, at 2.
Plaintiffs twice amended their Motion for Distribution to correct glaring
misrepresentations.6 Their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds now claims
that Plaintiffs “are owed at least $857,734.19 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and cost [sic] in
this Texas enforcement proceeding and the other related proceedings in Texas.” Second
Am. Mot., at 2.
All three of Plaintiffs’ motions for distribution of funds omit that, in October 2025,
Plaintiffs told the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, that their Texas attorneys’ fees
this is not a suitable alternative because the Parties have been engaged in ongoing,
settlement discussions, all of which have been unsuccessful.
5 Section 31.002 does not allow Plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees from “other”
proceedings. See Defs’ Response to Amended Motion for Expedited Hearing, at 4-6.
6 Plaintiffs’ Original Motion for Distribution of Funds falsely claimed that Defendants had
stipulated to the fees and costs sought. The Amended Motion for Distribution falsely
asserted that the Receiver had found the fees sought were reasonable.
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claimallegation
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received full payment and are judicially estopped from asserting a larger Texas entitlement. Quoted order and chart are missing; payment and preclusion scope cannot be resolved from this response alone.
Read the anchor · page 7
6
totaled only $173,763.59. Exhibit C. Indeed, at a hearing on a motion for disbursement of
funds in Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC v. Cyberlux
Corporation, Case No. CL-2025-3413, Plaintiffs attempted to recover $749,014.03, which
Plaintiffs claimed represented the total amount of fees and costs incurred by all their
attorneys in Texas, California, and Virginia (including fee and sanctions award from the
underlying judgment). Exhibit C is a chart that Plaintiffs submitted, in which Plaintiffs
identified that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59. See id . After hearing
arguments of counsel and receiving that chart, 7 the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia entered its Final Order. The Final Order reflects numerous findings, including
that the Plaintiffs’ total claim was $1,140,004.66, and the total claim included Plaintiffs’
“reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs . . . proven to be $187,399.95.”
Defendants’ Amended Response to Receiver’s Motion to Supplement, at 6.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits Plaintiffs from abandoning their
representations to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County and taking a clearly inconsistent
position before this Court. Reed v. City of Arlington , 650 F.3d 571, 576 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 121 (S.Ct. 1808); Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara , 364 F.3d 274, 294 (5th Cir.
2004) (applying judicial estoppel where positions taken in litigation are “clearly
inconsistent”).
7 Plaintiffs’ counsel has repeatedly suggested that additional information was adduced at
the October hearing held in Fairfax County, Virginia. Despite several requests, Plaintiffs
have not produced any of that information or other documentation to support their demand
for attorneys’ fees.
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claimallegation
Footnote8 expressly says there is no dispute that receiver obtained3083639.75dollars on or about11June2025. Defence uses that receipt date t
Footnote8 expressly says there is no dispute that receiver obtained3083639.75dollars on or about11June2025. Defence uses that receipt date to argue against later turnover fees; the conceded receipt does not concede fee entitlement or continuing custody.
Read the anchor · page 10
9
reasonableness of the requesting party’s fees); Mora v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.,
No. 2:08-CV-100, 2011 WL 13286042, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2011) (comparing other
federal circuits to the Fifth Circuit and finding that the “costs incurred by defense counsel,
which may include trips to meet with clients and other expenses particular to the posture
of the defense attorneys and their clients, has no relevance to the reasonableness of the
costs incurred by plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Harkless v. Sweeny I.S.D., 608
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Distribution of Funds should be denied and/or abated until
Plaintiffs produce evidence to support their demand for attorneys’ fees. 8 Defendants’
request that the Court provide Plaintiffs a deadline to produce such evidence, including all
billing statements upon which Plaintiffs rely, and if evidence is not produced by that
deadline, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
There is no good-faith basis for Plaintiffs’ refusal to mediate, and Plaintiffs cannot
recover any attorneys’ fees or costs without providing actual evidence to both the Court
and Defendants. The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Distribution and
compel Plaintiffs to mediate on or before February 13, 2026, in accordance with the Court’s
December 8, 2025 bench ruling.
The Court should also require Plaintiffs to produce, at least 48 hours prior to
mediation, unredacted documentary evidence that supports the attorneys’ fees they seek to
8 There is no dispute that the Receiver obtained $3,083,639.75 on or about June 11, 2025.
Plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees incurred after that date. See Thomas v. Thomas ,
917 S.W.2d 425, 438 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Plaintiffs may only recover
attorneys’ fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief. Feldman, 586 S.W.3d at 596.
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claimallegation
Defence requests denial or abatement pending fee proof, mediation by13February2026, unredacted supporting evidence at least48hours beforehan
Defence requests denial or abatement pending fee proof, mediation by13February2026, unredacted supporting evidence at least48hours beforehand, and receiver fee evidence. It seeks to bar fees after11June2025, outside turnover work or above173763.59; alternatively requests registry deposit, receiver discharge and termination. These remain requests, not orders or performed acts.
Read the anchor · page 10
9
reasonableness of the requesting party’s fees); Mora v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.,
No. 2:08-CV-100, 2011 WL 13286042, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2011) (comparing other
federal circuits to the Fifth Circuit and finding that the “costs incurred by defense counsel,
which may include trips to meet with clients and other expenses particular to the posture
of the defense attorneys and their clients, has no relevance to the reasonableness of the
costs incurred by plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Harkless v. Sweeny I.S.D., 608
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Distribution of Funds should be denied and/or abated until
Plaintiffs produce evidence to support their demand for attorneys’ fees. 8 Defendants’
request that the Court provide Plaintiffs a deadline to produce such evidence, including all
billing statements upon which Plaintiffs rely, and if evidence is not produced by that
deadline, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
There is no good-faith basis for Plaintiffs’ refusal to mediate, and Plaintiffs cannot
recover any attorneys’ fees or costs without providing actual evidence to both the Court
and Defendants. The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Distribution and
compel Plaintiffs to mediate on or before February 13, 2026, in accordance with the Court’s
December 8, 2025 bench ruling.
The Court should also require Plaintiffs to produce, at least 48 hours prior to
mediation, unredacted documentary evidence that supports the attorneys’ fees they seek to
8 There is no dispute that the Receiver obtained $3,083,639.75 on or about June 11, 2025.
Plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees incurred after that date. See Thomas v. Thomas ,
917 S.W.2d 425, 438 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Plaintiffs may only recover
attorneys’ fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief. Feldman, 586 S.W.3d at 596.
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entityobservation
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC
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1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiffs/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, AND
MOTION TO ABATE
Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC’s Second
Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds (“Motion”) should be denied because (1)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s order to mediate the issue of attorneys’ fees,
which is the only issue set out in their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds;
and (2) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to support the $857,734.19 attorneys’
fees and costs1 they seek to recover.
Plaintiffs cannot recover any of their attorneys’ fees without documentary evidence
of those fees, which Plaintiffs have not provided to either Defendants or this Court. Even
if Plaintiffs adduce documentation to support their fee demand, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 31.002(e) limits Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees to the attorneys’
fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief , and under no circumstance may Plaintiffs
1 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this figure is a gross overstatement of the fees Plaintiffs’
actually incurred in this matter. Plaintiffs informed the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, only a few weeks ago that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59.
1/22/2026 10:39 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 110345798
By: Alyssa Henderson
Filed: 1/22/2026 10:39 AM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
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entityobservation
SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC
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1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiffs/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, AND
MOTION TO ABATE
Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC’s Second
Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds (“Motion”) should be denied because (1)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s order to mediate the issue of attorneys’ fees,
which is the only issue set out in their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds;
and (2) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to support the $857,734.19 attorneys’
fees and costs1 they seek to recover.
Plaintiffs cannot recover any of their attorneys’ fees without documentary evidence
of those fees, which Plaintiffs have not provided to either Defendants or this Court. Even
if Plaintiffs adduce documentation to support their fee demand, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 31.002(e) limits Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees to the attorneys’
fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief , and under no circumstance may Plaintiffs
1 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this figure is a gross overstatement of the fees Plaintiffs’
actually incurred in this matter. Plaintiffs informed the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, only a few weeks ago that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59.
1/22/2026 10:39 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 110345798
By: Alyssa Henderson
Filed: 1/22/2026 10:39 AM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
Case 3:25-cv-00483-JAG Document 175-17 Filed 04/15/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID#
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entityobservation
CYBERLUX CORPORATION
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1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiffs/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, AND
MOTION TO ABATE
Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC’s Second
Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds (“Motion”) should be denied because (1)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s order to mediate the issue of attorneys’ fees,
which is the only issue set out in their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds;
and (2) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to support the $857,734.19 attorneys’
fees and costs1 they seek to recover.
Plaintiffs cannot recover any of their attorneys’ fees without documentary evidence
of those fees, which Plaintiffs have not provided to either Defendants or this Court. Even
if Plaintiffs adduce documentation to support their fee demand, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 31.002(e) limits Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees to the attorneys’
fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief , and under no circumstance may Plaintiffs
1 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this figure is a gross overstatement of the fees Plaintiffs’
actually incurred in this matter. Plaintiffs informed the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, only a few weeks ago that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59.
1/22/2026 10:39 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 110345798
By: Alyssa Henderson
Filed: 1/22/2026 10:39 AM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
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entityobservation
MARK D. SCHMIDT
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1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiffs/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, AND
MOTION TO ABATE
Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC’s Second
Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds (“Motion”) should be denied because (1)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s order to mediate the issue of attorneys’ fees,
which is the only issue set out in their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds;
and (2) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to support the $857,734.19 attorneys’
fees and costs1 they seek to recover.
Plaintiffs cannot recover any of their attorneys’ fees without documentary evidence
of those fees, which Plaintiffs have not provided to either Defendants or this Court. Even
if Plaintiffs adduce documentation to support their fee demand, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 31.002(e) limits Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees to the attorneys’
fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief , and under no circumstance may Plaintiffs
1 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this figure is a gross overstatement of the fees Plaintiffs’
actually incurred in this matter. Plaintiffs informed the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, only a few weeks ago that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59.
1/22/2026 10:39 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 110345798
By: Alyssa Henderson
Filed: 1/22/2026 10:39 AM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
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2821
entityobservation
Alexander J. Pennetti
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10
recover. The Court should separately require the Receiver to adduce, prior to mediation,
evidence of the fees and expenses he alleges were incurred for this appointment.
If Plaintiffs fail to comply with the Court’s order, the Court should bar Plaintiffs
from recovering any fees and costs. In any event, the Court should bar Plaintiffs from
recovering any fees incurred after June 11, 2025; any fees that were not incurred in the
pursuit of turnover relief; and any fees exceeding a total of $173,763.59.
Alternatively, the Court should abate any hearing on the Second Amended Motion
for Distribution of Funds until after the Parties and the Receiver conduct mediation. In the
interim, because the only issues remaining concern recoverable fees, the Court should order
the Receiver to deposit all funds into the Court’s registry. The Court also should discharge
the Receiver and terminate the receivership. Defendants respectfully ask that the Court
grant Defendants the relief requested above and all other relief to which they are entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Elizabeth G. Myers
State Bar No. 24047767
Douglas S. Lang
State Bar No. 11895500
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
emyers@thompsoncoburn.com
dlang@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
Attorneys for Defendants Cyberlux
Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt
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entityobservation
Elizabeth G. Myers
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10
recover. The Court should separately require the Receiver to adduce, prior to mediation,
evidence of the fees and expenses he alleges were incurred for this appointment.
If Plaintiffs fail to comply with the Court’s order, the Court should bar Plaintiffs
from recovering any fees and costs. In any event, the Court should bar Plaintiffs from
recovering any fees incurred after June 11, 2025; any fees that were not incurred in the
pursuit of turnover relief; and any fees exceeding a total of $173,763.59.
Alternatively, the Court should abate any hearing on the Second Amended Motion
for Distribution of Funds until after the Parties and the Receiver conduct mediation. In the
interim, because the only issues remaining concern recoverable fees, the Court should order
the Receiver to deposit all funds into the Court’s registry. The Court also should discharge
the Receiver and terminate the receivership. Defendants respectfully ask that the Court
grant Defendants the relief requested above and all other relief to which they are entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Elizabeth G. Myers
State Bar No. 24047767
Douglas S. Lang
State Bar No. 11895500
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
emyers@thompsoncoburn.com
dlang@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
Attorneys for Defendants Cyberlux
Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt
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Douglas S. Lang
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recover. The Court should separately require the Receiver to adduce, prior to mediation,
evidence of the fees and expenses he alleges were incurred for this appointment.
If Plaintiffs fail to comply with the Court’s order, the Court should bar Plaintiffs
from recovering any fees and costs. In any event, the Court should bar Plaintiffs from
recovering any fees incurred after June 11, 2025; any fees that were not incurred in the
pursuit of turnover relief; and any fees exceeding a total of $173,763.59.
Alternatively, the Court should abate any hearing on the Second Amended Motion
for Distribution of Funds until after the Parties and the Receiver conduct mediation. In the
interim, because the only issues remaining concern recoverable fees, the Court should order
the Receiver to deposit all funds into the Court’s registry. The Court also should discharge
the Receiver and terminate the receivership. Defendants respectfully ask that the Court
grant Defendants the relief requested above and all other relief to which they are entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Elizabeth G. Myers
State Bar No. 24047767
Douglas S. Lang
State Bar No. 11895500
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
emyers@thompsoncoburn.com
dlang@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
Attorneys for Defendants Cyberlux
Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
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entityobservation
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
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recover. The Court should separately require the Receiver to adduce, prior to mediation,
evidence of the fees and expenses he alleges were incurred for this appointment.
If Plaintiffs fail to comply with the Court’s order, the Court should bar Plaintiffs
from recovering any fees and costs. In any event, the Court should bar Plaintiffs from
recovering any fees incurred after June 11, 2025; any fees that were not incurred in the
pursuit of turnover relief; and any fees exceeding a total of $173,763.59.
Alternatively, the Court should abate any hearing on the Second Amended Motion
for Distribution of Funds until after the Parties and the Receiver conduct mediation. In the
interim, because the only issues remaining concern recoverable fees, the Court should order
the Receiver to deposit all funds into the Court’s registry. The Court also should discharge
the Receiver and terminate the receivership. Defendants respectfully ask that the Court
grant Defendants the relief requested above and all other relief to which they are entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Elizabeth G. Myers
State Bar No. 24047767
Douglas S. Lang
State Bar No. 11895500
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
emyers@thompsoncoburn.com
dlang@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
Attorneys for Defendants Cyberlux
Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
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entityobservation
Russell Lloyd
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mediation order; (3) Thompson Coburn LLP remained counsel of record for Defendants
until the Court grants the firm’s request to withdraw; and (5) the Court’s earliest
availability provided to Defendants’ counsel to hear the motion to withdraw was March 2,
2026. Id.
Although the Parties and Receiver have agreed that Hon. Russell Lloyd is a suitable
mediator for this matter, neither Plaintiffs nor the Receiver have provided their availability
for mediation for any of the dates provided by Judge Lloyd’s case manager. Id.
ARGUMENT
A. The Motion should be denied because Plaintiffs have refused to schedule the
court-ordered mediation of the issues identified in the Motion.
At the hearing on December 8, 2025, the Receiver indicated he did not wish to
proceed on his own motion to supplement his powers. Receiver’s counsel asserted that the
Receiver had improperly been denied the opportunity to attend the Parties’ mediation that
was limited by the Court of Appeals to only the parties and that mediation occurred on
December 5, 2025.3
The Parties discussed this issue with the Court, and Plaintiffs and Defendants
indicated they were not opposed to conducting a second mediation. Based on that
discussion, the Court ordered the Parties and the Receiver to mediate all outstanding issues
in this matter—including the issues of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees—on or before January 15,
2026.
3 Plaintiffs and Defendants participated in mediation on that date for 12 hours, but the
parties did not reach a settlement.
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eventattribution
Texas filing stamp10:39AM and same-date service certificate.
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CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiffs/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’
SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS, AND
MOTION TO ABATE
Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC’s Second
Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds (“Motion”) should be denied because (1)
Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s order to mediate the issue of attorneys’ fees,
which is the only issue set out in their Second Amended Motion for Distribution of Funds;
and (2) Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to support the $857,734.19 attorneys’
fees and costs1 they seek to recover.
Plaintiffs cannot recover any of their attorneys’ fees without documentary evidence
of those fees, which Plaintiffs have not provided to either Defendants or this Court. Even
if Plaintiffs adduce documentation to support their fee demand, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 31.002(e) limits Plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees to the attorneys’
fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief , and under no circumstance may Plaintiffs
1 By Plaintiffs’ own admission, this figure is a gross overstatement of the fees Plaintiffs’
actually incurred in this matter. Plaintiffs informed the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia, only a few weeks ago that their Texas attorneys’ fees totaled $173,763.59.
1/22/2026 10:39 AM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 110345798
By: Alyssa Henderson
Filed: 1/22/2026 10:39 AM
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eventattribution
Defence footnote says on or about this date; not a bank record.
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9
reasonableness of the requesting party’s fees); Mora v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.,
No. 2:08-CV-100, 2011 WL 13286042, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2011) (comparing other
federal circuits to the Fifth Circuit and finding that the “costs incurred by defense counsel,
which may include trips to meet with clients and other expenses particular to the posture
of the defense attorneys and their clients, has no relevance to the reasonableness of the
costs incurred by plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Harkless v. Sweeny I.S.D., 608
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Distribution of Funds should be denied and/or abated until
Plaintiffs produce evidence to support their demand for attorneys’ fees. 8 Defendants’
request that the Court provide Plaintiffs a deadline to produce such evidence, including all
billing statements upon which Plaintiffs rely, and if evidence is not produced by that
deadline, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
There is no good-faith basis for Plaintiffs’ refusal to mediate, and Plaintiffs cannot
recover any attorneys’ fees or costs without providing actual evidence to both the Court
and Defendants. The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Distribution and
compel Plaintiffs to mediate on or before February 13, 2026, in accordance with the Court’s
December 8, 2025 bench ruling.
The Court should also require Plaintiffs to produce, at least 48 hours prior to
mediation, unredacted documentary evidence that supports the attorneys’ fees they seek to
8 There is no dispute that the Receiver obtained $3,083,639.75 on or about June 11, 2025.
Plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees incurred after that date. See Thomas v. Thomas ,
917 S.W.2d 425, 438 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Plaintiffs may only recover
attorneys’ fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief. Feldman, 586 S.W.3d at 596.
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eventattribution
Requested future mediation cutoff, not a granted deadline.
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reasonableness of the requesting party’s fees); Mora v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.,
No. 2:08-CV-100, 2011 WL 13286042, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2011) (comparing other
federal circuits to the Fifth Circuit and finding that the “costs incurred by defense counsel,
which may include trips to meet with clients and other expenses particular to the posture
of the defense attorneys and their clients, has no relevance to the reasonableness of the
costs incurred by plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Harkless v. Sweeny I.S.D., 608
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Distribution of Funds should be denied and/or abated until
Plaintiffs produce evidence to support their demand for attorneys’ fees. 8 Defendants’
request that the Court provide Plaintiffs a deadline to produce such evidence, including all
billing statements upon which Plaintiffs rely, and if evidence is not produced by that
deadline, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
There is no good-faith basis for Plaintiffs’ refusal to mediate, and Plaintiffs cannot
recover any attorneys’ fees or costs without providing actual evidence to both the Court
and Defendants. The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Distribution and
compel Plaintiffs to mediate on or before February 13, 2026, in accordance with the Court’s
December 8, 2025 bench ruling.
The Court should also require Plaintiffs to produce, at least 48 hours prior to
mediation, unredacted documentary evidence that supports the attorneys’ fees they seek to
8 There is no dispute that the Receiver obtained $3,083,639.75 on or about June 11, 2025.
Plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees incurred after that date. See Thomas v. Thomas ,
917 S.W.2d 425, 438 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Plaintiffs may only recover
attorneys’ fees incurred in the pursuit of turnover relief. Feldman, 586 S.W.3d at 596.
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hypothesishypothesis
The apparent fee-total conflict may partly reflect different time periods or included matters rather than a single knowingly false total; al
The apparent fee-total conflict may partly reflect different time periods or included matters rather than a single knowingly false total; alternatively the later request may duplicate amounts already adjudicated. Original itemised records would distinguish these possibilities.
inferenceinference
The dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment ma
The dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment may overlap claims, but an original order and itemised chronology are needed before treating it as full satisfaction of every Texas fee.
inferenceinference
A claim that evidence was supplied to receiver is compatible with a claim it was not supplied to defendants or court. Recipient and date mus
A claim that evidence was supplied to receiver is compatible with a claim it was not supplied to defendants or court. Recipient and date must be compared before treating opposing fee-evidence accounts as a direct factual contradiction.
otherattribution
Complete supplied 12-page source reviewed at SHA-256 3f918fa1a88143409b576533326e07dbf34ef4436975d592814af4c56543a793. Source assertions, or
Complete supplied 12-page source reviewed at SHA-256 3f918fa1a88143409b576533326e07dbf34ef4436975d592814af4c56543a793. Source assertions, original visual features, filing/communication context and identified missing attachments are retained. Own exact SHA256 3f918fa1a88143409b576533326e07dbf34ef4436975d592814af4c56543a793 verified; complete own-source text and all rendered pages read. Page-level corrections explicitly attributed; no absent document or performed act inferred.
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EXHIBIT 15
Case 3:25-cv-00483-JAG Document 175-17 Filed 04/15/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID#
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questionquestion
What do the Fairfax order, October fee chart, Texas billing by matter/date, original mediation ruling and correspondence establish about ove
What do the Fairfax order, October fee chart, Texas billing by matter/date, original mediation ruling and correspondence establish about overlap, production and responsibility for missed mediation?
distillateattribution
CONNECT
Reviewed relationships
The canvas follows the database: source to DISTIL record, DISTIL record to knowledge object, then reviewed relationship. Position alone means nothing.
Footnote8 expressly says there is no dispute that receiver obtained3083639.75dollars on or about11June2025. Defence uses that receipt date to argue against later turnover fees; the conceded receipt does not concede fee entitlement or continuing custody.supportsPlaintiffs describe23June2023Richmond1,572,500judgment,30July2024enforcement petition and22May2025receivership; allege receiver took$3,083,639.75non-exempt Cyberlux funds inJune2025 and stillholds them. No bankstatement or turnover inventory supplied.
Opposing parties agree on historical receiver receipt amount; date here approximately11June2025. Not proof of current balance.
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and cross-examination rights, and turnover-only recovery under section31.002. They contend their own lawyers billing cannot substitute for plaintiffs proof. These are litigated positions, not findings.qualifiesPlaintiffs assert at least$857,734.19Texasfees/costs remain, say invoices/affidavits supplied toreceiver and offer in-camera production. Ask payment of$857,734.19within two business days of order. Supporting billing and granting order absent; requested timing not actual deadline.
Defence denial concerns production to defendants/court, while plaintiffs claim production to receiver and offer in-camera review.
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received full payment and are judicially estopped from asserting a larger Texas entitlement. Quoted order and chart are missing; payment and preclusion scope cannot be resolved from this response alone.contradictsPlaintiffs assert at least$857,734.19Texasfees/costs remain, say invoices/affidavits supplied toreceiver and offer in-camera production. Ask payment of$857,734.19within two business days of order. Supporting billing and granting order absent; requested timing not actual deadline.
Defence asserts prior total payment bars additional fees, whereas plaintiffs assert remaining Texas entitlement; legal scope disputed, not adjudicated.
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and cross-examination rights, and turnover-only recovery under section31.002. They contend their own lawyers billing cannot substitute for plaintiffs proof. These are litigated positions, not findings.supportsThe dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment may overlap claims, but an original order and itemised chronology are needed before treating it as full satisfaction of every Texas fee.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence says8December2025 bench ruling ordered parties and receiver to mediate by15January2026. It recounts unanswered23/30December and6January inquiries,9January receiver refusal pending counsel withdrawal, earliest withdrawal hearing2March2026, and continued counsel status until withdrawal granted. It alleges7January demand for12January mediation conflicted with mediator availability beginning21January. Referenced correspondence, declaration and orders are absent.supportsWhat do the Fairfax order, October fee chart, Texas billing by matter/date, original mediation ruling and correspondence establish about overlap, production and responsibility for missed mediation?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence says8December2025 bench ruling ordered parties and receiver to mediate by15January2026. It recounts unanswered23/30December and6January inquiries,9January receiver refusal pending counsel withdrawal, earliest withdrawal hearing2March2026, and continued counsel status until withdrawal granted. It alleges7January demand for12January mediation conflicted with mediator availability beginning21January. Referenced correspondence, declaration and orders are absent.supportsWhat does this response change about the fee request?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence contrasts an initial806400.96dollar distribution request with current857734.19, and alleges prior versions falsely described a fee stipulation or receiver reasonableness finding. It says an October2025 Fairfax chart put Texas fees at173763.59 and all Texas/California/Virginia fees at749014.03, including underlying fees/sanctions. Original chart and prior motions are not attached.supportsWhat do the Fairfax order, October fee chart, Texas billing by matter/date, original mediation ruling and correspondence establish about overlap, production and responsibility for missed mediation?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and cross-examination rights, and turnover-only recovery under section31.002. They contend their own lawyers billing cannot substitute for plaintiffs proof. These are litigated positions, not findings.supportsWhat do the Fairfax order, October fee chart, Texas billing by matter/date, original mediation ruling and correspondence establish about overlap, production and responsibility for missed mediation?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received full payment and are judicially estopped from asserting a larger Texas entitlement. Quoted order and chart are missing; payment and preclusion scope cannot be resolved from this response alone.supportsThe apparent fee-total conflict may partly reflect different time periods or included matters rather than a single knowingly false total; alternatively the later request may duplicate amounts already adjudicated. Original itemised records would distinguish these possibilities.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received full payment and are judicially estopped from asserting a larger Texas entitlement. Quoted order and chart are missing; payment and preclusion scope cannot be resolved from this response alone.supportsWhat do the Fairfax order, October fee chart, Texas billing by matter/date, original mediation ruling and correspondence establish about overlap, production and responsibility for missed mediation?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received full payment and are judicially estopped from asserting a larger Texas entitlement. Quoted order and chart are missing; payment and preclusion scope cannot be resolved from this response alone.supportsWhat does this response change about the fee request?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence requests denial or abatement pending fee proof, mediation by13February2026, unredacted supporting evidence at least48hours beforehand, and receiver fee evidence. It seeks to bar fees after11June2025, outside turnover work or above173763.59; alternatively requests registry deposit, receiver discharge and termination. These remain requests, not orders or performed acts.supportsWhat does this response change about the fee request?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence contrasts an initial806400.96dollar distribution request with current857734.19, and alleges prior versions falsely described a fee stipulation or receiver reasonableness finding. It says an October2025 Fairfax chart put Texas fees at173763.59 and all Texas/California/Virginia fees at749014.03, including underlying fees/sanctions. Original chart and prior motions are not attached.supportsThe apparent fee-total conflict may partly reflect different time periods or included matters rather than a single knowingly false total; alternatively the later request may duplicate amounts already adjudicated. Original itemised records would distinguish these possibilities.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence characterises Fairfax final order as total claim1140004.66 including187399.95 proven fees/costs, argues plaintiffs already received full payment and are judicially estopped from asserting a larger Texas entitlement. Quoted order and chart are missing; payment and preclusion scope cannot be resolved from this response alone.supportsThe dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment may overlap claims, but an original order and itemised chronology are needed before treating it as full satisfaction of every Texas fee.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Footnote8 expressly says there is no dispute that receiver obtained3083639.75dollars on or about11June2025. Defence uses that receipt date to argue against later turnover fees; the conceded receipt does not concede fee entitlement or continuing custody.supportsWhat does this response change about the fee request?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence contrasts an initial806400.96dollar distribution request with current857734.19, and alleges prior versions falsely described a fee stipulation or receiver reasonableness finding. It says an October2025 Fairfax chart put Texas fees at173763.59 and all Texas/California/Virginia fees at749014.03, including underlying fees/sanctions. Original chart and prior motions are not attached.supportsWhat does this response change about the fee request?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and cross-examination rights, and turnover-only recovery under section31.002. They contend their own lawyers billing cannot substitute for plaintiffs proof. These are litigated positions, not findings.supportsWhat does this response change about the fee request?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defence contrasts an initial806400.96dollar distribution request with current857734.19, and alleges prior versions falsely described a fee stipulation or receiver reasonableness finding. It says an October2025 Fairfax chart put Texas fees at173763.59 and all Texas/California/Virginia fees at749014.03, including underlying fees/sanctions. Original chart and prior motions are not attached.supportsThe dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment may overlap claims, but an original order and itemised chronology are needed before treating it as full satisfaction of every Texas fee.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment may overlap claims, but an original order and itemised chronology are needed before treating it as full satisfaction of every Texas fee.supportsThe apparent fee-total conflict may partly reflect different time periods or included matters rather than a single knowingly false total; alternatively the later request may duplicate amounts already adjudicated. Original itemised records would distinguish these possibilities.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Footnote8 expressly says there is no dispute that receiver obtained3083639.75dollars on or about11June2025. Defence uses that receipt date to argue against later turnover fees; the conceded receipt does not concede fee entitlement or continuing custody.supportsThe dispute concerns scope and proof of residual fees, not disagreement that the receiver initially obtained funds. Prior Fairfax payment may overlap claims, but an original order and itemised chronology are needed before treating it as full satisfaction of every Texas fee.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants oppose857734.19dollars sought by plaintiffs, asserting no documentary fee evidence supplied to defendants or court, fee proof and cross-examination rights, and turnover-only recovery under section31.002. They contend their own lawyers billing cannot substitute for plaintiffs proof. These are litigated positions, not findings.supportsA claim that evidence was supplied to receiver is compatible with a claim it was not supplied to defendants or court. Recipient and date must be compared before treating opposing fee-evidence accounts as a direct factual contradiction.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
WEIGH
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