Exhibit 1

Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 1 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver CAUSE NO. 202448085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC., § Plaintiffs, Judgment-Creditors, § § v. § 129TH JUDICIAL COURT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK D. SCHMIDT, individually, § IN AND FOR Defendants, Judgment-Debtors. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER On the date of entry below, this Court considered Judgment Creditors post-judgment Application for Turnover relief and to Appoint a Receiver, reviewed the documents on file, relevant statutory and case law, admissible evidence, all arguments of the parties and counsel, and finds the Judgment Creditors may aid from this action. The Court DEFINES that: 1) “Plaintiff(s)” or “Judgment Creditor” refers to ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, and may be reached at the counsel of record: David Walton, BELL NUNNALLY, 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900, Dallas, TX 75201. Telephone: 214-740-1445. Email: dwalton@bellnunnally.com David Keithly, MORTENSON TAGGART ADAMS LLP, 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1200, Irvine, CA. Telephone: 949-774-8107. Email: dkeithly@mortensontaggert.com Shawn Grady, LAW FIRM OF SHAWN GRADY, 2100 W Loop S #805, Houston, TX 77027. Telephone: 832-692-4542. Email: shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com James Sadigh, Law Office of James Sadigh, 9777 Wilshire Blvd Suite 400, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Telephone: 310-747-5919.Email: JamesSadigh@aol.com 4/1/2025 5:58 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99158470 By: Lisa Cooper Filed: 4/1/2025 4:40 PM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:24PM 02:24PM 02:25PM 02:25PM 02:25PM 20 procedural defect in their original motion and should be disregarded in its entirety; but nonetheless, we still tried to address 1442 just in case the Court was curious about it. And what's being left out of this discussion -- obviously we don't believe that they've jumped the first hurdle, but there is a second hurdle on 1442 that they can get nowhere near and that is the issue must affect the validity of law of the United States. And the validity factor is not just someone may argue something inconsistent with U.S. law. It has to be the person is taking a challenge as to the validity of U.S. law. In other words, U.S. law is invalid for these reasons. And nobody in this enforcement proceeding has taken that position. So we believe 1442 falls on its face not only because of the first hurdle, but certainly because of the second hurdle as well. THE COURT: So if I were to grant your motion and remand, presumably what you're telling me is that you would proceed to enforce your judgment against the nongovernment property in that warehouse? MR. KEITHLY: Yes. THE COURT: And only that property? MR. KEITHLY: Yes. MR. WALTON: That's right, Your Honor. And we would have the expectation that they would have the burden to prove UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

In re Berleth, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2020) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 pay it to Cavness. We're going to pay off the balance on his house and be done with it. 131 ... The first half of the lunch, I was merely negotiating with him as a settlement. Then we closed those settlement negotiations. We talked about Mexican food. We talked about - my wife is from El Paso. She speaks Spanish. She talks about Mexican food a lot. And we talked about pickup trucks, and that's when his business model came up of, well, this is what I do. I wait for the violation of the automatic stay typically against - I think he described it as the big banks are the ones that violate the automatic stay, whether intentionally or unintentionally, doesn't matter, but they do. And his business model is kind of going and, for lack of a better term, popping the big banks for violating that stay. In a completely separate conversation, that's when I said, well, Synergy has a lot of clients just by the numbers. Some of those clients are going to have their automatic stays violated. By the numbers, some of those clients are going to be here in Texas. 132 ... It was simply a networking issue, similar to him saying I've got a whole drawer full of default judgments that are empty. 133 *14 ... Q. But this guy is saying, I need 15,000 bucks. And isn't it true that you were trying to do what you could to knock that down for Synergy and say, listen, I think I can get that down; I think I can get it down? A. Sure. It wasn't about I think I can get it down. I think the conversation my opinion of it - without having a conversation that I had with them - my opinion of it was that it was an unrealistic number. Compared to what other settlements had been done in other districts and jurisdictions, I felt like Chuck Newton was, you know, pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered. He was asking for, quite frankly, way too much for what he had done, and compared to some of the other settlements, he was off the charts way too much. So that was my opinion of it, and I tried to express that to Chuck Newton. And I tried to express to Chuck Newton that an agreed settlement is probably never going to be as much as you want and but it is - it does turn the lights on for a day. 134 ... [T]hat was the intent with me meeting with Chuck Cavness (sic), for me to reduce the amount of money, reduce their exposure. 135 ... Now, I assert that at no point was anything I said intended to be a bribe. I didn't invite it as a bribe. It was merely a conversation about networking, and I network with opposing counsel on a regular basis. 136 ... Q. But your testimony here today is that you never tied settlement or dropping the Cavness matter with the stay and discharge injunction work in Texas with Mr. Newton? A. Absolutely no. Specifically, I did not make that connection. It was not intended to be that connection. There was no intent to bribe. Absolutely not. Now, we did have the conversation. But to follow-up on your previous question, I believe it's worked. Mr. Cavness still doesn't have the $10,000 that Synergy offered on that day. And so far, that settlement offer has held true. 137 F. May 22, 2019 - Joint Agreed Response to Show Cause Order 138 On May 22, 2019, Cavness, Synergy, and Berleth filed a Joint Agreed Response to the May 6 Show Cause Order, stipulating to a number of facts. The first paragraph of the joint response stated that it was being submitted by Cavness “by and through his attorney of record, Charles (Chuck) Newton,” and by Berleth “individually, and by and through his attorney of record, Adelita Cavada.” 139 The joint response states, in relevant part: 5. Newton and Synergy's attorney, Scott Marinelli, were in the process of negotiating a proposed settlement agreement (the “Proposed Settlement”) to present to the Court when Marinelli [became] unavailable to consummate the Proposed Settlement. *15 6. Synergy then requested that attorney Berleth make contact with Newton for purposes only of completing the Proposed Settlement. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Katharine Battaia Clark 972 629 7114 direct kclark@thompsoncoburn.com April 5, 2025 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL c/o shanelle.taylor@hcdistrictclerk.com The Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District of Harris County, Texas Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline St 10th floor Houston, TX 77002 Re: Cause No. 2024-48085; Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC v. Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt, Individually; In the 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas Dear Judge Gomez: I write on behalf of Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively “Defendants” or “Cyberlux”) concerning the letter and corresponding order (the “Proposed Order”)1 filed by Plaintiffs, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) on April 1, 2025,2 in the above-referenced action. In short, the Proposed Order exceeds the scope of this Court’s ruling, is excessively broad and ambiguous, would appoint a non-neutral receiver without any responsibility to anyone other than Plaintiffs and his own self-interests, and submits a balance due far in excess of an amount that could be due under the Virginia Consent Judgment (“Judgment”) that Plaintiffs have brought to this Court. Accordingly, Cyberlux respectfully contends the most reasonable means to get to the bottom of these issues is for the Court to set an emergency hearing. Defendants would like to post a supersedeas bond but need this Court’s assistance regarding the amount to be posted. In the alternative, Defendants seek the Court’s assistance to narrow and clarify the powers of any turnover or receivership order the Court may enter to comport with the record and applicable law. 1 See Exhibit 1, April 1, 2025 Letter from David A. Walton to The Honorable Michael Gomez and corresponding Proposed Order Granting Receiver. 2 Plaintiffs give no explanation as to why this Proposed Order is being submitted in comparison to the one Plaintiffs proposed in January, and Plaintiffs did not confer with Defendants prior to submitting the Proposed Order. 4/5/2025 8:12 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99327413 By: Shanelle Taylor Filed: 4/7/2025 12:00 AM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 3 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver Tele: 713-588-6900 4) “Judgment” refers to the Order domesticated by this court dated June 23, 2023. Applicant is owed a judgment amount of $1,572,500, with attorney’s fees of $177,126.19, plus sanctions of $3,895.00 and $6,842.50 plus court costs with post-judgment interest accruing at the rate of 12% per annum. As of 02/18/2025 $2,111,086.01 remains owed and due from the Debtors to the Plaintiff, and subject to the Receiver’s actions. The Court FINDS that: 5) Judgment Creditors own unsatisfied final judgments against Judgment Debtors. 6) Upon evidence admitted to this court, during the hearing for appointment of Receiver the court finds the requirements for chapter 31 turnover have been met. The court takes judicial notice of the evidence and testimony presented during the appointment hearing. 7) Judgment Creditors have good faith reasons to believe that Debtor owns non￾exempt rights to present or future property that cannot be readily attached or levied on by ordinary legal process as required by the standard set forth in Tanner2 . Such property includes, but is not limited to, real property, tangible and intangible assets, other property, professional corporations which have accounts receivable, bank accounts that are easily moved and constantly changing in balance, and community property held jointly. The appointment of a Receiver to locate, marshal, and administer assets is justified because the Court believes that non-exempt assets exist which Judgment Creditors are justified in believing Debtor willhide. 8) A Receiver is necessary to carry out this Court’s prior orders, and that the Receivership is necessary not to harass, but to serve justice. A Receiver is necessary in this case pursuant to the Texas Turnover Statute, TEX. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 31.002 and the Texas 2 Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 4 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver Fraudulent Transfer Act §24.009, with the power and authority to take possession of all leviable property of Debtors. This Order shall also serve as a Turnover Order, and the Judgment Creditor is entitled to collect post-judgment attorney’s fees under TEX. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002(e). 9) The unique power of a Receivership derives from the doctrine of custodia legis. Once a turnover order containing an appointment of a Receiver is signed, all of the judgment debtor's nonexempt property becomes property in custodia legis, or "in the custody of the law”.3 In other words, the judgment debtor's property is considered to be in the constructive possession of the court. During the pendency of a Receivership, the Receiver has exclusive possession and custody of the judgment debtor's property to which the Receivership relates.4 10) Pursuant to this order, the Receiver will have a judicial lien on all non-exempt assets of Debtor and on all non-exempt community assets of Debtor, regardless of whether the Receiver takes actual possession. No one-not even a lien holder with a prior filed deed of trust￾can sell property held in custodia legis by a duly appointed Receiver without first obtaining approval from the Court in which the Receivership is pending.5 Any unauthorized transfer of property in the custody of a Receiver is not merely voidable, it is void.6 Thus, any attempt by a judgment debtor to transfer any of his nonexempt property after the turnover order has been signed is void, and any conveyance of property in the custody of aReceiver without approval by the court has no effect upon theReceivership and the accomplishment of its purposes.7 3 First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d339, 343 (Tex. 1976). 4 First S. Props., at 343; Ellis v. Vernon Ice Co. & Water Co., 86 Tex. 109, S.W. 858 (1893). 5 First S. Props., at 341; Huffmeyer v. Mann, 49 S.W.3d 554,560 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi, 2001). 6 First S. Props., at 341. 7 T.H. Neel v. WL. Fuller, 557 S.W2d 73, 76 (Tex. 1977). UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 10 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver Powers GRANTED unto the Receiver by this Court: 25) Possession. The Receiver may take possession of Debtor’s non-exempt property in Debtor’s actual or constructive possession, custody, or control, including but not limited to the items described in Exhibit “A”. The Receiver may secure control over all non-exempt property and engage in presale activities, including appraisals, evaluations, listing and advertising agreements. Receiver may transfer title into the receivership or place a hold on the title of personal and intangible property, including but not limited to: a. All patents, trademarks, service marks, copyrights, websites, and domain names; b. All documents or records, including financial records, related to such property that is in actual or constructive possession of the Debtors; c. All financial accounts (bank accounts), certificates of deposit, money-market accounts, and accounts held by any third party; d. All federal and state tax returns filed or prepared by or on behalf of the Debtors for the past five (5) years; e. All non-exempt vehicles, to include boats, motor vehicles, cars, trucks, utility vehicles, recreation vehicles, aircraft, trailers, or other wheeled vehicles; f. All real property owned or rented by any Debtor or Debtor’s agent or assigns in part or whole; g. All securities; h. All gifts, inheritances, or divisions of property; i. All safety deposit boxes, safes, lock boxes, or vaults; j. All cash; k. All negotiable instruments, including promissory notes, drafts, and checks; UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 12 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver aircraft to conduct surveillance of the Debtor’s property held in custodia legis, and such operations are deemed essential for the safety of the Receiver in his official duties under Tex. Gov. Code § 423.002(a); 27) Disable or remove non-exempt property. The Receiver may disable or remove non￾exempt property belonging to a Debtor or place the property into storage; insure any property taken into his possession; obtain such writs as Receiver deems necessary to obtain possession; and change the locks to premises belonging to the Debtor. Receiver has no duty to take these actions, or to maintain, guard, or insure property taken into custodia legis, or to maintain or pay any lease, nor shall Receiver be required to pay any mortgage, lien or assessment, defend against any lawsuit, pay any tax or fee, file tax returns, maintain any insurance coverage, or have any obligation except as specifically ordered. 28) Assume property is not exempt. A Receiver may assume Debtor’s property is not exempt, until the person claiming the exemption files a statement that claims the exemption, cites the legal and factual grounds for the exemption, and describes the property with sufficient specificity that a constable can levy upon it. If there be any dispute whether an asset is exempt or belongs to a Debtor, Receiver may take custody of the asset until the Court determines the rights of those claiming an interest in the asset. Objections to the Receiver’s assumption must be made to this Court within 21 days of collection; 29) Personal Property Rights of Judgment Debtor. Receiver must comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 679b. 30) Receiver to Hold Property. Receiver must not disburse funds to Judgment Creditor or sell property within 14 days after serving Judgment Debtor with the Notice of Protected Property Rights, the Instructions for Protected Property Claim Form, and the UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 14 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver 36) Utilities. The Receiver may order providers of utilities, telecommunications, telephone, cell phone, cable, internet, data services, internet website hosts, email hosts, iCANN providers, satellite television services, and similar services (including ComCast, AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and Direct TV), and financial institutions to turnover information that Receiver believes may prove or lead to the discovery of the existence or location of a Debtor's whereabouts or non￾exempt assets, including account information, telephone numbers, names, service addresses, telephone numbers, payment records, and bank and credit card information. a. The orders must be directed to the entity from which the information is sought and specifically describe the information requested with the dates for which the information is required, which may not be more than one year before issuing Receiver’s request, unless specifically stated in the request or attachments. b. This order specifically defines Receiver as a state official, acting in an official capacity, as defined in section 182.054(1) of the Texas Utility Code. c. This order specifically serves as the court order required by 47 U.S.C. § 551, and TEX. FIN. CODE §59.001, and satisfies all obligations of the responding party to obtain or receive a court order prior to disclosing material containing before contained personally identifiable information of the subscriber or customer; d. Disclosing information under this order does not violate PUC Substantive Rule 25.272. This order satisfies the law, regulation, or legal process exception to the Proprietary Customer Information Safeguards found in PUC Substantive Rule 25.272 (g)(1). UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 18 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver b. By first class mail to Debtor and every person who has filed a request for notice; 50) Objection to Abandonment or Sale. Objections to the proposed abandonment or sale must state the grounds and be filed within five days after Receiver’s service of the notice. a. If no objection is timely filed, Receiver may abandon the property as described in the notice, without further order. b. If an objection is timely filed, the proposed abandonment or sale must not be completed until the Court has decided the objection. 51) Retention of counsel. Receiver may employ counsel, at not more than $300.00 per hour, for representation and assistance in the prosecution of this order. 52) Ancillary Litigations. Receiver does not have to defend or prosecute any litigation regarding the Debtor, but may intervene in any litigation for any party to this litigation. 53) Receivers Fees. The Receiver’s fees and expenses are considered costs of court. Competent and experienced receivers are rare and the time and effort required by a receiver to keep time, apply for fees and the lag between filing for fees and being paid and that the fees earned would be at an ordinary rate. Not being paid at the time of or shortly after rendering of services would inhibit the recruitment of experienced receivers. Given the chances of no recovery, contingent fees are the most economical fee schedule. The costs of proving an hourly fee could easily exceed the original judgment. A contingency fee is the only way that plaintiff can afford a receiver. Debtor has not tried to pay the judgment. The costs of proving an hourly fee are prohibitive. Therefore, the Receiver is entitled to a fee equal to 25% of all sales of assets that come into his actual, constructive, or legal possession, and all recoveries and credits against the judgment. Upon hearing, and once the Rohrmoos Ventures12 elements have been proven, the Court 12 Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tex. 2019) “To assist district courts in awarding attorney's fees, the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Pg. 1 of 11 Order Appointing Receiver-Exh. A Exhibit A Documents Ordered to be Delivered to Receiver, at His Office, Within Ten Days of Receipt of the Order Appointing Receiver Definitions and instructions. 1) Time Periods. All time periods are for the three years before this order was signed, unless otherwise stated. 2) Continuing duty to supplement. The turnover order is continuing and must be supplemented. Should a defendant or witness come into possession, custody, or control of anything that was ordered turned over or produced, that person must turn over the item within ten days. 3) Definitions: a. “Order” means the turnover order in this caseorder. b. “Account Information” means the login, username or other account identifier with all passwords associated with accessing the accounts. c. “Contact Information,” “telephone number,” and “address,” mean that person’s full name, nick names, d/b/a’s, and all addresses (including work and residence), all telephone numbers (including home, office, fax, pager, and cell numbers), and e-mail, Facebook, social networking, and web site addresses. If any of the information is lacking, provide the Contact Information for every person believed to be able to provide the missing information. d. “Defendant” includes every judgment defendant and every spouse or ex-spouse of the judgment defendant within three years of signing the order. e. “Copies” means complete, legible copies. Illegible copies are to be provided, with a notation showing where legible copies can be found. f. “Entity” includes all business organizations, whatever their form, including public or private corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, joint ventures, unincorporated associations, and individual proprietorships. g. “Manager” refers collectively to anyone who is an officer, director, manager, or supervisor of an Entity, or who makes business decisions for an Entity. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 From: Travis Vargo <tvargo@vargolawfirm.com> Sent: Friday, January 31, 2025 10:21 AM To: Pennetti, Alex; Clark, Katharine B. Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com'; Michael Poynter Subject: RE: Order Attachments: image003.png RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL SENDER - USE CAUTION Alex, We have not received anything from your client contesting my calculations (below). Do you have any information that would alter my calculation distributed below? We have not received zero payments from your client. We have not received dates for depositions that were court ordered. We have not received proper discovery responses. We did receive useless/document-less discovery responses. We do however continue to receive motions, briefing and argues to delay, hinder, and stop my creditor client’s collection efforts. Your client’s continued silence, non-compliance and subversion of the collection process is resulting in continued collection costs. Rest assured, that this email begging your client for payments and/or compliance will be an exhibit to the request for fees if/when your client says they are unreasonable. Travis B. Vargo Vargo Law Firm, PC (713) 524-2441 - Office From: Travis Vargo Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 3:41 PM To: Pennetti, Alex <APennetti@thompsoncoburn.com>; Clark, Katharine B. <KClark@thompsoncoburn.com> Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com' <shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com> Subject: RE: Order Alex, Here is a pay-off that I prepared based on documents that I’ve seen. This does not include collection fees and costs that my client is entitled to under the settlement agreement, which I understand to be a substantial sum. Obviously, I need to investigate this number, declare it, and provide support for it. I also need to confirm this spreadsheet with my client. In the meantime, please let me know your thoughts. If your client made payments that are not shown on tab 2, please send me evidence of the payment so that I can discuss it with my client and provide proper credit, if applicable. Yes, provide dates for the court ordered depositions please. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 From: Travis Vargo <tvargo@vargolawfirm.com> Sent: Friday, January 31, 2025 10:21 AM To: Pennetti, Alex; Clark, Katharine B. Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com'; Michael Poynter Subject: RE: Order Attachments: image003.png RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL SENDER - USE CAUTION Alex, We have not received anything from your client contesting my calculations (below). Do you have any information that would alter my calculation distributed below? We have not received zero payments from your client. We have not received dates for depositions that were court ordered. We have not received proper discovery responses. We did receive useless/document-less discovery responses. We do however continue to receive motions, briefing and argues to delay, hinder, and stop my creditor client’s collection efforts. Your client’s continued silence, non-compliance and subversion of the collection process is resulting in continued collection costs. Rest assured, that this email begging your client for payments and/or compliance will be an exhibit to the request for fees if/when your client says they are unreasonable. Travis B. Vargo Vargo Law Firm, PC (713) 524-2441 - Office From: Travis Vargo Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 3:41 PM To: Pennetti, Alex <APennetti@thompsoncoburn.com>; Clark, Katharine B. <KClark@thompsoncoburn.com> Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com' <shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com> Subject: RE: Order Alex, Here is a pay-off that I prepared based on documents that I’ve seen. This does not include collection fees and costs that my client is entitled to under the settlement agreement, which I understand to be a substantial sum. Obviously, I need to investigate this number, declare it, and provide support for it. I also need to confirm this spreadsheet with my client. In the meantime, please let me know your thoughts. If your client made payments that are not shown on tab 2, please send me evidence of the payment so that I can discuss it with my client and provide proper credit, if applicable. Yes, provide dates for the court ordered depositions please. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

2 I don’t have authority to move a court ordered deadline. My client also opposes in light of your client’s continued filings that necessitate responses from my firm. Travis B. Vargo Vargo Law Firm, PC (713) 524-2441 - Office From: Pennetti, Alex <APennetti@thompsoncoburn.com> Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 3:03 PM To: Travis Vargo <tvargo@vargolawfirm.com>; Clark, Katharine B. <KClark@thompsoncoburn.com> Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com' <shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com> Subject: RE: Order Hi, Travis. With the tight timeframe, we need to proceed with the depositions of the three court-ordered witnesses first. I’m working on those dates, as Katie said. For the other two, as Katie asked, let us know on Mr. Robinson because I’m not clear on whether we’re trying to coordinate everyone or if you guys want to depose him twice. Do you have any update on the payoff letter and supporting documentation that we discussed last week? Given the existing dispute over what is owed, without a payoff letter and supporting documentation, we need to depose Messrs. Welter, Peterson, and Keithly. If we need to pursue the depositions of Messrs. Robinson, Watts, Welter, Peterson, and Keithly, perhaps we can schedule a full week to conduct these. But as you told the Court, the plaintiffs have been crediting amounts received or collected against the judgment, so I would imagine a payoff history and payoff amount is something that can be provided relatively easily, which would mean those depositions wouldn’t be necessary. Also, may we have until next Friday, 2/7, to serve discovery responses? Best, Alex Pennetti apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com P: 972 629 7168 F: 972 629 7171 Thompson Coburn LLP 2100 Ross Avenue Suite 3200 Dallas, TX 75201 www.thompsoncoburn.com REDACTED - IRRELEVANT UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

April 5, 2025 Page 2 I. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order exceeds the record and statutory authority. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order greatly exceeds what is shown in the record and statutory authority. It defines “Judgment Debtors” as the Defendants and then purports to appoint a receiver as to “Debtor,” which is not defined, making the Proposed Order impermissibly ambiguous on its face, especially because this Court expressly declined to appoint a receiver as to Defendant Mark Schmidt. The Proposed Order further states as a conclusion not based in “fact”: “Upon evidence admitted to this court, during the hearing for appointment of Receiver the court finds the requirements for chapter 31 turnover have been met. The court takes judicial notice of the evidence and testimony presented during the appointment hearing.” Proposed Order ¶ 6. Nothing of the kind happened, and this Court made no such ruling. Not even the balance due pursuant to the judgment has been proved as required by TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002. That provision requires Plaintiffs to identify the amount of money “required to satisfy the judgment.” And, as Defendants demonstrated at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ application, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the requirements that would show turnover and receivership is otherwise appropriate.3 Defendants will not repeat the deficiencies previously demonstrated to the Court but rather will emphasize the additional concerns this latest Proposed Order raises. A. The amount due to satisfy the Judgment has not been proven by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have repeatedly misstated the balance due to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Judgment, despite the amount being fundamental to the relief sought in the first instance. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 31.002 requires that Plaintiffs (as judgment creditors) identify the amount of money “required to satisfy the judgment.” They have not done so. The inconsistencies and misstatement by Plaintiffs respecting the sums due stated below are palpable. First, on July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Judgment in the amount of $1,572,500. On December 2, 2024, Plaintiffs sought a writ of execution in the amount of $1,760,363.69. Then, on January 9, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Application for Turnover After Judgment and for 3 See, e.g., Defendants’ January 21, 2025 and January 23, 2025 letter briefs and Defendants’ January 27 Motion to Stay, or in the alternative, to Set Amount of Security to Suspend, Turnover and Appointment of Receiver. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION *************************************************************** ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC, and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, Plaintiffs/Judgment￾Creditors, VS. CYBERLUX CORPORATION and MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, Defendants/Judgment￾Debtors. 4:25-CV-00626 HOUSTON, TEXAS MARCH 26, 2025 *************************************************************** TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEE H. ROSENTHAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE *************************************************************** APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MR. DAVID ALAN WALTON Bell Nunnally & Martin LLP 2323 Ross Avenue Suite 1900 Dallas, Texas 75201 MR. DAVID M. KEITHLY Mortenson Taggart Adams LLP 300 Spectrum Center Drive Suite 1200 Irvine, California 92618 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced via computer. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:07PM 02:07PM 02:08PM 02:08PM 02:08PM 8 It's part of a well-documented and ongoing pattern of delay that I don't really want to spend too much time on. But the main issues here are that the removal is procedurally defective, it's untimely for the reasons that we've stated in our motion. More importantly, there's no federal jurisdiction under either Section 2410 or Section 1442(a)(2). To take the first, Section 2410 doesn't apply because there is no lien. So this statute applies only where the United States has asserted a lien or an interest in property. The United States has not interpled. They have not asserted that they have a lien on such property. All we have are the statements of the judgment debtors. Moving to 1442(a)(2), so the argument there, as I understand it, is that Cyberlux believes that it is acting under a federal officer; but it really brushes over what a federal officer is. What it really is is a subcontractor under a prime contractor that has a contract with the federal government. This fails the acting-under test that's outlined in Watson versus Phillip Morris that we cited in our papers. There is no direct supervision or delegation by the federal government. Drone equipment is not classified. Documents at issue are not sensitive and -- UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:15PM 02:16PM 02:16PM 02:16PM 02:17PM 14 these to you as quickly as possible?" We have no interest in selling assets that belong to the federal government. MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, they're making representations back to the would-or-could thing. If this is remanded and the receiver moves on those assets and tries to liquidate them, we have an issue where U.S. Government property prepared for the military is being put out on the open market. THE COURT: Well, if the receiver did that, then you might have a trigger for removal. MR. WRIGHT: Right. THE COURT: But that's not what happened. And it might and I'm not sure that even then it would because I'm not sure that federal officer removal, as broadly as that's construed, would apply, but that's not -- the record as to what documents were filed or presented and when in relation to your time of removal, I'm trying to nail down which particular -- you're relying on the proposed order. MR. WRIGHT: The proposed order and the January 3rd letter, which I want to clarify again for the receiver. The receiver was nominated by the plaintiff. He has not been -- THE COURT: He's appointed by the Court. MR. WRIGHT: He was not yet appointed by the Court. THE COURT: But that was the mechanism that had to occur to make him the receiver, correct? UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:21PM 02:21PM 02:22PM 02:22PM 02:22PM 18 officer removal statute? MR. WRIGHT: The fact that the federal officer removal statute -- and I'm actually glad that they mentioned Watson versus Phillip Morris because there is a Fifth Circuit case that distinguishes that called Wilde versus Huntington Ingalls. THE COURT: Cite? MR. WRIGHT: 616 F. App'x 710. The pinpoint cite is 713. And in that case there was discussion about whether Huntington Ingalls, or HII in our case, was a federal officer; and I think the Court put it best in that case when it said presumably the federal government would have had to build those ships itself had Huntington not done so and that therefore meets the requirements of 1442. And we're in that same position. The federal government isn't the one that's -- THE COURT: But you didn't cite that in your notice of removal, did you -- or did you? MR. WRIGHT: I believe we cited 1442(a) and another case called -- just bear with me for a second, Your Honor, because I always -- Latiolais versus Huntington Ingalls. And if you would like the cite, I can give you that one as well, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. WRIGHT: 951 F.3d 286, 292. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:24PM 02:24PM 02:25PM 02:25PM 02:25PM 20 procedural defect in their original motion and should be disregarded in its entirety; but nonetheless, we still tried to address 1442 just in case the Court was curious about it. And what's being left out of this discussion -- obviously we don't believe that they've jumped the first hurdle, but there is a second hurdle on 1442 that they can get nowhere near and that is the issue must affect the validity of law of the United States. And the validity factor is not just someone may argue something inconsistent with U.S. law. It has to be the person is taking a challenge as to the validity of U.S. law. In other words, U.S. law is invalid for these reasons. And nobody in this enforcement proceeding has taken that position. So we believe 1442 falls on its face not only because of the first hurdle, but certainly because of the second hurdle as well. THE COURT: So if I were to grant your motion and remand, presumably what you're telling me is that you would proceed to enforce your judgment against the nongovernment property in that warehouse? MR. KEITHLY: Yes. THE COURT: And only that property? MR. KEITHLY: Yes. MR. WALTON: That's right, Your Honor. And we would have the expectation that they would have the burden to prove UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:27PM 02:27PM 02:27PM 02:27PM 02:28PM 22 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, I would love to believe that that is the case, but I am in a bit of a double bind here because we have taken this position that that position has been rejected by the plaintiff and we have -- THE COURT: I just heard them accept it. MR. WRIGHT: We have the documentation and all we need is for them to sign a protective order for us to be able to provide them that documentation that shows -- because it's subject to a confidentiality obligation that we have to HII. MR. KEITHLY: Well, Your Honor, all of that is incorrect. There's already a protective order in place in the state court proceeding. We've been in contact with HII, and they say the only reason the documents haven't been released is because Cyberlux will not allow HII to release contract documents to us. MR. WRIGHT: I don't believe that that is the case, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, it sounds like from the representations made in this hearing by lawyers who are officers of the Court that the only levy and execution will be on whatever is in that warehouse that is not government property or otherwise exempt from the levy and execution process under the state court law. So I think you are where you wanted to be to protect your client's interest and obligation to protect the UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:28PM 02:28PM 02:29PM 02:29PM 02:29PM 23 government's interest. MR. WRIGHT: I appreciate that, Your Honor, and I -- THE COURT: And when I say "where you want to be," I mean where you want to be in the state court. MR. WRIGHT: And I understand the Court's position on that. I do appreciate the Court getting the express commitment out of the plaintiff that they're not going to move on the government property which we believe we do have an obligation to protect, which is why we removed in order to protect that property. THE COURT: So I am going to remand because I don't find that this was timely removed because you knew that there was government property in there; you knew that the plaintiffs were going to levy on your Texas facility; and you knew that more than 30 days before you filed your motion, your removal. So I think this is appropriate to remand, but I'm not going to impose attorneys' fees for what we used to call improvident removal. MR. KEITHLY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: I think there was -- it's not a situation of no colorable basis at all. MR. KEITHLY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: So no fees, but back in state court. MR. WRIGHT: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you all very much. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 Hearing January 16, 2024 REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 2024-48085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC AND SECURE COMMUNITY, ) LLC ) ) vs. ) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ) CYBERLUX CORPORATION AND ) MARK D. ) SCHMIDT, INDIVIDUALLY ) 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________ HEARING _____________________________________________ On the 16TH day of January, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled and numbered cause before the Honorable Michael Gomez, Judge Presiding, held in Houston, Harris County, Texas. Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype machine. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

3 Hearing January 16, 2024 THE COURT: Court's on the record, Cause No. 2024-48085, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC versus Cyberlux. Will everyone, please, introduce themselves for the record? MR. GRADY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Shawn Grady for Atlantic Wave Holdings. And my co-counsel, Travis Vargo, is here, as well. MR. PENNETTI: Alex Pennetti for Cyberlux and Mark Schmidt. MS. CLARK: Katharine Clark on behalf of Cyberlux and Mark Schmidt. THE COURT: So how can I help you today? MR. VARGO: Well, I believe there's a couple matters that are set for today. One is an application of appointment of post-judgment receiver under Texas C.P.R.C. 31.002, the turnover statute. And the other one is a request for access to the premises. In this case there's a written motion. There's also ample evidence inside the docket that would support the appointment of a receiver. The -- to the extent that it's deficient, we would also ask for access to a premises. Because in the debtor's response, they're saying, Well, there's no evidence attached to the application of what's at that premises. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

8 Hearing January 16, 2024 But that being said, I do agree with the concept that, Look, if you're not telling us what you have and you're hiding your assets, then that specificity requirement can't be met; and you can't really hold the receiver responsible -- or the applicant responsible for the failure to provide that information. So it weighs against the denial of a Motion for Turnover. So that's just sort of -- so I agree with those sort of guiding principles. So to the -- if the issue is, Look, we're not willing to turn over because we're concerned about them giving it to third parties, I don't have a problem with that conceptually. I don't know what the problem is on a protective order. What's your issue? MR. GRADY: Your Honor, I can speak to this. They did submit a protective order from the Southern District. It has an attorney's eyes only provision on there. And, you know, we don't -- I don't understand this business, and I need -- my client needs to see the documents, simple as that. But we have made -- THE COURT: So why does your client need to see the business? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

April 5, 2025 Page 3 Appointment of Receiver (“Application”), which states $1,430,551.304 is due. And now, Plaintiffs present an altogether different (and much higher) amount in the Proposed Order. The Proposed Order states that the Judgment was originally “a judgment amount of $1,572,500 with attorney’s fees of $177,126.19, plus sanctions of $3,895.00 and $6,842.50 plus court costs with post-judgment interest accruing at the rate of 12% per annum.” And then states without any evidence or support, that “as of February 18, 2025 $2,111,086.01 remains owed and due from the Debtors to the Plaintiff.” Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show how the judgment amount escalated from $1,430,551.30 to the extraordinary number stated in the proposed order of $2,111,086.01, which is nearly 1 and 1/2 times what they represented to the Court in the Application. There is more. At the hearing of January 16, 2025, Plaintiffs presented their Application. Their sole witness, William Welter, admitted (1) the actual balance due under the Virginia judgment, per a December 2, 2024 letter sent to Defendants, was $848,363.47, and (2) additional amounts for attorney’s fees claimed not as part of the Virginia Judgment (but rather as a demand pursuant to the parties’ Settlement Agreement).5 Finally, on January 28, 2025, Counsel for Plaintiffs in this case sent counsel for Cyberlux a spreadsheet claiming the balance due to pay the Judgment was actually $949,469.50.6 The sum alleged of $2,111,086.01 is over 2.2 times greater than the $949, 469.50 sum presented as of January 28 to Defendants’ counsel. Accordingly: what is the actual sum remaining due pursuant to the Virginia Judgment? Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to proceed without meeting their burden to prove the balance due and owing. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002. (Proof of the sum “required to satisfy the judgment.”). Moreover, Defendants are prejudiced in their efforts to file a supersedeas bond because of Plaintiffs’ refusal to provide clarity on the amount actually due to satisfy the Judgment. 4 Application at p. 2, “As of December 31, 2024, there remains a total amount due and owing of $1,430,551.30 on the Judgment. Said judgment is in all respects, final, valid, and subsisting. Applicants are the owners and holders of said judgment.” 5 See Reporter’s Record of January 16, 2025 (Plaintiffs’ witness William Welter acknowledged the “Application” attached a letter dated December 2, 2024. That letter, from another counsel for Plaintiffs to a counsel for Defendants, claimed a total due pursuant to the Judgment of $1,219,671.97. However, that sum purports to include $371,307.60 in legal fees not awarded by any court. When those attorney’s fees of $371,307.60 are subtracted from the purported total, the real balance due as of December 31, 2024 is $848,363.47.) 6 Exhibit 2, January 28 and 31, 2025 e-mails between Travis Vargo and Alex Pennetti. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

21 Hearing January 16, 2024 just got to tell me one thing. MR. VARGO: Right. Just -- THE COURT: I mean, if the order says I get to do more than one thing, you're going to have a problem; but that gets us there. MR. VARGO: Sure. It's going to be the subsidiary named Catalyst Metalworks [sic], which has an office and a manufacturing facility located at 21631 Rhodes Road, Spring, Texas 77388. This is a 21,450-square-foot facility with a renewable three-year lease with one and a quarter years remaining. THE COURT: So what are you seeking? MR. VARGO: We're seeking a turnover of that -- of the subsidiary. THE COURT: So -- what kind of business entity is it? MR. VARGO: Well -- MR. GRADY: Manufacturer. THE COURT: I mean, no, what kind of -- MR. GRADY: Yeah, it's an LLC, I believe, Your Honor. Actually, I don't know that for sure. Your Honor, this is a -- Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 is an operating report of Cyberlux, which is a corporation. And as a corporation, it discloses its income in this. This report is dated September 30th, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

25 Hearing January 16, 2024 THE COURT: The Court is back on the record. So I've been tendered a copy of Plaintiffs' first set of requests for admissions to defendant. Did they respond to that, the RFAs? MR. PENNETTI: Sorry, Your Honor? THE COURT: I'm assuming they responded to the RFAs? MR. PENNETTI: Judge, we have a Motion for Protection pending. We asked for a hearing on that. Mr. Grady didn't give us availability. Your first availability when I asked for the hearing was actually Monday of this week, and I never got a substantive response on that. And then we engaged on a variety of other motion -- THE COURT: So you haven't responded to the RFAs? MR. PENNETTI: No. And, again, Your Honor, as Ms. Clark pointed out, those are not standard post-judgment RFAs anyways. They're outside the scope. The scope of post-judgment discovery is relevant to the collection efforts. And most of those, as you'll see, are not. MR. VARGO: Admit that Cyberlux has not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

28 Hearing January 16, 2024 litigation, and I'm not familiar with it. But if you have -- if fraudulently transferred assets, right, and they want to know what you own, when you transferred it -- MS. CLARK: Yeah. THE COURT: Misrepresentations that were made regarding ownership or whatever, yeah, they could -- that's not necessarily -- I mean, collection is a very broad umbrella, because then he could -- potentially a receiver, they could a file fraudulent transfer claim against somebody else that you may have transferred assets to that they would need that they would be entitled to get discovery on those issues in post-judgment discovery because it's about what you owned -- MS. CLARK: Right. THE COURT: -- and how you may have misrepresented what you owned or how it was transferred or -- so I don't know that that's necessarily a problem. I think -- so on -- let me see. MS. CLARK: But to the extent that they are for this dual purpose, Your Honor, or with respect to the substantive operations, the day-to-day operations of the business, or anything else, that is why we asked for -- okay. If we're going to go full scope, not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

31 Hearing January 16, 2024 Virginia matter with all of the other stuff that has nothing to do with financials. As I stated earlier when I used the hypothetical number of 50 requests and I said 22 of them were -- let's just call it, don't need to be responded to, they still could have responded to the 28. They are not telling us where their assets are. We have an asset right here that's ready to be sold. We're not hearing, It's far sale. Okay? We're not hearing, Why don't we jointly go sell this together. You get your judgment payoff and pay us the balance. We're not hearing any of that. That's what we should be hearing. MS. CLARK: Well, Your Honor, as I've said, we have paid this judgment down, from our perspective, exactly in accordance with the settlement agreement. The parties had litigation. They settled the litigation. Part of the settlement said, Here's the total we agree to settle, and we will pay it out over time. And we have done that. They don't agree. They didn't like the timing on the payments. And so they have commenced post-judgment discovery, collection efforts. They've garnished bank accounts, half a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

34 Hearing January 16, 2024 amount, but it is nowhere near $1.5 million. THE COURT: So what do you think you owe? MS. CLARK: Let me see, I have it here. Mr. Welter. MR. WELTER: Yes, Judge. Good morning, Judge. THE COURT: Yeah, is -- MR. WELTER: Oh, are you asking me, Judge? THE COURT: Are you affiliated -- is he affiliated with somebody? MR. GRADY: He's the managing director -- MR. WELTER: Yes, Judge. MR. GRADY: -- yes, of the plaintiffs' entity -- plaintiff entities. THE COURT: Okay. MR. WELTER: Can you hear me, Judge? THE COURT: Yes. MR. WELTER: Okay. So, first of all, when she talks about the -- when counsel talks about the attorney's fees, that was for the initial litigation, Judge. The $300,000 plus is we are -- under the settlement agreement, we are entitled to collect attorney's fees in collecting the settlement agreement. I also need to correct counsel. They are not current on their payments. The reason Mr. Petersen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

41 Hearing January 16, 2024 MR. WELTER: So on the protective order -- and sorry if I'm -- I'm an attorney, as well, Judge, and just running the business as managing director. But on the protective order, we couldn't disagree on it. So we went above and beyond. We said that instead of saying -- requiring one party to say this is confidential, you know, and the other party disagrees, we said that we would, under Rule 11 of the Texas -- we would agree that we would hold the entire deposition, everything in the whole deposition, confidential for 30 days, which would give them a chance to come to your court, Judge, and ask them -- ask you to make decisions on this, whatever issues they had, and then any objections that they -- and we also offered them, Judge, that if they weren't able to get a hearing before the Court within 30 days, we would extend it as long as they could get a hearing. And it just made it so simple, because they're tangling the three separate state litigations together. And if we enter a protective order in this case, it's going to wind up -- we're not going to be able to admit it in another case, the documents. So the easiest way was we gave them more than they were asking. And we said the entire deposition, everything in the deposition, will be held 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

46 Hearing January 16, 2024 motions because they're the ones withholding the documents pursuant to whatever it is that they're saying is so confidential and proprietary and that we shouldn't have, as opposed to us continuing to expend resources on these items. THE COURT: Response. MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I just -- we had time out there. Nothing was proposed to us. I think I understand what he's saying, but I would love to see what it really looks like on paper. I mean, if the bottom line is, is that you want us to come to court but we can mark them and they're going to remain AEO for a time, I don't have a problem with that, Your Honor. I don't think there's any issue with that. I think we would have the burden to show they're AEO at the end of the day no matter what. THE COURT: So I -- look, it's post-judgment. I don't think I've had an AEO post-judgment discovery -- MR. VARGO: Exactly. THE COURT: -- issue, ever. So my assumption is you're going to have very few AEO documents, unless they involve something that is a trade secret, a privilege of some sort, some sort of national security issue. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

50 Hearing January 16, 2024 compensated with attorney's fees, I'll award attorney's fees to the degree that they -- it's post-judgment. They should be complying. They should be giving you stuff. To the degree that you have to spend time, write motions, do that thing, I'm going to award attorney's fees, right? So you're going to get that back to the degree you can get any of that back. But we're spending a lot of time talking about hypotheticals. Let's see what they do, and then we talk about what happens. So I'll go ahead and enter that order, and then we can move on discovery and then we can move on to this other stuff. So the Court -- what are the -- so what's the outstanding discovery? So you have your first request, and then you have -- you want to do an inspection, and then you wanted to do depos. MR. GRADY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: What did you want to deal with first? MR. GRADY: Depositions. THE COURT: So who are you looking to do depos of? MR. GRADY: Three witnesses; Neill Whiteley, Phil Tucker, and Mark Schmidt. Mark Schmidt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

55 Hearing January 16, 2024 imagine why we couldn't find a time and a date in 30 days that we can present him. We've been able to do that each time we've gone out looking for dates. THE COURT: Okay. And let me table whether it's in person or not for a moment. Who are the other two folks? MR. GRADY: Neill Whiteley and Phillip Tucker. THE COURT: Whiteley. And what's his relationship to the case? MR. GRADY: So there's been some confusion or -- you know, we asked opposing counsel, you know, their capacities and were told different things at different times. I've got notes. THE COURT: I'm sorry. Whiteley's relationship, again, is what? MR. GRADY: Well, we believe that they're executives of Cyberlux and that they're represented by same counsel over here. THE COURT: Is that true? MS. CLARK: No, Your Honor. And Mr. Pennetti knows the details. MR. PENNETTI: It's been our understanding they've been consultants. I've conveyed that consistently ever since this started. Both of them were 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

57 Hearing January 16, 2024 THE COURT: Okay. So you're fine with both of them? MR. PENNETTI: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. So 30 days, they can appear in person? MR. PENNETTI: I don't see why not. THE COURT: Okay. So we'll order all three in 30 days. The two local folks, they'll be in person; and Mr. Schmidt via video deposition. If it turns out it's a problem, he's not cooperative, then you can come back and say, I want an in-person depo. So that will be the -- that will be the potential sanction. What's next? MR. GRADY: Written discovery. We've got requests for production, request for admissions. I believe we have interrogatories, too. MR. PENNETTI: That's right. THE COURT: So I have RFAs 1 through 31. Any of these you find highly problematic that you can't answer yes or no? MR. PENNETTI: Based on my recollection, no. But let me -- I don't remember any that are highly problematic. The ones that I point out, No. 9 references a government contract. And while I think my clients did reference that contract online, I'm not sure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

April 5, 2025 Page 4 B. The scope of property subject to the Receivership is ambiguous and excessive and violates due process of law. Cyberlux has repeatedly notified the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and this Court that a material portion of the person property located at Cyberlux’s Spring, Texas warehouse includes military drones built to the Government’s specifications, pursuant to contracts providing for the tasks to be performed by Cyberlux. The drones have been assembled at the direction of the Government and under federal and state law, the drones and related equipment and materials are owned by the Government.7 In fact, at a hearing before the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, on March 26, 2025, counsel for Plaintiffs represented to United States District Judge Rosenthal that they have no intention of attaching the Government’s property.8 The presentation of the Proposed Order to this Court is in direct contradiction with that representation. To render a receivership order which purports to include seizure of the drones would violate not only Defendants’ rights, but also those of the Government, without due process of law. The law directs and holds that the Government has title to the drone property. It is uncontested that the United States Government contracted with HII Mission Technologies Corp (HII) who in turn contracted with Cyberlux to build the drones. The drones and related equipment have been inventoried by the Government and are ready for delivery. As such, the drones and related equipment are the Government’s property to which it holds title.9 Not only does the Proposed Order give the receiver power to seize the Government’s property, it also purports to give the receiver the power to dispose of and sell the property in which “third parties” have an interest. Proposed Order ¶ 19. (“Third parties are notified that Receiver, not Debtor, is the party entitled to possess, sell, liquidate, and otherwise deal with Debtor’s non-exempt property and once any third party receives notice of this order, the third party may be subject to liability if the third party releases property, unless directed by Receiver or the Court.” Id. ). These powers would arm the receiver with purported authority to violate the property rights of others, and even sell the property, without due process of law. The entire order is excessive and beyond the law. 7 See e.g., 48 CFR 45.402 Title to contractor-acquired property.(Federal Acquisition Regulations); “(a)Title vests in the Government for all property acquired or fabricated by the contractor in accordance with the financing provisions or other specific requirements for passage of title in the contract. Under fixed-price type contracts, in the absence of financing provisions or other specific requirements for passage of title in the contract, the contractor retains title to all property acquired by the contractor for use on the contract, except for property identified as a deliverable end item. If a deliverable item is to be retained by the contractor for use after inspection and acceptance by the Government, it shall be made accountable to the contract through a contract modification listing the item as Government-furnished property.” See also American Ordinance LLC v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 559, 573 (2008), explaining the context of the regulation and “contractor acquired property.”) and Declaration of Cameron G. Holt filed with Defendants’ January 27, 2025 Motion. 8 See Exhibit 3, Transcript of March 26, 2025 hearing, pg. 20, ll. 17-23; pg. 22, ll. 18-23. 9 See n. 7, supra. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

63 Hearing January 16, 2024 sufficient. And so that being said, is there something here that you have an issue with that you would like the court to address? MR. PENNETTI: Not at this time. THE COURT: Okay. So you're fine with producing documents responsive? MR. PENNETTI: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. So it looks like we're good with 18. Do we have anything else? MR. GRADY: The site inspection. THE COURT: Where are we on the site inspection? MR. PENNETTI: The only thing I'd say is what's important with that is we'd have to have some sort of protocol. It can be very basic, a record of who's there, whether there's going to be photographs, videos taken, a provision for exchange of those, and then the fact that the inspection and anything collected -- data collected there is subject to the protective order, and that's all we ask. And, again, I think we're generally fine with that, so long as the real property owner and the owner of the property and if we give them notice, I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

67 Hearing January 16, 2024 time to move the stuff, which is exactly our concern -- reason for having it done quickly. MR. PENNETTI: I don't really think this is a -- THE COURT: Where's the warehouse? MR. GRADY: In Spring, Texas. THE COURT: And it's a warehouse, right? MR. PENNETTI: That's right. THE COURT: Can you describe it for me, please? MR. PENNETTI: It's a -- MS. CLARK: It's two units at an industrial complex in the Spring, Texas area that -- I can't remember the square footage, but they're relatively large. I bet it would take a little while to walk it, if that helps Your Honor. It's, like, Unit A and D; and they're not contiguous. That's what I know. I have not visited the site, but I've seen pictures. THE COURT: Is it -- are people officed there, or is it just a storage warehouse? MR. PENNETTI: Predominantly storage. MS. CLARK: I think -- yeah, I think at one time it had manufacturing capability; but at this point my understanding is that it's primary storage of the produced product. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

72 Hearing January 16, 2024 discussing dates with the other side. They're important witnesses; Charles Watts, Chuck Watts, and Jimmy Robinson, too. So we -- and that's it. That's all the depositions. I forgot to mention those. My apologies. THE COURT: That's fine. But you haven't noticed them yet, right? MR. GRADY: We have not. We were discussing dates and trying to arrange it. THE COURT: I'll just see if you folks can work it out, and then the assumption is that they'll provide you dates soon. And then you'll find a date within the next -- within a reasonable time period. MR. GRADY: Okay. THE COURT: If they don't provide dates, then we can have a conversation about it. But I'll let you work together first. MR. GRADY: Will do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Let me go ahead and -- how much time did you need to respond to the discovery requests? MR. PENNETTI: Judge, may I have two weeks? THE COURT: Is that fine? Fourteen days? MR. GRADY: Fourteen days, calender days? THE COURT: Yes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

74 Hearing January 16, 2024 MR. GRADY: Well, the other side has shown that they have been evasive with discovery; but, also -- of course, we have discovery orders today; but more importantly, they've dissipated assets. They had an agreement in place with us that they would give us a percentage of the receivables; and then without telling us, they sold that to a factory company. THE COURT: So was this agreement the settlement agreement on the Virginia judgment? MR. GRADY: Exactly, Your Honor. THE COURT: When was that entered into? MR. GRADY: It was entered into, I think, current -- around the time of the judgment, which is in June of '23. And then I was informed by my client, who could speak in greater detail, but that they learned about this either in October or November about the sale -- they had sold the receivables to the factor much earlier in '24, I believe in March, and then -- but we did not find out until late, you know, in the fall. THE COURT: So you entered into a settlement agreement June 15th? MR. GRADY: Yes, that sounds right, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So right after you got the judgment, or right around? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

85 Hearing January 16, 2024 MR. WELTER: Yes, Judge. Can you hear me? THE COURT: I can. I think -- can you speak up? MR. WELTER: When counsel speaks from the table, I can hear them fine. It's just when they stand. Someone just opened up the whole courthouse view. So I can now see the whole courtroom. And when they stand up, for some reason maybe they're too far from the microphone. THE COURT: Yeah, the microphones are in front of them. But you're not getting any reverb, and you can hear me? MR. WELTER: I can hear you fine, Judge. THE COURT: Can we test? Counsel, can you -- MR. VARGO: Yes. Can you hear me? MR. WELTER: Yes. MR. VARGO: Outstanding. MR. WELTER: Whoever just spoke, I can hear. MR. PENNETTI: Can you hear us? MR. WELTER: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Let's -- it's supposed to be piping through here, through the Court's speakers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

89 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Direct Examination by Mr. Vargo A Okay. Q And tell us what you're looking at. A The disclosure statement pursuant to the Pink -- Pink basic disclosure guidelines, Cyberlux Corporation. Q Okay. Hold on just a moment. THE COURT: You have a copy of that, I'm assuming? MR. VARGO: I do. It's filed in the record. It's the 66-page document. THE COURT: Does opposing counsel have a copy? MR. PENNETTI: We have a copy. MR. VARGO: All right. MS. CLARK: Well, Your Honor, excuse me. My confusion is just that the document I have is labeled Exhibit 3, and he just said Exhibit 2. Think we're talking about the same thing, but I just want to double-check. I apologize. MR. VARGO: Yeah, no problem. Here you go. On the docket, it's the one that's 66 pages. MS. CLARK: Okay. Thank you. MR. VARGO: Yes. Q (By Mr. Vargo) Okay. Sir, so on -- let me pull this thing back up. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

93 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Direct Examination by Mr. Vargo or important concerning Section 5 on page 18 of 46? A Well, it -- in this section, it details the different companies that are involved with Cyberlux. It talks about their -- what is located at each facility. And primarily to Texas, it says, Catalyst Machineworks has its offices and manufacturing facilities located at 21631 Road, Spring, Texas 77488. And then it goes on to say, This is a 21,450-foot square-foot facility, with a renewable three-year lease, with one and a quarter year remaining. Q Is this document a true and correct copy of the disclosure that you downloaded from the OTC's website? A Yes. Q All right. I see the next paragraph down there refers to "our Datron World Communications subsidiary." Is that what it says there? MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I object. The document speaks for itself -- A That is correct. MR. CLARK: -- and it's not in evidence, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's fine. MR. VARGO: I move to admit the disclosure. THE COURT: You're seeking to move what, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

99 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I'm going to object as nonresponsive. THE COURT: Sustained. She hasn't posed a question. So until then, please don't say anything. THE WITNESS: Okay. Q (By Ms. Clark) I just wanted to direct your attention to what you were just talking to your counsel about, and that was a statement in the disclosures with respect to the -- an address reference. Do you remember talking to your attorney about that, sir? A For the address of Cyberlux or their Spring, Texas, facility? Q Spring, Texas, sir. A Yes, I remember that. Q I'm trying to go get to that page. Have you ever visited the facility in Spring, Texas? A I have not. Q So you don't know what's inside it, right? A I do not. We've been trying to find out for about a year and -- with no -- no -- MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I'm going to object again as nonresponsive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

101 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark MS. CLARK: Okay. Okay. THE COURT: The amended and final order. So -- MS. CLARK: Okay. A I'm having trouble finding it, but I know the judgment pretty well. And if you want to -- I don't want to hold you up any further. If you want to go forward. I cannot find a copy on my computer of the judgment for some reason. Q (By Ms. Clark) Well, sir, so within the judgment it talks about specifically that there is an amount of $177,126.19 for reasonable attorney's fees. Do you remember that part of the judgment? A I do. Q Okay. MR. VARGO: Objection, relevance. THE COURT: It's overruled. I'll let her -- MR. VARGO: All right. THE COURT: -- for right now. Q (By Ms. Clark) And you were talking with the Court earlier. My understanding is that that amount of $177,126.19 has been paid; is that true? A I don't mean to interrupt you, but I have found a copy of it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

105 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark the judgment. MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I pass the witness. MR. WELTER: Judge, can I add one thing to that last sentence? THE COURT: No. MR. WELTER: All right. Thank you. THE COURT: Did you have any questions? MR. VARGO: No, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. Any other witnesses or any other evidence? MR. VARGO: No. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So what -- so where are we at now? MR. VARGO: Plaintiffs move for entry of an application to appointment a receiver. MS. CLARK: Obviously, Your Honor -- or would you like to hear my argument about why it shouldn't be awarded? THE COURT: Yes, please. MS. CLARK: Your Honor, we object to the appointment of a receiver. The statutory prerequisites of 31.002 have not been met. Mr. Welter testified he had no knowledge of the property that's located in Spring, Texas, or at the Datron facility. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

April 5, 2025 Page 5 The Proposed Order further fails to define the “Debtor” over which the proposed receiver would be granted power, which makes the Proposed Order unreasonably ambiguous on its face, and expressly violates this Court’s ruling at the January 16, 2025 hearing wherein Mark D. Schmidt was to be expressly excluded from the Order. C. The Proposed Order is excessive, unreasonable, not supported by law, and not supported by evidence. There is insufficient evidence of the property that is to be the subject of the order. At the hearing on January 16, 2025 relating to Plaintiffs’ Application for Turnover After Judgment and for Appointment of Receiver, Plaintiffs provided only one document as their evidence. This document identified two (2) leasehold interests of subsidiaries and Cyberlux’s stated ownership of the subsidiaries themselves as of a date certain. However, the Proposed Order, unsupported by evidentiary support, includes a vague list of property Plaintiffs now claim Cyberlux owns – including but not limited to “real property, tangible and intangible assets, other property, professional corporations which have accounts receivable, bank accounts that are easily moved and constantly changing in balance, and community property held jointly.” Exhibit 1 at ¶ 7. This purported definition would give the Receiver unfettered power to swoop into the Cyberlux warehouse in Spring, Texas and scoop up, indiscriminately, whatever the receiver “thinks” might be property of Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs have included in the Proposed Order that Defendants deliver certain documents to the Proposed Receiver10 within ten (10) days of the receipt of an Order of appointment. Exhibit A of Ex. 1 at pg. 21. However, this list of documents is 43 paragraphs long, consists of multiple overarching documents not previously presented to the Court, and authorizes the Receiver to essentially have the ability to receive any document of Defendants or Defendant Schmidt’s spouse that could at any point relate to any potential assets for the last three (3) years. Therefore, in addition to the defective vagueness of the topics previously mentioned, the Proposed Order would unreasonably and invasively obligate Cyberlux and Schmidt’s spouse to turn over virtually all of Defendants’ books and records (this list ultimately allows the receiver to hold those assets until it is determined whether they are appropriate and without the receiver or Plaintiffs posting any bond11) relating to:  For each defendant, Entity, and owner, Shareholder, or Manager of the Entity in the last three years, turn over all Items, data, and records: o A letter for each defendant authorizing the Receiver to obtain all records and assets to which defendant is entitled (Ex. A of Proposed Order at ¶ 5); 10 “Receiver” is defined as Robert Berleth which Plaintiffs have indicated as the Proposed Receiver. Defendants have great concern about Mr. Berleth’s ability to be a fair, neutral, and trustworthy receiver in this matter and as such are not in agreement with his appointment. 11 See Proposed Order at ¶ 25, 28, and 31. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

112 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark turnover, it's going to disrupt; and then we're not going to have anything to pay. And it's going to be a problem. But I don't think those discussions have been had, right? MS. CLARK: No. We've been spending all our time just trying to get ready for today, and we -- I think the parties -- the most they could do is say, Let's try mediation and -- THE COURT: And I'm not -- MS. CLARK: So, no, I don't think the discussions have been had. THE COURT: I understand, Counselor. And I appreciate that you've just been brought on; but this is not a new judgment for your client, right? So I'm not -- I'm talking about your client when I -- MS. CLARK: Yes. No, no, no. THE COURT: And I'm not -- MS. CLARK: That's what I was speaking to, whose talked about it. THE COURT: And I appreciate your position as counsel being difficult, but I'm trying to -- we're really just talking about the judgment debtor here, what have they done since the judgment was entered -- MS. CLARK: Right. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

115 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark THE COURT: The -- the other thing is I think there's been some recent case law regarding receiver fees that you might want to take a look at. MR. VARGO: I'm familiar. It's a presumptive fee, and there's a subsequent hearing. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. VARGO: He needs to talk about his time and the factors. THE COURT: Yeah. So I don't know if that's been -- the order has been changed to reflect that. MS. CLARK: Right now, Your Honor, it speaks to a 25 percent cap to be earned on everything that is taken and sold. And the case law, as I recall, Your Honor, talks about the resume being required of the receiver to understand their qualifications to even serve and then to look at what is appropriate, because it has to be reasonable. And so right now I do not think that the order, as it's written, takes into account that case law. MR. VARGO: We'll file an amended order, and we'll address those two items. If she's got concerns about the qualifications, can I call Mr. Berleth to talk about his qualifications? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

118 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark MR. VARGO: I can cut out any duplicative stuff; but, I mean, I would submit that the RFPs that are attached -- I say "RFPs," the requests for documents related to the debtor that we ordered be produced, this is, you know, elementary-type stuff. Where are your bank accounts? What are your assets? THE COURT: Right. And so I understand there's a continuing obligation and whatnot. That's fine. Why don't you take a look at that. And you can take a look at the form. MR. VARGO: I can condense it and cut it down and obviously send an MS Word to your staff so you can -- with copy to counsel, of course. MS. CLARK: Your Honor, I really think it's important to go through this order. Because this is an extreme remedy to have a receiver appointed to just come in and open our mail, change our locks. THE COURT: So is that the plan, or what's the plan? And so why don't you introduce yourself for the record. MR. BERLETH: Your Honor, may I approach? THE COURT: Yes. MR. BERLETH: My name is Robert Berleth. I'm the proposed receiver. I am a member in good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

124 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark a record with respect to objecting to this form of order? Because I was not done, and I really want a record on this. THE COURT: Okay. So before you do that, the Court is going to grant the application and appoint a receiver. We need to -- we talked about fixing the order and amending it to address the concerns that were raised before. And so what the Court currently has is not what I'm going to enter. I don't know specifically what your objection -- if you have additional objections than we've already discussed. MS. CLARK: Yes. THE COURT: Yes, you want to go ahead and elaborate on those? MS. CLARK: Yes, I would, Your Honor. The receiver statute states that the Court may appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment. That's what the statute says. This order does not do that. This order allows the receiver lots of powers. And, basically, he can go on a wild goose chase, look at everything. What's the point of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

124 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark a record with respect to objecting to this form of order? Because I was not done, and I really want a record on this. THE COURT: Okay. So before you do that, the Court is going to grant the application and appoint a receiver. We need to -- we talked about fixing the order and amending it to address the concerns that were raised before. And so what the Court currently has is not what I'm going to enter. I don't know specifically what your objection -- if you have additional objections than we've already discussed. MS. CLARK: Yes. THE COURT: Yes, you want to go ahead and elaborate on those? MS. CLARK: Yes, I would, Your Honor. The receiver statute states that the Court may appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment. That's what the statute says. This order does not do that. This order allows the receiver lots of powers. And, basically, he can go on a wild goose chase, look at everything. What's the point of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

130 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark reasonably small amount of property that's going to be sold that's not going to satisfy the judgment, he needs to absolutely sequester that, keep it safe, and make sure that he has the ability to sell it. Many times things might weigh a lot. A transport could be crazy. I can tell you personally that I went to South Texas one time and dealt with 23 locomotives. I had to get a special court order out of Harris County to specifically sequester the property in place and hold an auction within 48 hours. Well, there was a lot of heavy equipment. It was 2 miles from the border. All types of circumstances come up that would require very heightened authority. In this instance, that doesn't mean he has to use it. MS. CLARK: We're not talking about -- they identified leasehold rights and stock. We are not talking about the property that's inside it, which they state is owned by a subsidiary, we state is owned by the government. So we're talking about stock. We're talking about leasehold rights. So that's where I have the issue. THE COURT: Right. Mr. Berleth, you're not going to sell government property, right? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

133 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Cross-Examination by Ms. Clark property interests. They deal with the government. The government may have some interest, and you don't want to run afoul of any of those potential issues. And so I assume you're going to try to clear all that up and make sure you're doing the right thing as it relates to that kind of property. MR. BERLETH: Correct, Your Honor. I have not been as successful in this courthouse by being unreasonable. THE COURT: Again, and some of this is rhetorical; but we're just having this conversation on the record so there's no misunderstandings. And you -- I'm sure you're -- I'm sure this is not anything that is a problem; but just so we're clear, we've had this discussion before and so there's no surprises. And I'm sure you'll try to do everything in an appropriate way going forward. So with that, I think we're spinning our wheels a little bit. MS. CLARK: Your Honor, respectfully, I do not want to walk out of this courtroom without understanding the order with respect to the receiver. Does he have to have a bond? What is the language going to look like so that I can inform my client, at a minimum, how to get ready for the disruption that is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

137 Hearing January 16, 2024 STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS I, Jennifer Gajevsky, Official Court Reporter in and for the 129th District Court of Harris, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me. I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties. /s/ Jennifer Gajevsky Jennifer Gajevsky, CSR Texas CSR 9250 Official Court Reporter 129th District Court Harris County, Texas 201 Caroline Houston, Texas 77002 Expiration: 2/2026 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

In re Berleth, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2020) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 2020 WL 522710 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division. IN RE: Attorney Robert W. BERLETH Miscellaneous No. H-19-2011 | Signed 01/31/2020 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SIM LAKE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE I. Background *1 Robert W. Berleth was licensed to practice law in Texas on May 1, 2017, and he was admitted to the Southern District of Texas on May 5, 2017. 1 Berleth's practice involves debt collection and consumer bankruptcy, and he has offices in Houston, Texas, and Helena, Montana. 2 In January of 2019 Berleth appeared as attorney of record in two bankruptcy cases before Judge Marvin Isgur and a third before Judge Jeff Norman. 3 In each case the petitioner was either referred to Berleth by Synergy Law LLC (“Synergy”) or Synergy was otherwise involved in preparing the debtor's petition. 4 Around the same time, Berleth represented Synergy in settlement negotiations with a former Synergy client, Sean Cavness, who had threatened to bring an adversary proceeding against Synergy related to its handling of Cavness's bankruptcy case, also assigned to Judge Isgur. 5 In the course of these proceedings, allegations arose that Berleth had offered to refer cases to Cavness's lawyer, Charles Newton, if Newton would agree to settle the proposed adversary proceeding for less than previously agreed. 6 Details of the underlying dispute between Cavness and Synergy, and its ultimate resolution, as well as the allegations against Berleth, and the events that led to this referral, are documented in the five cases assigned to Judge Isgur. 7 A. Synergy Law Operations *2 Synergy Law LLC, which appears to have been based in Virginia and Washington, DC, offered loan modification, foreclosure defense, and bankruptcy filing services to clients throughout the country. 8 As recently as March of 2019, Synergy advertised itself as “an experienced full service law firm,” with “an extensive and experienced nationwide network of attorneys.” 9 When a potential client contacted Synergy, the company's non-lawyer staff in Virginia would advise the client about various options, including bankruptcy. 10 If the client elected to file for bankruptcy, Synergy's non-lawyer staff would prepare the client's bankruptcy petition using automated software, and Synergy would then forward the petition to an “Of Counsel” attorney in the state where the petition would be filed. 11 It appears that clients would not necessarily provide a “wet ink” signature on the original petition prior to electronic filing, and in certain cases the “Of Counsel” attorneys shared their CM/ECF login credentials with Synergy's non-lawyer staff, who themselves filed the petitions. 12 B. Scott Marinelli Synergy's former managing partner, Scott Marinelli, was reportedly suspended from the practice of law in New Jersey in 2017, as well as in DC in May of 2018. 13 In June of 2018 Marinelli was charged criminally for fraud and theft related to various real estate transactions in Pennsylvania. 14 After June of 2018 Marinelli was removed from the managing partner role at Synergy and appointed as COO, until early December of 2018, when he appears to have been terminated. 15 C. Berleth's Work for Synergy According to Berleth, Scott Marinelli contacted him in mid-to late-September of 2018 and informed him that Synergy was facing approximately $150, 000 in sanctions in Montana. 16 Synergy retained Berleth, and he was able to reach a favorable settlement for Synergy. 17 Berleth also agreed to be an “appearance counsel” for Synergy in connection with certain bankruptcy cases filed on behalf of UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

In re Berleth, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2020) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 pay it to Cavness. We're going to pay off the balance on his house and be done with it. 131 ... The first half of the lunch, I was merely negotiating with him as a settlement. Then we closed those settlement negotiations. We talked about Mexican food. We talked about - my wife is from El Paso. She speaks Spanish. She talks about Mexican food a lot. And we talked about pickup trucks, and that's when his business model came up of, well, this is what I do. I wait for the violation of the automatic stay typically against - I think he described it as the big banks are the ones that violate the automatic stay, whether intentionally or unintentionally, doesn't matter, but they do. And his business model is kind of going and, for lack of a better term, popping the big banks for violating that stay. In a completely separate conversation, that's when I said, well, Synergy has a lot of clients just by the numbers. Some of those clients are going to have their automatic stays violated. By the numbers, some of those clients are going to be here in Texas. 132 ... It was simply a networking issue, similar to him saying I've got a whole drawer full of default judgments that are empty. 133 *14 ... Q. But this guy is saying, I need 15,000 bucks. And isn't it true that you were trying to do what you could to knock that down for Synergy and say, listen, I think I can get that down; I think I can get it down? A. Sure. It wasn't about I think I can get it down. I think the conversation my opinion of it - without having a conversation that I had with them - my opinion of it was that it was an unrealistic number. Compared to what other settlements had been done in other districts and jurisdictions, I felt like Chuck Newton was, you know, pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered. He was asking for, quite frankly, way too much for what he had done, and compared to some of the other settlements, he was off the charts way too much. So that was my opinion of it, and I tried to express that to Chuck Newton. And I tried to express to Chuck Newton that an agreed settlement is probably never going to be as much as you want and but it is - it does turn the lights on for a day. 134 ... [T]hat was the intent with me meeting with Chuck Cavness (sic), for me to reduce the amount of money, reduce their exposure. 135 ... Now, I assert that at no point was anything I said intended to be a bribe. I didn't invite it as a bribe. It was merely a conversation about networking, and I network with opposing counsel on a regular basis. 136 ... Q. But your testimony here today is that you never tied settlement or dropping the Cavness matter with the stay and discharge injunction work in Texas with Mr. Newton? A. Absolutely no. Specifically, I did not make that connection. It was not intended to be that connection. There was no intent to bribe. Absolutely not. Now, we did have the conversation. But to follow-up on your previous question, I believe it's worked. Mr. Cavness still doesn't have the $10,000 that Synergy offered on that day. And so far, that settlement offer has held true. 137 F. May 22, 2019 - Joint Agreed Response to Show Cause Order 138 On May 22, 2019, Cavness, Synergy, and Berleth filed a Joint Agreed Response to the May 6 Show Cause Order, stipulating to a number of facts. The first paragraph of the joint response stated that it was being submitted by Cavness “by and through his attorney of record, Charles (Chuck) Newton,” and by Berleth “individually, and by and through his attorney of record, Adelita Cavada.” 139 The joint response states, in relevant part: 5. Newton and Synergy's attorney, Scott Marinelli, were in the process of negotiating a proposed settlement agreement (the “Proposed Settlement”) to present to the Court when Marinelli [became] unavailable to consummate the Proposed Settlement. *15 6. Synergy then requested that attorney Berleth make contact with Newton for purposes only of completing the Proposed Settlement. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

April 5, 2025 Page 9 property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3). If the Receiver acts pursuant to the Proposed Oder, the Receiver will be supplanting the Court’s authority and would do so without having posted any bond. Where, as here, the Proposed Order empowers the Receiver (and not this Court) to assess Cyberlux’s property interests and sell such assets without further order of this Court, the turnover receivership is conflated with that of a Master in Chancery, despite the strict standard for the appointment of a master in chancery having not been met. See Simpson, 806 S.W.2d at 811. IV. The Proposed Receiver, Robert Berleth, Must Not Serve. Plaintiffs have proposed that an attorney, Robert Berleth, serve as receiver, Mr, Berleth presented himself to this court at the January 16, 2025 hearing respecting the Plaintiffs’ Application. At that hearing, Mr. Berleth represented to the Court he was in “good standing” as a receiver and had been appointed previously by other Texas state courts and federal courts in Houston.16 What neither Plaintiffs’ counsel nor Mr. Berleth advised the Court is that in 2020 Mr. Berleth was cited for unethical conduct by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.17 In that case, Senior United States District Judge Sim Lake concluded in part as follows: This is a troubling case. An inexperienced lawyer violated several Guidelines for Professional Conduct, and his conduct could have resulted in much more serious violations had the court found fraudulent intent. Having considered all of the relevant factors, the court concludes that Berleth should be privately reprimanded. A private reprimand is not a viable remedy, however, because the records in the underlying bankruptcy cases and in this action, which will include the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, are publicly available. The court's Memorandum Opinion and Order will serve as a reprimand since the court has reproved Berleth for his conduct. No further sanction is necessary. The court cautions Berleth, however, to give careful attention to all of the ethical standards that govern his conduct as an attorney admitted to practice before the court and to guard against any violations of those standards.18 Another difficulty in which Mr. Berleth found himself is very recent, in late 2024. Neither Mr. Berleth nor Plaintiffs’ counsel brought to the court’s attention a 2024 Fifth Circuit decision, In re Preferred Ready-Mix, L.L.C., .2024 WL 525249874, Case No. 24-20158 (5th Cir. Dec. 31, 2024). The Fifth Circuit opinion specifically recounted Mr. Berleth’s activities as follows: In 2019, the owners of Preferred Ready-Mix were sued by a plaintiff for breach of contract [] the state court entered a default judgment against them in the amount of $173,120.68. Following the entry of a default judgment, the state court appointed 16 See Exhibit 4, Reporter’s Record of January 16, 2025 hearing at p.118-123. 17 See In re Berleth, No. MC H-19-2011, 2020 WL 522710, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2020). A copy of this opinion is attached to this letter as Exhibit 5. 18 Id. at * 25. (emphasis added). UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

In re Berleth, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2020) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17 settlement demand. Specifically, while Berleth argues that the offer was part of a “completely separate” 185 “post-settlement conversation,” 186 the Joint Agreed Response states that the offer was “part of a trial balloon of sorts to get negotiations started toward an agreement to settle the Cavness case for an amount of less than $15,000.” 187 Similarly, while Berleth argues that the offer “had nothing to do with Mr. Cavness,” 188 the Joint Agreed Response states that “the goal” of the offer was “to make Cavness more amenable to accepting less than the $15,000.00 made the subject of the Proposed Settlement.” 189 Second, it makes sense that Berleth would try to find an alternative way to satisfy Newton. According to Berleth, Newton's attorneys’ fees were the sticking point in negotiations: “Chuck Newton was doing the negotiating for himself, not for Mr. Cavness, because the $10,000 settlement that I offered would have made his client whole.” 190 In Berleth's view, Newton “was asking for, quite frankly, way too much for what he had done, and compared to some of the other settlements, he was off the charts way too much.” 191 As such, offering to refer cases to Newton in exchange for a lower settlement amount would have been a logical, albeit improper, negotiating tactic. *23 Third, while Berleth asserts that “Mr. Newton has stated on the record that he supports [Berleth's] interpretation, and that he believes no further action should be taken,” 192 the record does not support these assertions. When questioned by Judge Isgur, Newton confirmed that the allegations in the Cavness Objection were truthful, that Berleth in fact made the offer twice during the January 14 lunch meeting, and that Newton told Berleth that Newton was there to discuss his client, not his firm's business. 193 Newton agreed with Judge Isgur that, in offering to refer cases to Newton, Berleth was “trying to persuade [Newton] to back off.” 194 As to these factual allegations, Newton did not waiver: “I stick with what I told the court.” 195 Furthermore, although Newton was concerned that a criminal referral might “get out of hand,” he nonetheless felt that Berleth made some “egregious errors,” and “there has to be some statement made.” 196 “If you want to sanction him, if you want to make him go further than what you have, I think that's appropriate. I think what happened happened.” 197 For all of these reasons, the court finds that the second element of § 152(6) is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence: Berleth offered to refer cases to Newton in an attempt to persuade Newton to reduce his settlement demand in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding. (b) Acting Knowingly and Fraudulently There is no genuine dispute that Berleth acted knowingly, i.e., “voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident.” 198 To the extent Berleth argues that he did not act knowingly because his offer was not linked to Newton reducing his settlement demand, the credible evidence is to the contrary, as discussed above. Similarly, Berleth's argument that he was unaware of § 152(6) when he made the offer to Newton is irrelevant: knowledge of illegality is not an element of § 152(6). 199 Whether Berleth acted fraudulently, i.e., whether he made the offer to Newton “with intent to deceive or cheat any creditor, trustee, or bankruptcy judge,” 200 is a closer question. There is little direct evidence in the record on which to make that determination. Deceptive intent was not addressed in Berleth's deposition or the Joint Agreed Response, and Berleth's position in his Preliminary Response and at the January 14, 2020, disciplinary hearing was simply that “there was no intent to bribe [Newton] in any way.” 201 Nevertheless, as addressed by the special prosecutor at the January 14 hearing, there is evidence in the record to suggest that had Newton accepted Berleth's offer and case referrals had become part of the settlement consideration, finalizing the settlement could have involved misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court. 202 As Newton advised the court when he first proposed an adversary proceeding against Synergy, “[s]hould a settlement or resolution result without the need to file an adversary proceeding, Mr. Cavness will file and circulate a motion for approval pursuant to F.R. Bankr. P. 9019.” 203 Such a motion would require the parties to make a number of representations to the court, chief among them that the settlement was an arms-length transaction not tainted by fraud. 204 When the Cavness dispute was ultimately settled without Berleth's involvement, Newton submitted a motion stating just that: “Mr. Cavness contends that the parties have engaged in arms-length negotiations and that the settlement agreement reached is an arms-length settlement.” 205 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

In re Berleth, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2020) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18 *24 The court recognizes that this possible result is speculative. There is no evidence that Berleth was aware of Rule 9019’s requirements or that he knew settlement of the Cavness dispute would involve any factual representations to the bankruptcy court. Nevertheless, as discussed in Judge Isgur's opinion referring this case, Berleth's lack of candor before the bankruptcy court and his inconsistent statements regarding the allegations against him are indicative of “dishonest character.” 206 They provide circumstantial evidence of fraudulent intent. But after applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to the strict elements of § 152(6), the court does not find that the third element of § 152(6) is satisfied. There is not sufficient evidence to establish that Berleth offered cases to Newton with the intent to deceive a creditor, trustee, or bankruptcy judge. Based on the record before it, the court therefore finds that the evidence is not sufficient to prove a violation of § 152(6) or a violation of Texas Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(2). (c) Whether Berleth violated Rule 8.04(a)(3) Unlike Rule 8.04(a)(2), which requires proof of a crime, Rule 8.04(a)(3) sweeps more broadly — it prohibits any conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The Texas Disciplinary Rules define “fraud” as “conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.” 207 The terms “dishonesty,” “deceit,” and “misrepresentation” are not defined in the Rules, but they have similar and overlapping dictionary definitions: demonstrating a lack of honesty or integrity, causing someone to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid, and giving false or misleading representations. 208 Violation of Rule 8.04(a)(3) requires proof of fraudulent intent or an intent to deceive. As discussed above, there is no direct evidence that Berleth intended to deceive the bankruptcy court. While it could be argued that Berleth intended to deceive Cavness by insisting on terms that would benefit Synergy and Newton at Cavness's expense, the evidence in the record suggests that any reduction in the settlement demand would have come from Newton's attorneys’ fees, not Cavness's recovery. Berleth stated that his reduced settlement offer would make Cavness whole, but “Newton was doing the negotiating for himself, not for Mr. Cavness.” 209 The evidence therefore does not establish that Berleth sought to deceive or disadvantage Cavness by offering to refer cases to Newton. It is true that even apart from his interactions with Newton, Berleth demonstrated a lack of candor before the bankruptcy court, and that the positions he took in his deposition were inconsistent with his statements in the Joint Agreed Response. Nevertheless, having carefully considered all of the evidence, the court concludes that there is insufficient evidence of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to prove a violation of Texas Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(3). 2. Violation of the Southern District of Texas Guidelines for Professional Conduct The Southern District of Texas Guidelines for Professional Conduct states, inter alia: A. In fulfilling his or her primary duty to the client, a lawyer must be ever conscious of the broader duty to the judicial system that serves both attorney and client. B. A lawyer owes, to the judiciary, candor, diligence and utmost respect. ... D. A lawyer unquestionably owes, to the administration of justice, the fundamental duties of personal dignity and professional integrity. 210 The court concludes that Berleth violated these Guidelines for Professional Conduct. Berleth owed a duty of candor to the judiciary. His deposition testimony, which is inconsistent with the stipulation in the Joint Agreed Response to Show Cause Order, reflects a lack of candor before Judge Isgur in violation of Guidelines A, B, and D. *25 In addition, Berleth's attempts to renegotiate the settlement amount to be paid to Cavness by offering to refer cases to Newton if he would reduce the $15,000 settlement evidenced a lack of professional integrity. Even if Berleth's settlement proposal had only resulted in an agreement by Newton to reduce his attorneys’ fees, with no reduction in the damages to be received by Cavness, the submission of such an agreement to Judge Isgur for approval could have been a breach of Berleth's duty to the judicial system in violation of Guideline A, a breach of his duty of candor to the judiciary in violation of Guideline B, and a breach of his duty to the administration of justice and personal integrity in violation of UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

In re Berleth, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2020) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20 1 Texas Attorney Profile, State Bar of Texas, available at https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm? Section=Find_A_Lawyer&te mplate=/Customsource/MemberDirectory/MemberDirectoryDetail.cfm&co ntactID=339245 (last accessed January 16, 2020); In re Attorney Admissions, Case No. H-17-MC-1154. 2 Oral Deposition of Robert Berleth, Case No. H-19-MP-302 (Synergy), Exhibit A at May 23 Show Cause Hearing, Docket Entry No. 27A, p. 40. The transcript of Berleth's deposition was not filed in H-19-MP-302, but it was admitted as an exhibit and incorporated into the record of the instant case at Berleth's January 14, 2020, disciplinary hearing. It was referred to at the hearing, and will be referred to in this opinion, as Docket Entry No. 27A in the Synergy case. 3 See In re Afaf Ali Ahmad, Case No. H-18-BK-37392; In re Darian Butler, Case No. H-19-BK-30007; In re Leonel Botello, Case No. H-19-BK-30032. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 See Objection to Agreed Judgment Sanctioning Synergy (“Cavness Objection”), Case No. H-19-MP-302 (Synergy), Docket Entry No. 6, ¶ 40. Berleth also shared his CM/ECF credentials with Synergy, and non￾lawyer staff at Synergy used those credentials to file bankruptcy petitions on behalf of Synergy clients. Agreed Order Sanctioning Robert W. Berleth, Case No. H-19-BK-30007 (Butler), Docket Entry No. 70. Berleth was sanctioned for that conduct, and the issue is not presently before the court. 7 See id. It was also determined that Berleth shared his CM/ECF credentials with Synergy, and that non-lawyer staff at Synergy used those credentials to file bankruptcy petitions on behalf of Synergy clients. Agreed Order Sanctioning Robert W. Berleth, Case No. H-19-BK-30007 (Butler), Docket Entry No. 70. Berleth was sanctioned for that conduct, and the issue is not presently before the court. 8 Id. 9 Exhibit CAV-1 to Cavness Objection, Case No. H-19-MP-302 (Synergy), Docket Entry No. 6-1, p. 1. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 25, 28. 13 Original Complaint Concerning Violation of Restrictions on Debt Relief Agencies; Failure to Properly Provide Bankruptcy Disclosures Information; the Violation of F. R. Bankr. P. 9011; Violation of the Automatic Stay; and, Related Relief (“Cavness Adversary Complaint”), Case No. C-19-AP-2012 (Cavness AP), Docket Entry No. 1, ¶¶ 19, 25; see also Testimony of Terrylle Blackstone, Case No. H-19-BK-30007 (Butler), Docket Entry No. 58, pp. 9, 19 (stating that Synergy learned in or about June of 2018 that Marinelli lost his law license). 14 Exhibit CAV-2 to Cavness Objection, Case No. H-19-MP-302 (Synergy), Docket Entry No. 6-2. 15 Testimony of Terrylle Blackstone, Case No. H-19-BK-30007(Butler), Docket Entry No. 58, p. 9. 16 Berleth Deposition, Case No. H-19-MP-302 (Synergy), Docket Entry No. 27A, pp. 50, 53. 17 Id. at 15-16. 18 Id. at 52-53. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY PAGE 1 OF 7 CAUSE NO. 2024-48085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC AND § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, § Plaintiffs, § § V. § 129th JUDICIAL DISTRICT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK SCHMIDT, Individually, § Defendants. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART TURNOVER AND APPOINTING RECEIVER On January 17, 2025, came on to be heard the Application for Turnover After Judgment and for Appointment of Receiver made by Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings LLC and Secure Community LLC, (hereinafter “Applicants”). After the Court's review of the papers on the docket and the testimony and admitted evidence, the Court GRANTS the Application to aid the collection of the Judgment that is on file in this cause against Defendant Cyberlux Corporation (“Cyberlux”) on the terms set forth herein and DENIES the Application as to Defendant Mark Schmidt. The Court, therefore, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 1. Applicants are judgment creditors of Cyberlux pursuant to the Amended Final Order and Judgment signed on June 28, 2023, which sets forth an award of $1,572,500 “as agreed to by the parties pursuant to the parties’ separate agreement”; an award of costs of $177,126.19; and “sanctions” in the amounts of $3,895 and $6,842.50, plus interest at 12% per annum “as provided in the parties’ agreement.” The Final Order has been reduced pursuant to payments of the “sanctions” amounts and the costs, as well as by application of additional amounts. The amount due pursuant to the Amended Final Order as of October 31, 2024, was $848,363.37. 2. That Robert W. Berleth (“Receiver”), whose address is 9950 Cypresswood Dr., Suite 200 Houston, Texas 77070; phone: 713-588-6900, is hereby appointed Receiver in this cause pursuant to the Texas Turnover Statute, shall post a $2,000 bond, and shall serve with the powers and duties set forth herein and as limited by applicable law. 3. That Cyberlux shall make a full and complete disclosure to the Receiver with respect to the Receivership Property (as defined herein) of the matters Cyberlux has been so EXHIBIT 1-B UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY PAGE 2 OF 7 ordered to disclose pursuant to this Order and to neither directly nor indirectly interfere or impede the Receiver in his performance of his duties under this Order. 4. That Cyberlux is Ordered to turnover and deliver custody to the Receiver within fourteen (14) days from Cyberlux’s receipt of a copy of this Order, c/o its attorney of record, Katharine Battaia Clark via email to kclark@thompsoncoburn.com, the documents described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, subject in all respects to the Protective Order entered in this cause, and is further Ordered to provide to the Receiver within 30 days hereof a copy of the responses to the previously pending Request for Admission, Requests for Production, and Interrogatories, subject in all respects to the Protective Order entered in this cause . 5. That Cyberlux shall turnover to the Receiver at Receiver's address stated above, within ten (10) days of Cyberlux’s receipt of a copy of this Order through its attorney of record, Katharine Battaia Clark via email to kclark@thompsoncoburn.com, all checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title and contracts that make up the Receivership Property (defined herein), and Cyberlux is hereby Ordered to continue to turnover to the Receiver at the Receiver's address all of said checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title and contracts that make up the Receivership Property (defined herein) within three (3) days from Cyberlux’s receipt and possession of such property, if, as and when Cyberlux comes into receipt and possession of any such property, but only for so long as the Amended Final Order remains unsatisfied. 6. Receiver shall have all the power and authority allowed by law to take possession of the following of Cyberlux’s non-exempt property in its actual or constructive possession or control, which property is defined herein as the “Receivership Property”: a. Its interest, if any, in the leased office and manufacturing facility of Catalyst MachineWorks, LLC, located at 21631 Rhodes Road, Spring, TX 77388, as shown on page 18 of 46 of Applicants’ Exhibit 2, admitted into evidence at the hearing; provided, however, this Order shall not apply to property located at the Spring, TX facility, as Applicants have not demonstrated Cyberlux has an EXHIBIT 1-B UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY PAGE 2 OF 7 ordered to disclose pursuant to this Order and to neither directly nor indirectly interfere or impede the Receiver in his performance of his duties under this Order. 4. That Cyberlux is Ordered to turnover and deliver custody to the Receiver within fourteen (14) days from Cyberlux’s receipt of a copy of this Order, c/o its attorney of record, Katharine Battaia Clark via email to kclark@thompsoncoburn.com, the documents described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, subject in all respects to the Protective Order entered in this cause, and is further Ordered to provide to the Receiver within 30 days hereof a copy of the responses to the previously pending Request for Admission, Requests for Production, and Interrogatories, subject in all respects to the Protective Order entered in this cause . 5. That Cyberlux shall turnover to the Receiver at Receiver's address stated above, within ten (10) days of Cyberlux’s receipt of a copy of this Order through its attorney of record, Katharine Battaia Clark via email to kclark@thompsoncoburn.com, all checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title and contracts that make up the Receivership Property (defined herein), and Cyberlux is hereby Ordered to continue to turnover to the Receiver at the Receiver's address all of said checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title and contracts that make up the Receivership Property (defined herein) within three (3) days from Cyberlux’s receipt and possession of such property, if, as and when Cyberlux comes into receipt and possession of any such property, but only for so long as the Amended Final Order remains unsatisfied. 6. Receiver shall have all the power and authority allowed by law to take possession of the following of Cyberlux’s non-exempt property in its actual or constructive possession or control, which property is defined herein as the “Receivership Property”: a. Its interest, if any, in the leased office and manufacturing facility of Catalyst MachineWorks, LLC, located at 21631 Rhodes Road, Spring, TX 77388, as shown on page 18 of 46 of Applicants’ Exhibit 2, admitted into evidence at the hearing; provided, however, this Order shall not apply to property located at the Spring, TX facility, as Applicants have not demonstrated Cyberlux has an EXHIBIT 1-B UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

BELL NUNNALLY — ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS David A. Walton; TEL: 214.740.1445; FAX: 214.740.5745; DWALTON@BELLNUNNALLY.COM April 1, 2025 VIA EFILE.TXCOURTS.GOV Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District Court Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline, 10th Floor Houston Texas 77002 RE: Cause No. 2024-48085, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Cyberlux Corporation, et al., 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Dear Judge Gomez: I represent Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, and Secure Community, LLC (Plaintiffs) in the above-referenced action. On March 27, 2025, Senior District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. Southern District of Texas remanded the action to this Court for lack of jurisdiction, as shown in the notice of remand order filed in this action on the same day. Prior to the failed jurisdictional challenge raised by Judgment-Debtors Cyberlux Corporation and Mark Schmidt (Judgment-Debtors), this Court stated on January 16, 2025, it “is going to grant the [receivership] application and appoint a receiver” subject to certain revisions to the proposed receivership order (January 16, 2025, Hearing Transcript at 124:4-9.) Attached is a revised receivership order approved by the court-appointed receiver, Robert Berleth of Berleth & Associates, PLLC, intended to address those proposed revisions. As soon as jurisdiction is formally revested in this Court, we respectfully request that the attached receivership order be signed instanter to minimize any further delay implemented by the Judgment-Debtors. To be clear, the focus of Plaintiffs’ collection efforts is not to seize personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien as established by competent evidence, but rather to seize personal property of Judgment-Debtors as set forth in the proposed receivership order. [Unofficial Copy Office of Marilyn Burgess District Clerk watermark]

BELL NUNNALLY — ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS David A. Walton; TEL: 214.740.1445; FAX: 214.740.5745; DWALTON@BELLNUNNALLY.COM April 1, 2025 VIA EFILE.TXCOURTS.GOV Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District Court Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline, 10th Floor Houston Texas 77002 RE: Cause No. 2024-48085, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Cyberlux Corporation, et al., 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Dear Judge Gomez: I represent Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, and Secure Community, LLC (Plaintiffs) in the above-referenced action. On March 27, 2025, Senior District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. Southern District of Texas remanded the action to this Court for lack of jurisdiction, as shown in the notice of remand order filed in this action on the same day. Prior to the failed jurisdictional challenge raised by Judgment-Debtors Cyberlux Corporation and Mark Schmidt (Judgment-Debtors), this Court stated on January 16, 2025, it “is going to grant the [receivership] application and appoint a receiver” subject to certain revisions to the proposed receivership order (January 16, 2025, Hearing Transcript at 124:4-9.) Attached is a revised receivership order approved by the court-appointed receiver, Robert Berleth of Berleth & Associates, PLLC, intended to address those proposed revisions. As soon as jurisdiction is formally revested in this Court, we respectfully request that the attached receivership order be signed instanter to minimize any further delay implemented by the Judgment-Debtors. To be clear, the focus of Plaintiffs’ collection efforts is not to seize personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien as established by competent evidence, but rather to seize personal property of Judgment-Debtors as set forth in the proposed receivership order. [Unofficial Copy Office of Marilyn Burgess District Clerk watermark]

Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 1 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver CAUSE NO. 202448085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC., § Plaintiffs, Judgment-Creditors, § § v. § 129TH JUDICIAL COURT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK D. SCHMIDT, individually, § IN AND FOR Defendants, Judgment-Debtors. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER On the date of entry below, this Court considered Judgment Creditors post-judgment Application for Turnover relief and to Appoint a Receiver, reviewed the documents on file, relevant statutory and case law, admissible evidence, all arguments of the parties and counsel, and finds the Judgment Creditors may aid from this action. The Court DEFINES that: 1) “Plaintiff(s)” or “Judgment Creditor” refers to ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, and may be reached at the counsel of record: David Walton, BELL NUNNALLY, 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900, Dallas, TX 75201. Telephone: 214-740-1445. Email: dwalton@bellnunnally.com David Keithly, MORTENSON TAGGART ADAMS LLP, 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1200, Irvine, CA. Telephone: 949-774-8107. Email: dkeithly@mortensontaggert.com Shawn Grady, LAW FIRM OF SHAWN GRADY, 2100 W Loop S #805, Houston, TX 77027. Telephone: 832-692-4542. Email: shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com James Sadigh, Law Office of James Sadigh, 9777 Wilshire Blvd Suite 400, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Telephone: 310-747-5919.Email: JamesSadigh@aol.com 4/1/2025 5:58 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99158470 By: Lisa Cooper Filed: 4/1/2025 4:40 PM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Katharine Battaia Clark 972 629 7114 direct kclark@thompsoncoburn.com April 5, 2025 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL c/o shanelle.taylor@hcdistrictclerk.com The Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District of Harris County, Texas Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline St 10th floor Houston, TX 77002 Re: Cause No. 2024-48085; Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC v. Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt, Individually; In the 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas Dear Judge Gomez: I write on behalf of Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively “Defendants” or “Cyberlux”) concerning the letter and corresponding order (the “Proposed Order”)1 filed by Plaintiffs, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) on April 1, 2025,2 in the above-referenced action. In short, the Proposed Order exceeds the scope of this Court’s ruling, is excessively broad and ambiguous, would appoint a non-neutral receiver without any responsibility to anyone other than Plaintiffs and his own self-interests, and submits a balance due far in excess of an amount that could be due under the Virginia Consent Judgment (“Judgment”) that Plaintiffs have brought to this Court. Accordingly, Cyberlux respectfully contends the most reasonable means to get to the bottom of these issues is for the Court to set an emergency hearing. Defendants would like to post a supersedeas bond but need this Court’s assistance regarding the amount to be posted. In the alternative, Defendants seek the Court’s assistance to narrow and clarify the powers of any turnover or receivership order the Court may enter to comport with the record and applicable law. 1 See Exhibit 1, April 1, 2025 Letter from David A. Walton to The Honorable Michael Gomez and corresponding Proposed Order Granting Receiver. 2 Plaintiffs give no explanation as to why this Proposed Order is being submitted in comparison to the one Plaintiffs proposed in January, and Plaintiffs did not confer with Defendants prior to submitting the Proposed Order. 4/5/2025 8:12 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99327413 By: Shanelle Taylor Filed: 4/7/2025 12:00 AM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION *************************************************************** ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC, and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, Plaintiffs/Judgment￾Creditors, VS. CYBERLUX CORPORATION and MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, Defendants/Judgment￾Debtors. 4:25-CV-00626 HOUSTON, TEXAS MARCH 26, 2025 *************************************************************** TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEE H. ROSENTHAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE *************************************************************** APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MR. DAVID ALAN WALTON Bell Nunnally & Martin LLP 2323 Ross Avenue Suite 1900 Dallas, Texas 75201 MR. DAVID M. KEITHLY Mortenson Taggart Adams LLP 300 Spectrum Center Drive Suite 1200 Irvine, California 92618 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced via computer. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: MR. GABE WRIGHT Hahn Loeser & Parks LLP One America Plaza 600 West Broadway Suite 1500 San Diego, California 92101 Official Court Reporter: Lanie M. Smith, CSR, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter United States District Court Southern District of Texas 515 Rusk Room 8004 Houston, Texas 77002 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION *************************************************************** ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC, and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, Plaintiffs/Judgment￾Creditors, VS. CYBERLUX CORPORATION and MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, Defendants/Judgment￾Debtors. 4:25-CV-00626 HOUSTON, TEXAS MARCH 26, 2025 *************************************************************** TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEE H. ROSENTHAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE *************************************************************** APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MR. DAVID ALAN WALTON Bell Nunnally & Martin LLP 2323 Ross Avenue Suite 1900 Dallas, Texas 75201 MR. DAVID M. KEITHLY Mortenson Taggart Adams LLP 300 Spectrum Center Drive Suite 1200 Irvine, California 92618 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced via computer. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

86 William Welter - January 16, 2024 Direct Examination by Mr. Vargo It's not doing that. I'm not sure why. And so I'm outputting what he's saying through the laptop speakers. I think Mr. Welter is getting a little bit of that. We're getting a little bit of reverb. But in any event, let's see if we can make that work for right now. MR. VARGO: Certainly. Are we ready to proceed? THE COURT: Yes. MR. VARGO: Let's see if we can make it work. Do we need to swear in the witness? THE COURT: Hold on a second. Let me... (Discussion held off the record) (Witness duly sworn) THE COURT: You may proceed, Counselor. WILLIAM WELTER, having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. VARGO: Q Please state your name. A William Welter. Q Mr. Walter, what is your affiliation to this matter? (Technical difficulties) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

137 Hearing January 16, 2024 STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS I, Jennifer Gajevsky, Official Court Reporter in and for the 129th District Court of Harris, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me. I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties. /s/ Jennifer Gajevsky Jennifer Gajevsky, CSR Texas CSR 9250 Official Court Reporter 129th District Court Harris County, Texas 201 Caroline Houston, Texas 77002 Expiration: 2/2026 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:30PM 24 This has been an interesting case. Thank you for your time. MR. KEITHLY: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. WALTON: May we be excused? THE COURT: You as well. MR. WALTON: Thank you. (The proceedings were adjourned.) * * * * REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, Lanie M. Smith, CSR, RMR, CRR, Official Court Reporter, United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability and understanding, from the record of the proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered matter. /s/ Lanie M. Smith_______ Official Court Reporter UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY PAGE 2 OF 7 ordered to disclose pursuant to this Order and to neither directly nor indirectly interfere or impede the Receiver in his performance of his duties under this Order. 4. That Cyberlux is Ordered to turnover and deliver custody to the Receiver within fourteen (14) days from Cyberlux’s receipt of a copy of this Order, c/o its attorney of record, Katharine Battaia Clark via email to kclark@thompsoncoburn.com, the documents described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, subject in all respects to the Protective Order entered in this cause, and is further Ordered to provide to the Receiver within 30 days hereof a copy of the responses to the previously pending Request for Admission, Requests for Production, and Interrogatories, subject in all respects to the Protective Order entered in this cause . 5. That Cyberlux shall turnover to the Receiver at Receiver's address stated above, within ten (10) days of Cyberlux’s receipt of a copy of this Order through its attorney of record, Katharine Battaia Clark via email to kclark@thompsoncoburn.com, all checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title and contracts that make up the Receivership Property (defined herein), and Cyberlux is hereby Ordered to continue to turnover to the Receiver at the Receiver's address all of said checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title and contracts that make up the Receivership Property (defined herein) within three (3) days from Cyberlux’s receipt and possession of such property, if, as and when Cyberlux comes into receipt and possession of any such property, but only for so long as the Amended Final Order remains unsatisfied. 6. Receiver shall have all the power and authority allowed by law to take possession of the following of Cyberlux’s non-exempt property in its actual or constructive possession or control, which property is defined herein as the “Receivership Property”: a. Its interest, if any, in the leased office and manufacturing facility of Catalyst MachineWorks, LLC, located at 21631 Rhodes Road, Spring, TX 77388, as shown on page 18 of 46 of Applicants’ Exhibit 2, admitted into evidence at the hearing; provided, however, this Order shall not apply to property located at the Spring, TX facility, as Applicants have not demonstrated Cyberlux has an EXHIBIT 1-B UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER AND TO COMPEL DISCOVERY PAGE 3 OF 7 interest in such property (and, instead, Applicants’ witness testified he has no knowledge of what is located at the Spring, Texas facility); b. Its interest in Datron World Communications that has a leased office and manufacturing facility located at 995 Joshua Way, Vista, CA 92081, as shown on page 18 of 46 of Applicants’ Exhibit 2, admitted into evidence at the hearing; provided, however, this Order shall not apply to the lease of or property located at the Vista, CA facility, as Applicants have not demonstrated Cyberlux has an interest in such property in the form of a leasehold interest or otherwise (and, instead, Applicants’ witness testified he has no knowledge of what is located at the Vista, California facility); 7. Receiver shall have all the power and authority allowed by law to take possession of all documents, books and records reasonably necessary to allow Receiver to evaluate said Receivership Property that is in the actual or constructive possession or control of Cyberlux; 8. The Receiver is hereby authorized to take all action necessary to gain access to all non￾exempt real property, leased premises, storage facilities and safe deposit boxes wherein any real and/or personal property of Debtor may be situated and to seize the contents thereof. 9. The Receiver is hereby authorized to secure control over the Receivership Property, and engage in presale activities in order to secure the highest and best sales price for such Receivership Property, including but not limited to appraisals, evaluations, listing agreements, advertising agreements, etc. Receiver may not breach the peace but may seek further instruction from this Court. All sales of Receivership Property must be individually approved by this Court with reasonable and adequate notice and opportunity for hearing granted for Applicants and Cyberlux. 10. Receiver is authorized but not required to (a) disable or remove the Receivership Property or to place the Receivership Property into storage; (b) insure any Receivership Property taken into his possession, and (c) change the locks to premises belonging to EXHIBIT 1-B UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

BELL NUNNALLY — ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS David A. Walton; TEL: 214.740.1445; FAX: 214.740.5745; DWALTON@BELLNUNNALLY.COM April 1, 2025 VIA EFILE.TXCOURTS.GOV Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District Court Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline, 10th Floor Houston Texas 77002 RE: Cause No. 2024-48085, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Cyberlux Corporation, et al., 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Dear Judge Gomez: I represent Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, and Secure Community, LLC (Plaintiffs) in the above-referenced action. On March 27, 2025, Senior District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. Southern District of Texas remanded the action to this Court for lack of jurisdiction, as shown in the notice of remand order filed in this action on the same day. Prior to the failed jurisdictional challenge raised by Judgment-Debtors Cyberlux Corporation and Mark Schmidt (Judgment-Debtors), this Court stated on January 16, 2025, it “is going to grant the [receivership] application and appoint a receiver” subject to certain revisions to the proposed receivership order (January 16, 2025, Hearing Transcript at 124:4-9.) Attached is a revised receivership order approved by the court-appointed receiver, Robert Berleth of Berleth & Associates, PLLC, intended to address those proposed revisions. As soon as jurisdiction is formally revested in this Court, we respectfully request that the attached receivership order be signed instanter to minimize any further delay implemented by the Judgment-Debtors. To be clear, the focus of Plaintiffs’ collection efforts is not to seize personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien as established by competent evidence, but rather to seize personal property of Judgment-Debtors as set forth in the proposed receivership order. [Unofficial Copy Office of Marilyn Burgess District Clerk watermark]

Cause No. 202448085 Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 20 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver 55) Attorney’s fees. The Court takes judicial notice of the time that is reasonable and necessary for obtaining this order, and Debtor is ordered to pay Creditor $1,750 in attorney’s fees for obtaining this order. Additional fees may be awarded, after notice and hearing. 56) Receiver's Final Accounting. The Receiver shall promptly file a final accounting with a motion to close the receivership. Should no collection be made against the Debtor after reasonable attempts by the Receiver, the Creditor shall reimburse the Receiver a sum of $1,500 plus reasonable and necessary expenses upon the Court granting the Receiver’s motion to close the receivership. BE IT SO ORDERED. Any and all further relief not expressly stated herein is denied. Signed and Dated: __________________ _____________________ Hon. Michael Gomez JUDGE PRESIDING Approved as to form and substance: Berleth & Associates Robert W. Berleth Texas Bar # 24091860 SDOT #: 3062288 E-mail: rberleth@berlethlaw.com Tristian Harris Texas Bar # 24134449 E-mail: tharris@berlethlaw.com 9950 Cypresswood Dr. Suite 200 Tele: 713-588-6900 PROPOSED RECEIVER UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 1 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver CAUSE NO. 202448085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC., § Plaintiffs, Judgment-Creditors, § § v. § 129TH JUDICIAL COURT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK D. SCHMIDT, individually, § IN AND FOR Defendants, Judgment-Debtors. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER On the date of entry below, this Court considered Judgment Creditors post-judgment Application for Turnover relief and to Appoint a Receiver, reviewed the documents on file, relevant statutory and case law, admissible evidence, all arguments of the parties and counsel, and finds the Judgment Creditors may aid from this action. The Court DEFINES that: 1) “Plaintiff(s)” or “Judgment Creditor” refers to ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, and may be reached at the counsel of record: David Walton, BELL NUNNALLY, 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900, Dallas, TX 75201. Telephone: 214-740-1445. Email: dwalton@bellnunnally.com David Keithly, MORTENSON TAGGART ADAMS LLP, 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1200, Irvine, CA. Telephone: 949-774-8107. Email: dkeithly@mortensontaggert.com Shawn Grady, LAW FIRM OF SHAWN GRADY, 2100 W Loop S #805, Houston, TX 77027. Telephone: 832-692-4542. Email: shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com James Sadigh, Law Office of James Sadigh, 9777 Wilshire Blvd Suite 400, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Telephone: 310-747-5919.Email: JamesSadigh@aol.com 4/1/2025 5:58 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99158470 By: Lisa Cooper Filed: 4/1/2025 4:40 PM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 1 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver CAUSE NO. 202448085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC., § Plaintiffs, Judgment-Creditors, § § v. § 129TH JUDICIAL COURT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK D. SCHMIDT, individually, § IN AND FOR Defendants, Judgment-Debtors. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER On the date of entry below, this Court considered Judgment Creditors post-judgment Application for Turnover relief and to Appoint a Receiver, reviewed the documents on file, relevant statutory and case law, admissible evidence, all arguments of the parties and counsel, and finds the Judgment Creditors may aid from this action. The Court DEFINES that: 1) “Plaintiff(s)” or “Judgment Creditor” refers to ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, and may be reached at the counsel of record: David Walton, BELL NUNNALLY, 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900, Dallas, TX 75201. Telephone: 214-740-1445. Email: dwalton@bellnunnally.com David Keithly, MORTENSON TAGGART ADAMS LLP, 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1200, Irvine, CA. Telephone: 949-774-8107. Email: dkeithly@mortensontaggert.com Shawn Grady, LAW FIRM OF SHAWN GRADY, 2100 W Loop S #805, Houston, TX 77027. Telephone: 832-692-4542. Email: shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com James Sadigh, Law Office of James Sadigh, 9777 Wilshire Blvd Suite 400, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Telephone: 310-747-5919.Email: JamesSadigh@aol.com 4/1/2025 5:58 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99158470 By: Lisa Cooper Filed: 4/1/2025 4:40 PM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 1 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver CAUSE NO. 202448085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC., § Plaintiffs, Judgment-Creditors, § § v. § 129TH JUDICIAL COURT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK D. SCHMIDT, individually, § IN AND FOR Defendants, Judgment-Debtors. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER On the date of entry below, this Court considered Judgment Creditors post-judgment Application for Turnover relief and to Appoint a Receiver, reviewed the documents on file, relevant statutory and case law, admissible evidence, all arguments of the parties and counsel, and finds the Judgment Creditors may aid from this action. The Court DEFINES that: 1) “Plaintiff(s)” or “Judgment Creditor” refers to ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, and may be reached at the counsel of record: David Walton, BELL NUNNALLY, 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900, Dallas, TX 75201. Telephone: 214-740-1445. Email: dwalton@bellnunnally.com David Keithly, MORTENSON TAGGART ADAMS LLP, 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1200, Irvine, CA. Telephone: 949-774-8107. Email: dkeithly@mortensontaggert.com Shawn Grady, LAW FIRM OF SHAWN GRADY, 2100 W Loop S #805, Houston, TX 77027. Telephone: 832-692-4542. Email: shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com James Sadigh, Law Office of James Sadigh, 9777 Wilshire Blvd Suite 400, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Telephone: 310-747-5919.Email: JamesSadigh@aol.com 4/1/2025 5:58 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99158470 By: Lisa Cooper Filed: 4/1/2025 4:40 PM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC et al v. Cyberlux Corporation et al. Pg. 1 of 20 Order Appointing Receiver CAUSE NO. 202448085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC., § Plaintiffs, Judgment-Creditors, § § v. § 129TH JUDICIAL COURT § CYBERLUX CORPORATION and § MARK D. SCHMIDT, individually, § IN AND FOR Defendants, Judgment-Debtors. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER On the date of entry below, this Court considered Judgment Creditors post-judgment Application for Turnover relief and to Appoint a Receiver, reviewed the documents on file, relevant statutory and case law, admissible evidence, all arguments of the parties and counsel, and finds the Judgment Creditors may aid from this action. The Court DEFINES that: 1) “Plaintiff(s)” or “Judgment Creditor” refers to ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, and may be reached at the counsel of record: David Walton, BELL NUNNALLY, 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 1900, Dallas, TX 75201. Telephone: 214-740-1445. Email: dwalton@bellnunnally.com David Keithly, MORTENSON TAGGART ADAMS LLP, 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1200, Irvine, CA. Telephone: 949-774-8107. Email: dkeithly@mortensontaggert.com Shawn Grady, LAW FIRM OF SHAWN GRADY, 2100 W Loop S #805, Houston, TX 77027. Telephone: 832-692-4542. Email: shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com James Sadigh, Law Office of James Sadigh, 9777 Wilshire Blvd Suite 400, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Telephone: 310-747-5919.Email: JamesSadigh@aol.com 4/1/2025 5:58 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99158470 By: Lisa Cooper Filed: 4/1/2025 4:40 PM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 From: Travis Vargo <tvargo@vargolawfirm.com> Sent: Friday, January 31, 2025 10:21 AM To: Pennetti, Alex; Clark, Katharine B. Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com'; Michael Poynter Subject: RE: Order Attachments: image003.png RECEIVED FROM EXTERNAL SENDER - USE CAUTION Alex, We have not received anything from your client contesting my calculations (below). Do you have any information that would alter my calculation distributed below? We have not received zero payments from your client. We have not received dates for depositions that were court ordered. We have not received proper discovery responses. We did receive useless/document-less discovery responses. We do however continue to receive motions, briefing and argues to delay, hinder, and stop my creditor client’s collection efforts. Your client’s continued silence, non-compliance and subversion of the collection process is resulting in continued collection costs. Rest assured, that this email begging your client for payments and/or compliance will be an exhibit to the request for fees if/when your client says they are unreasonable. Travis B. Vargo Vargo Law Firm, PC (713) 524-2441 - Office From: Travis Vargo Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 3:41 PM To: Pennetti, Alex <APennetti@thompsoncoburn.com>; Clark, Katharine B. <KClark@thompsoncoburn.com> Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com' <shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com> Subject: RE: Order Alex, Here is a pay-off that I prepared based on documents that I’ve seen. This does not include collection fees and costs that my client is entitled to under the settlement agreement, which I understand to be a substantial sum. Obviously, I need to investigate this number, declare it, and provide support for it. I also need to confirm this spreadsheet with my client. In the meantime, please let me know your thoughts. If your client made payments that are not shown on tab 2, please send me evidence of the payment so that I can discuss it with my client and provide proper credit, if applicable. Yes, provide dates for the court ordered depositions please. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

2 I don’t have authority to move a court ordered deadline. My client also opposes in light of your client’s continued filings that necessitate responses from my firm. Travis B. Vargo Vargo Law Firm, PC (713) 524-2441 - Office From: Pennetti, Alex <APennetti@thompsoncoburn.com> Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 3:03 PM To: Travis Vargo <tvargo@vargolawfirm.com>; Clark, Katharine B. <KClark@thompsoncoburn.com> Cc: 'shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com' <shawn@gradycollectionlaw.com> Subject: RE: Order Hi, Travis. With the tight timeframe, we need to proceed with the depositions of the three court-ordered witnesses first. I’m working on those dates, as Katie said. For the other two, as Katie asked, let us know on Mr. Robinson because I’m not clear on whether we’re trying to coordinate everyone or if you guys want to depose him twice. Do you have any update on the payoff letter and supporting documentation that we discussed last week? Given the existing dispute over what is owed, without a payoff letter and supporting documentation, we need to depose Messrs. Welter, Peterson, and Keithly. If we need to pursue the depositions of Messrs. Robinson, Watts, Welter, Peterson, and Keithly, perhaps we can schedule a full week to conduct these. But as you told the Court, the plaintiffs have been crediting amounts received or collected against the judgment, so I would imagine a payoff history and payoff amount is something that can be provided relatively easily, which would mean those depositions wouldn’t be necessary. Also, may we have until next Friday, 2/7, to serve discovery responses? Best, Alex Pennetti apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com P: 972 629 7168 F: 972 629 7171 Thompson Coburn LLP 2100 Ross Avenue Suite 3200 Dallas, TX 75201 www.thompsoncoburn.com REDACTED - IRRELEVANT UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 Hearing January 16, 2024 REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 2024-48085 ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT LLC AND SECURE COMMUNITY, ) LLC ) ) vs. ) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS ) CYBERLUX CORPORATION AND ) MARK D. ) SCHMIDT, INDIVIDUALLY ) 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________ HEARING _____________________________________________ On the 16TH day of January, 2025, the following proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled and numbered cause before the Honorable Michael Gomez, Judge Presiding, held in Houston, Harris County, Texas. Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype machine. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02:28PM 02:28PM 02:29PM 02:29PM 02:29PM 23 government's interest. MR. WRIGHT: I appreciate that, Your Honor, and I -- THE COURT: And when I say "where you want to be," I mean where you want to be in the state court. MR. WRIGHT: And I understand the Court's position on that. I do appreciate the Court getting the express commitment out of the plaintiff that they're not going to move on the government property which we believe we do have an obligation to protect, which is why we removed in order to protect that property. THE COURT: So I am going to remand because I don't find that this was timely removed because you knew that there was government property in there; you knew that the plaintiffs were going to levy on your Texas facility; and you knew that more than 30 days before you filed your motion, your removal. So I think this is appropriate to remand, but I'm not going to impose attorneys' fees for what we used to call improvident removal. MR. KEITHLY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: I think there was -- it's not a situation of no colorable basis at all. MR. KEITHLY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: So no fees, but back in state court. MR. WRIGHT: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you all very much. UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

BELL NUNNALLY — ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS David A. Walton; TEL: 214.740.1445; FAX: 214.740.5745; DWALTON@BELLNUNNALLY.COM April 1, 2025 VIA EFILE.TXCOURTS.GOV Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District Court Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline, 10th Floor Houston Texas 77002 RE: Cause No. 2024-48085, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Cyberlux Corporation, et al., 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas. Dear Judge Gomez: I represent Plaintiffs Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC, and Secure Community, LLC (Plaintiffs) in the above-referenced action. On March 27, 2025, Senior District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. Southern District of Texas remanded the action to this Court for lack of jurisdiction, as shown in the notice of remand order filed in this action on the same day. Prior to the failed jurisdictional challenge raised by Judgment-Debtors Cyberlux Corporation and Mark Schmidt (Judgment-Debtors), this Court stated on January 16, 2025, it “is going to grant the [receivership] application and appoint a receiver” subject to certain revisions to the proposed receivership order (January 16, 2025, Hearing Transcript at 124:4-9.) Attached is a revised receivership order approved by the court-appointed receiver, Robert Berleth of Berleth & Associates, PLLC, intended to address those proposed revisions. As soon as jurisdiction is formally revested in this Court, we respectfully request that the attached receivership order be signed instanter to minimize any further delay implemented by the Judgment-Debtors. To be clear, the focus of Plaintiffs’ collection efforts is not to seize personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien as established by competent evidence, but rather to seize personal property of Judgment-Debtors as set forth in the proposed receivership order. [Unofficial Copy Office of Marilyn Burgess District Clerk watermark]

Katharine Battaia Clark 972 629 7114 direct kclark@thompsoncoburn.com April 5, 2025 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL c/o shanelle.taylor@hcdistrictclerk.com The Honorable Michael Gomez 129th Judicial District of Harris County, Texas Harris County Civil Courthouse 201 Caroline St 10th floor Houston, TX 77002 Re: Cause No. 2024-48085; Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC v. Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt, Individually; In the 129th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas Dear Judge Gomez: I write on behalf of Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively “Defendants” or “Cyberlux”) concerning the letter and corresponding order (the “Proposed Order”)1 filed by Plaintiffs, Atlantic Wave Holdings, LLC and Secure Community, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) on April 1, 2025,2 in the above-referenced action. In short, the Proposed Order exceeds the scope of this Court’s ruling, is excessively broad and ambiguous, would appoint a non-neutral receiver without any responsibility to anyone other than Plaintiffs and his own self-interests, and submits a balance due far in excess of an amount that could be due under the Virginia Consent Judgment (“Judgment”) that Plaintiffs have brought to this Court. Accordingly, Cyberlux respectfully contends the most reasonable means to get to the bottom of these issues is for the Court to set an emergency hearing. Defendants would like to post a supersedeas bond but need this Court’s assistance regarding the amount to be posted. In the alternative, Defendants seek the Court’s assistance to narrow and clarify the powers of any turnover or receivership order the Court may enter to comport with the record and applicable law. 1 See Exhibit 1, April 1, 2025 Letter from David A. Walton to The Honorable Michael Gomez and corresponding Proposed Order Granting Receiver. 2 Plaintiffs give no explanation as to why this Proposed Order is being submitted in comparison to the one Plaintiffs proposed in January, and Plaintiffs did not confer with Defendants prior to submitting the Proposed Order. 4/5/2025 8:12 PM Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 99327413 By: Shanelle Taylor Filed: 4/7/2025 12:00 AM UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk

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