Original sourceJune 30, 2025 defence motion for protection in Harris County 2024-48085; embedded transcript excerpt and quoted external records, not a ruling granting relief.
Each card carries the governed distillate name from the database. Open the quoted anchor before relying on the interpretation.
claimallegation
Cyberlux and Schmidt object to Berleth’s document demand and seek protection, reprimand and attorney fees. The motion was filed June 30, 202
Cyberlux and Schmidt object to Berleth’s document demand and seek protection, reprimand and attorney fees. The motion was filed June 30, 2025 at 3:45 PM, with /s/ Pennetti signature and same-day service certificate.
Read the anchor · page 1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO DEMAND FOR DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTION
COME NOW, Defendants Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively,
“Cyberlux” or “Defendants”), and file their Objections to Demand for Document Disclosure and
Motion for Protection (“Motion”). In support thereof, Defendants respectfully show:
INTRODUCTION
Robert Berleth (“Berleth”) was appointed pursuant to the Court’s TCPRC section 31.002
Turnover Order entered on May 22, 2025. Therefore, his appointment in the case, as outlined in
section 31.002, is limited to: “take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the
proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3). Although the initial judgment in that action was approximately
$1.572 million, the Court’s Turnover Order identified the judgment amount to be approximately
$2.1 million. The Turnover Order did not credit Cyberlux for several hundreds of thousands of
dollars in prior payments that Cyberlux had made to judgment creditors Atlantic Wave and Secure
Community.
6/30/2025 3:45 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 102603629
By: Jasmine Garner
Filed: 6/30/2025 3:45 PM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding procee
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding proceedings, continued broader creditor contacts and attempts to obtain an approximately $25 million HII receivable, and demanded documents June 27. Some ongoing-conduct assertions are expressly information and belief; appellate Exhibit 7 and demand Exhibit 8 are absent.
Read the anchor · page 6
33430530 - 6 -
Even though it was Legalist that had wired over $3 million based upon Berleth’s own
“judgment calculation, Berleth falsely claimed that “Cyberlux has not ‘paid in full’ and they’ve
objected to the disbursement of funds anyways. . .”11 Berleth then misrepresented that the “trial
court can’t even set a hearing to terminate the receivership . . .”12 This representation is directly
contrary to the court of appeals’ directive that the trial court was not prohibited from taking further
action to conclude the matter.13
Upon information and belief, even despite filing his Receiver’s Report and Motion to
Terminate and despite that the ex parte TRO in the Tucker Action has expired by its own terms,
Berleth continues to contact various creditors regarding Cyberlux, making attempts to settle
claims, and trying to seize property of Cyberlux, most notably an approximately $25 million
payment under a subcontract with HII Mission Technologies Corp., Berleth has made repeated
efforts to contact HII and persuade it to pay the full receivable to his trust account.
Then, on June 27, 2025, Berleth contacted the undersigned, demanding that Cyberlux
produce documents pursuant to the Turnover Order.14 Berleth has no basis for this demand, which
amounts to nothing more than a blatant attempt to drive up Cyberlux’s litigation costs and spite
Cyberlux for refusing to capitulate. Berleth’s demand and all of his ongoing actions fall well
outside any judicial immunity he may have been afforded before the judgment was paid. Berleth’s
unlawful actions must be stopped to avoid irreparable harm to Cyberlux, its subsidiaries, and
business interests. The Court should grant Cyberlux’s motion for protection and immediately
reprimand Berleth for his wrongful conduct.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Exhibit 7.
14 Exhibit 8.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Defendants argue under section 31.002 and cited cases that payment made the turnover order moot and removed authority, so document demands n
Defendants argue under section 31.002 and cited cases that payment made the turnover order moot and removed authority, so document demands need not be obeyed. They seek protection and fees on that basis. This is the requested legal outcome, not an entered declaration of no authority.
Read the anchor · page 7
33430530 - 7 -
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
1. On June 11, 2025, the Judgment was paid in full so all of Berleth’s actions in this case
plainly exceed the statutory authority conferred under TCPRC 31.002.
The appointment of a receiver pursuant to § 31.002(b)(3) is expressly limited by statute. In
fact, a trial court’s authority to appoint a receiver is limited to appointing a receiver “with the
authority to take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the
judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 31.002(b)(3). In other words, Berleth cannot act for other creditors (i.e., his duty under § 31.002
is to judgment creditors Atlantic Wave and Secure Community), and he may only act until the
judgment is satisfied.
Under Texas law, a turnover order becomes “immediately moot when the judgment which
it was issued to enforce was satisfied.” Bennett/Nguyen Joint Venture v. Coghlan, No. 01-10-
00575-CV, 2011 WL 2732435, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 2011, no pet.);
Pandozy v. Beaty, 254 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (“once the
judgment was paid, the turnover order lost its teeth and was of no further force and effect.”).
Cyberlux paid the full amount calculated by Berleth on June 9, so Berleth has no further
authority as a matter of law. This does not even account for the fact that Berleth himself filed his
Report and Motion to Terminate the Receivership, in which Berleth contended:
The Receivership has completed with no further remaining issues
pending the final distribution of funds as detailed above. The
Receiver has fulfilled his obligations required by law. The Receiver
moves the Court order the judgment satisfied and Receivership
terminated. The Receiver as that effective on the of entry of the
Termination Order, the Receivership has been terminated, the
Receiver has been discharged, and the Receivership has ceased to
exist as a legal entity.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The motion invokes a 2020 In re Berleth reprimand quotation that expressly distinguishes professional-guideline violations from more serious
The motion invokes a 2020 In re Berleth reprimand quotation that expressly distinguishes professional-guideline violations from more serious violations had fraudulent intent been found, and says no further sanction was necessary. The quotation must not be converted into a fraud finding. The underlying opinion is not attached.
Read the anchor · page 8
33430530 - 8 -
There is no legitimate purpose behind Berleth’s demand that Cyberlux produce documents
other than to harass Cyberlux and drive up Cyberlux’s legal fees. It is indisputable that the
judgment was satisfied on June 10, 2025.15 The exact amount of Berleth’s “judgment calculation”
was paid despite the objections to the amount remain pending. Berleth confirmed receipt and filed
his Final Report, which included a Motion to Terminate the Receivership. Because the judgment
amount and all fees and expenses were paid in the overpayment to Berleth, and because even
Berleth acknowledged his job is done, Berleth’s continued actions, including the demand for
documents, plainly exceed his statutory authority and Cyberlux is not obligated to comply with
Berleth’s unlawful demands. Berleth has no authority to act and Cyberlux’s Motion should be
granted.
2. Berleth’s demand for documents, which is nothing more than a means of intimidation
and a deliberate attempt to drive up Cyberlux’s litigation costs, comes straight out of
Berleth’s standard playbook of misconduct.
Berleth has no authority to act yet continues to falsely represent the nature of his
involvement regarding Cyberlux. This sort of misconduct is nothing new to Berleth. Indeed, the
Honorable Judge Sim Lake for the Southern District of Texas previously redressed Berleth’s
actions. In re Berleth, No. MC H-19-2011, 2020 WL 522710, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2020).
Indeed, Judge Lake found, among other things:
This is a troubling case. An inexperienced lawyer violated several
Guidelines for Professional Conduct, and his conduct could have
resulted in much more serious violations had the court found
fraudulent intent. Having considered all of the relevant factors, the
court concludes that Berleth should be privately reprimanded. A
private reprimand is not a viable remedy, however, because the
records in the underlying bankruptcy cases and in this action, which
will include the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, are
publicly available. The court's Memorandum Opinion and Order
will serve as a reprimand since the court has reproved Berleth for
15 Funds were tendered the afternoon of June 10, 2025, via wire transfer. On June 11, 2025, the Receiver confirmed he received
the payment. On June 12, 2025, the Receiver informed the Court the entire judgment amount was in his trust account.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The text describes a Montana Supreme Court memorandum criticising factual/legal representations, but supplies a Rideg v. Berleth citation id
The text describes a Montana Supreme Court memorandum criticising factual/legal representations, but supplies a Rideg v. Berleth citation identifying D. Mont., August 9, 2021. The described tribunal and printed citation require source verification rather than silent correction or assuming they identify the same opinion.
Read the anchor · page 9
33430530 - 9 -
his conduct. No further sanction is necessary. The court cautions
Berleth, however, to give careful attention to all of the ethical
standards that govern his conduct as an attorney admitted to practice
before the court and to guard against any violations of those
standards.
Id.
This is not the only instance. Only a few months after Judge Lake reprimanded Berleth,
the Montana Supreme Court issued a memorandum opinion in which it held against Berleth in that
landlord-tenant dispute. Notably, the Montana Supreme Court took issue with Berleth’s lack of
candor, stating:
Upon our review of the record, we are troubled by the inaccuracy of
many of Robert's factual and legal representations here and below
as a self-represented litigant but licensed member of the Montana
Bar. While we generally give wide latitude to self-represented
litigants, we caution Robert to be more cognizant of his professional
duties before the courts of this State. See M. R. Pro. Cond. 1.1, 1.3,
and 3.3 (competence, diligence, and candor to the tribunal).
Rideg v. Berleth, CV 21-21-M-DLC, 2021 WL 3500815, at * 1 (D. Mont. Aug. 9, 2021).
In 2022, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas found Berleth
intentionally deprived a debtor of his assets. In re Preferred Ready-Mix LLC, No. 21-33369, 2022
WL 16952650, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2022). The Southern District of Texas found,
among other things, that Berleth had acted intentionally and with bad faith, to wit:
the Court finds Berleth’s actions were with actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy filing and intentional, with the intent to deprive the
debtor of his assets. Additionally, his actions were not in good faith
and in contravention of the provisions of the automatic stay.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Berleth did more than just passive
retention of estate property, as demand was made. Consequences for
violations of the automatic stay can be severe. Parties that willfully
violate the automatic stay may be liable to debtors for actual
damages, including costs, attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, punitive damages. Here, actual damages would be
duplicative of the damage award from violation of sections 543 and
542 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, to the extent the prior award
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The motion quotes a 2022 Preferred Ready-Mix bankruptcy finding of intentional stay violations and describes $10,000 punitive damages within
The motion quotes a 2022 Preferred Ready-Mix bankruptcy finding of intentional stay violations and describes $10,000 punitive damages within $45,000 total, then says the Fifth Circuit upheld the opinion December 31, 2024. The quoted appellate account expressly says conversion was the claim not won. These reported findings concern that other dispute and do not adjudicate the Cyberlux motion.
Read the anchor · page 9
33430530 - 9 -
his conduct. No further sanction is necessary. The court cautions
Berleth, however, to give careful attention to all of the ethical
standards that govern his conduct as an attorney admitted to practice
before the court and to guard against any violations of those
standards.
Id.
This is not the only instance. Only a few months after Judge Lake reprimanded Berleth,
the Montana Supreme Court issued a memorandum opinion in which it held against Berleth in that
landlord-tenant dispute. Notably, the Montana Supreme Court took issue with Berleth’s lack of
candor, stating:
Upon our review of the record, we are troubled by the inaccuracy of
many of Robert's factual and legal representations here and below
as a self-represented litigant but licensed member of the Montana
Bar. While we generally give wide latitude to self-represented
litigants, we caution Robert to be more cognizant of his professional
duties before the courts of this State. See M. R. Pro. Cond. 1.1, 1.3,
and 3.3 (competence, diligence, and candor to the tribunal).
Rideg v. Berleth, CV 21-21-M-DLC, 2021 WL 3500815, at * 1 (D. Mont. Aug. 9, 2021).
In 2022, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas found Berleth
intentionally deprived a debtor of his assets. In re Preferred Ready-Mix LLC, No. 21-33369, 2022
WL 16952650, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2022). The Southern District of Texas found,
among other things, that Berleth had acted intentionally and with bad faith, to wit:
the Court finds Berleth’s actions were with actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy filing and intentional, with the intent to deprive the
debtor of his assets. Additionally, his actions were not in good faith
and in contravention of the provisions of the automatic stay.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Berleth did more than just passive
retention of estate property, as demand was made. Consequences for
violations of the automatic stay can be severe. Parties that willfully
violate the automatic stay may be liable to debtors for actual
damages, including costs, attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, punitive damages. Here, actual damages would be
duplicative of the damage award from violation of sections 543 and
542 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, to the extent the prior award
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Counsel certifies electronic service; automated records identify envelope 102603629, filing by Carranza for Pennetti and June 30 3:45:04 PM
Counsel certifies electronic service; automated records identify envelope 102603629, filing by Carranza for Pennetti and June 30 3:45:04 PM SENT statuses, including Berleth and repeated contacts. The certificate establishes listed transmission status, not reading or agreement.
Read the anchor · page 11
33430530 - 11 -
Dated: June 30, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
By : /s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Douglas S. Lang
State Bar No. 11895500
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
dlang@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
COUNSEL FOR
CYBERLUX CORPORATION AND
MARK D. SCHMIDT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 30, 2025, I had this document served on all counsel of record via
electronic service.
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Alexander J. Pennetti
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Defendants challenge an approximately $2.1 million turnover-order balance compared with the original approximately $1.572 million judgment,
Defendants challenge an approximately $2.1 million turnover-order balance compared with the original approximately $1.572 million judgment, alleging hundreds of thousands in uncredited payments. They say Berleth’s June 5 demand of $2,975,774.98 became $3,083,639.75 by June 9, an increase of $107,864.77. Supporting calculation exhibits are not included.
Read the anchor · page 1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO DEMAND FOR DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTION
COME NOW, Defendants Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively,
“Cyberlux” or “Defendants”), and file their Objections to Demand for Document Disclosure and
Motion for Protection (“Motion”). In support thereof, Defendants respectfully show:
INTRODUCTION
Robert Berleth (“Berleth”) was appointed pursuant to the Court’s TCPRC section 31.002
Turnover Order entered on May 22, 2025. Therefore, his appointment in the case, as outlined in
section 31.002, is limited to: “take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the
proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3). Although the initial judgment in that action was approximately
$1.572 million, the Court’s Turnover Order identified the judgment amount to be approximately
$2.1 million. The Turnover Order did not credit Cyberlux for several hundreds of thousands of
dollars in prior payments that Cyberlux had made to judgment creditors Atlantic Wave and Secure
Community.
6/30/2025 3:45 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 102603629
By: Jasmine Garner
Filed: 6/30/2025 3:45 PM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The motion distinguishes funds tendered by wire the afternoon of June 10, receipt confirmed June 11 and in-court confirmation June 12. It sa
The motion distinguishes funds tendered by wire the afternoon of June 10, receipt confirmed June 11 and in-court confirmation June 12. It says the full $3,083,639.75 demanded was transferred despite contested credits and fees. These dates describe different steps, not necessarily conflicting payment dates; the bank record is absent.
Read the anchor · page 2
33430530 - 2 -
Even though Cyberlux objected to the incorrect judgment amount in the Court’s Turnover
Order, in hopes of streamlining a resolution of the matter, on June 10, 2025, the sum of
$3,083,639.75 was tendered and delivered via wire transfer to the Receiver. The amount had been
calculated by Berleth as the amount owed on the judgment.1 In fact, on June 9, 2025, Berleth
represented to the Court during a hearing that this was the amount of the judgment owed, inclusive
of fees. Berleth’s “judgment calculation” included amounts allegedly owed for Plaintiffs attorneys’
fees, as well as over $800,000 of fees and expenses Berleth claims to have incurred despite his
three-week appointment during which Berleth did not seize or sell a single asset; he merely
changed the locks on Cyberlux’s facility and observed an inspection by Cyberlux, HII, and the
United States Government.
Despite being appointed as a ‘neutral’ extension of this Court, Berleth had previously
refused to accept payment on the judgment on June 5, 2025 in his initial improper effort to extend
the receivership. In fact, during the June 9, 2025 hearing, the Court ordered Berleth to provide his
wiring instructions so the judgment could be satisfied.2 During that hearing, Cyberlux expressed
concern Berleth would continue to act in his own interest to try and rack up more fees. In response,
Berleth disagreed, stating “there’s nothing to do . . . [but] await payment . . .” In fact, Berleth
represented to the Court that awaiting payment was “all I’m doing.” The transcript of that exchange
reflects:
1 Notably, on June 5, 2025, Berleth represented that $2,975,774.98 was owed by Cyberlux. See Exhibit 1. On that
date, when Cyberlux contacted Berleth to try and pay that amount, Berleth refused to provide his wiring instructions.
Over the weekend, Berleth concocted an increase in that amount by over $100,000, to $3,083,639.75, the figure in his
June 9, 2025 “Judgment Calculation.” See Exhibit 2. Berleth provided his wiring instructions after the trial court
directed him to do so. See the trial court’s June 9, 2025 hearing transcript, attached as Exhibit 3.
2 Judge Payne of the 55th Judicial District Court for Harris County presided over this hearing while the Honorable
Judge of this Court was away
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The embedded June 9 hearing excerpt shows Pennetti asking for a stay until Wednesday at 8:30; the court says it will trust representations t
The embedded June 9 hearing excerpt shows Pennetti asking for a stay until Wednesday at 8:30; the court says it will trust representations that the receiver will await payment. Berleth says the facility’s items have shipped and he is only awaiting Legalist or HII payment. This selected excerpt is not a comprehensive order terminating authority.
Read the anchor · page 2
33430530 - 2 -
Even though Cyberlux objected to the incorrect judgment amount in the Court’s Turnover
Order, in hopes of streamlining a resolution of the matter, on June 10, 2025, the sum of
$3,083,639.75 was tendered and delivered via wire transfer to the Receiver. The amount had been
calculated by Berleth as the amount owed on the judgment.1 In fact, on June 9, 2025, Berleth
represented to the Court during a hearing that this was the amount of the judgment owed, inclusive
of fees. Berleth’s “judgment calculation” included amounts allegedly owed for Plaintiffs attorneys’
fees, as well as over $800,000 of fees and expenses Berleth claims to have incurred despite his
three-week appointment during which Berleth did not seize or sell a single asset; he merely
changed the locks on Cyberlux’s facility and observed an inspection by Cyberlux, HII, and the
United States Government.
Despite being appointed as a ‘neutral’ extension of this Court, Berleth had previously
refused to accept payment on the judgment on June 5, 2025 in his initial improper effort to extend
the receivership. In fact, during the June 9, 2025 hearing, the Court ordered Berleth to provide his
wiring instructions so the judgment could be satisfied.2 During that hearing, Cyberlux expressed
concern Berleth would continue to act in his own interest to try and rack up more fees. In response,
Berleth disagreed, stating “there’s nothing to do . . . [but] await payment . . .” In fact, Berleth
represented to the Court that awaiting payment was “all I’m doing.” The transcript of that exchange
reflects:
1 Notably, on June 5, 2025, Berleth represented that $2,975,774.98 was owed by Cyberlux. See Exhibit 1. On that
date, when Cyberlux contacted Berleth to try and pay that amount, Berleth refused to provide his wiring instructions.
Over the weekend, Berleth concocted an increase in that amount by over $100,000, to $3,083,639.75, the figure in his
June 9, 2025 “Judgment Calculation.” See Exhibit 2. Berleth provided his wiring instructions after the trial court
directed him to do so. See the trial court’s June 9, 2025 hearing transcript, attached as Exhibit 3.
2 Judge Payne of the 55th Judicial District Court for Harris County presided over this hearing while the Honorable
Judge of this Court was away
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The motion quotes the receiver’s final report as saying work is completed pending distribution and asking the court to order satisfaction an
The motion quotes the receiver’s final report as saying work is completed pending distribution and asking the court to order satisfaction and termination effective upon entry of a termination order. Defendants agree termination is appropriate but dispute credits and fees before disbursement. The quoted request and completion statement do not themselves establish that a termination order was entered.
Read the anchor · page 3
21
MR. PENNETTI:
And, Judge, with that in
22
mind, can we have
a stay until Wednesday morning at
23
8: 30?
24
THE COURT:
I am going to trust counsel's
25
representations that this is where
.. that he's not
Tamika T. Bartee, Official Court Reporter, CSR #12593
55th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas
36
1
going to do anything.
He's going to await y
payment
2
until Wednesday.
3
MR. BERLETH:
There'
's nothing to do, Judge.
4
THE COURT:
Yeah.
5
MR. BERLETH:
I mezo
) the facility is
6
all the stuff has been shipped
Really, the only thing
7
to do is to either await payment from Legalist or await
8
payment from HII. That
I am doing. So their idea
9
that I am somehow going
it and, you know, flipping
10
mattress cushions, there's nothing to do at this point.
Transcript rom June 9, 2025 hearing, at p. 36: 3, 5-10.
On June 11, 2025, Berleth confirmed he received the $3,083,639.75, the amount he had
calculated and demanded. After receiving what Berleth knew was an overpayment, Berleth filed
his Final Report, Final Accounting, Verified Motion for Disbursement of Funds and Motion to
Terminate Receiyership ("Final Report).4 In Berleth's Final Report, Berleth indicated, among
other things, that:
3 Despite the undersigned advising Berleth on several occasions that hundreds of thousands of dollars of prior
payments were made towards this judgment, Berleth has done nothing to investigate or to credit those payments -
likely because he is vying for a contingent fee and is concerned it will result in a reduced fee paid to him.
4 Cyberlux agrees that the receivership should be terminated and that Berleth should be discharged. However, the
judgment amount must be corrected and Berleth must provide documentation to support his fees and expenses (which
this Court must review and approve) before funds can be disbursed.
33430530
- 3 -
claimallegation
Defendants accuse Berleth of refusing wiring instructions on June 5, pursuing more than $800,000 fees and expenses during about three weeks,
Defendants accuse Berleth of refusing wiring instructions on June 5, pursuing more than $800,000 fees and expenses during about three weeks, and acting without seizing or selling an asset. They describe locks changed and an inspection involving Cyberlux, HII and government. These are adversarial allegations requiring records, not established bad faith or a verified accounting.
Read the anchor · page 2
33430530 - 2 -
Even though Cyberlux objected to the incorrect judgment amount in the Court’s Turnover
Order, in hopes of streamlining a resolution of the matter, on June 10, 2025, the sum of
$3,083,639.75 was tendered and delivered via wire transfer to the Receiver. The amount had been
calculated by Berleth as the amount owed on the judgment.1 In fact, on June 9, 2025, Berleth
represented to the Court during a hearing that this was the amount of the judgment owed, inclusive
of fees. Berleth’s “judgment calculation” included amounts allegedly owed for Plaintiffs attorneys’
fees, as well as over $800,000 of fees and expenses Berleth claims to have incurred despite his
three-week appointment during which Berleth did not seize or sell a single asset; he merely
changed the locks on Cyberlux’s facility and observed an inspection by Cyberlux, HII, and the
United States Government.
Despite being appointed as a ‘neutral’ extension of this Court, Berleth had previously
refused to accept payment on the judgment on June 5, 2025 in his initial improper effort to extend
the receivership. In fact, during the June 9, 2025 hearing, the Court ordered Berleth to provide his
wiring instructions so the judgment could be satisfied.2 During that hearing, Cyberlux expressed
concern Berleth would continue to act in his own interest to try and rack up more fees. In response,
Berleth disagreed, stating “there’s nothing to do . . . [but] await payment . . .” In fact, Berleth
represented to the Court that awaiting payment was “all I’m doing.” The transcript of that exchange
reflects:
1 Notably, on June 5, 2025, Berleth represented that $2,975,774.98 was owed by Cyberlux. See Exhibit 1. On that
date, when Cyberlux contacted Berleth to try and pay that amount, Berleth refused to provide his wiring instructions.
Over the weekend, Berleth concocted an increase in that amount by over $100,000, to $3,083,639.75, the figure in his
June 9, 2025 “Judgment Calculation.” See Exhibit 2. Berleth provided his wiring instructions after the trial court
directed him to do so. See the trial court’s June 9, 2025 hearing transcript, attached as Exhibit 3.
2 Judge Payne of the 55th Judicial District Court for Harris County presided over this hearing while the Honorable
Judge of this Court was away
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
A footnote says a separate Tucker/Whiteley receivership arose under an ex parte TRO in cause 2025-41073, later removed to SDTX 4:25-cv-02770
A footnote says a separate Tucker/Whiteley receivership arose under an ex parte TRO in cause 2025-41073, later removed to SDTX 4:25-cv-02770 before Sim Lake, and asserts that TRO expired with no continuing authority. The separate orders and docket are absent; authority from distinct proceedings must not be merged.
Read the anchor · page 4
33430530 - 4 -
The Receivership has completed with no further remaining issues
pending the final distribution of funds as detailed above. The
Receiver has fulfilled his obligations required by law. The Receiver
moves the Court order the judgment satisfied and Receivership
terminated. The Receiver as that effective on the of entry of the
Termination Order, the Receivership has been terminated, the
Receiver has been discharged, and the Receivership has ceased to
exist as a legal entity.
Final Report, at 4.
Indeed, on June 12, 2025, Berleth confirmed on the record that he had received the funds.5
During that hearing, Cyberlux reiterated that no credits or offsets had been applied and, because
of that, funds could not be distributed until the trial court determined the correct amount of credits
that should be applied to the judgment based on Cyberlux’s prior payments. Although Cyberlux
disagreed that the Receiver was entitled to his proposed contingent fee, Cyberlux pointed out that
even if an undocumented contingent fee could be awarded to the Receiver, the amount of that fee
needed to be adjusted after the judgment amount was corrected.
Apparently dissatisfied with the June 12 hearing (i.e., that Cyberlux had not caved to
Berleth’s unreasonable fee and that Berleth would not immediately secure the $800,000 windfall),
Berleth decided to continue his efforts to collect funds under the guise that he still had authority to
act even though he had already filed his Receiver’s Report, in which he represented, among other
things, that: “[1] The Receivership has completed with no further remaining issues pending the
final distribution . . . [2] The Receiver has fulfilled his obligations required by law . . . [3] The
Receiver moves the Court order the judgment satisfied and Receivership terminated. . .”,6 Berleth
5 Also, during that hearing, Berleth claimed that he had been appointed as receiver over Cyberlux in a Cause No.
2025-41073 pursuant to an ex parte TRO order signed by Judge Miller. That order expired and Berleth has no ongoing
authority. Further, that new, separate case, styled Phillip Rick Tucker a/k/a Rick Tucker and Neill Whiteley,
Individually v. Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt, is now pending before the Southern District of Texas,
Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-02770, before the Honorable Sim Lake (the “Tucker Action”).
6 Receiver’s Report, at 4, attached as Exhibit 4.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
The motion quotes Berleth’s June 25 approach to ANPC asserting approximately $65 million debt and less than half available, and offering $1.
The motion quotes Berleth’s June 25 approach to ANPC asserting approximately $65 million debt and less than half available, and offering $1.2 million for complete release including fees and expenses. This is an attributed settlement solicitation, not ANPC acceptance, actual total debt or a transfer. Exhibit 5 is referenced with a note that its redacted part is attorney-client communication, but is not embedded.
Read the anchor · page 5
33430530 - 5 -
is now falsely claiming that the judgment has not been paid and misrepresenting to third parties
that he still has statutory authority to act as receiver.
For example, nearly two weeks after the June 12 hearing, on June 25, 2025, the Receiver
contacted Advanced Navigation and Positioning Corporation (“ANPC”), stating:
I’m seeking to get an agreed final order to distribute funds in the
Cyberlux matter entered promptly. Unfortunately, Cyberlux has
~$65M in debt, with less than half that available to pay
creditors. Will your clients accept $1,200,000 lump sum payment
to completely release the Cyberlux matter, which would include all
your legal fees, expenses, and other incurred amounts to
date? Please call to confer.7
The next day, Berleth contacted Legalist, asking “[i]s Legalist simply going to skip
participating in settlement conference, and seek remedy for collecting on Cyberlux outside the
receivership?”8 In response, counsel for Legalist stated they had not been made aware of a
settlement conference, asking “[w]hat’s the status on that?”9 Rather than conceding there is no
“settlement conference” outside of something orchestrated entirely by Berleth himself, Berleth
responded: “But you also haven't asked me to collect the funds for [L]egalist or even told me how
much is owed. I'll take your lack of action and communication as a ‘no’.” Legalist’s counsel then
pressed Berleth, stating:
. . . [o]ur understanding based on the last hearing we attended on
June 12 is that the judgment has been satisfied in full based on
Legalist wiring you the attached judgment amount. Cyberlux
indicated at the hearing that they plan to challenge the judgment and
fee amount, which is their prerogative. . . If the landscape has
changed and additional funds are in play to pay other creditors,
please let us know. Legalist reserves all rights to seek funds to which
it is legally entitled.10
7 Exhibit 5. The redacted portion of Exhibit 5 is an attorney-client communication.
8 Exhibit 6.
9 Id. Legalist’s counsel also contacted the undersigned regarding the supposed settlement conference. The undersigned
has never been informed about a settlement conference.
10 Id.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
claimallegation
Quoted June 26 Legalist correspondence shows Berleth questioning participation in a settlement conference; Legalist counsel says none was kn
Quoted June 26 Legalist correspondence shows Berleth questioning participation in a settlement conference; Legalist counsel says none was known and understood the prior judgment satisfied by its wire while reserving collection rights. Berleth reportedly disputes paid-in-full status because disbursement was contested. The source preserves competing descriptions; Exhibit 6 is absent.
Read the anchor · page 5
33430530 - 5 -
is now falsely claiming that the judgment has not been paid and misrepresenting to third parties
that he still has statutory authority to act as receiver.
For example, nearly two weeks after the June 12 hearing, on June 25, 2025, the Receiver
contacted Advanced Navigation and Positioning Corporation (“ANPC”), stating:
I’m seeking to get an agreed final order to distribute funds in the
Cyberlux matter entered promptly. Unfortunately, Cyberlux has
~$65M in debt, with less than half that available to pay
creditors. Will your clients accept $1,200,000 lump sum payment
to completely release the Cyberlux matter, which would include all
your legal fees, expenses, and other incurred amounts to
date? Please call to confer.7
The next day, Berleth contacted Legalist, asking “[i]s Legalist simply going to skip
participating in settlement conference, and seek remedy for collecting on Cyberlux outside the
receivership?”8 In response, counsel for Legalist stated they had not been made aware of a
settlement conference, asking “[w]hat’s the status on that?”9 Rather than conceding there is no
“settlement conference” outside of something orchestrated entirely by Berleth himself, Berleth
responded: “But you also haven't asked me to collect the funds for [L]egalist or even told me how
much is owed. I'll take your lack of action and communication as a ‘no’.” Legalist’s counsel then
pressed Berleth, stating:
. . . [o]ur understanding based on the last hearing we attended on
June 12 is that the judgment has been satisfied in full based on
Legalist wiring you the attached judgment amount. Cyberlux
indicated at the hearing that they plan to challenge the judgment and
fee amount, which is their prerogative. . . If the landscape has
changed and additional funds are in play to pay other creditors,
please let us know. Legalist reserves all rights to seek funds to which
it is legally entitled.10
7 Exhibit 5. The redacted portion of Exhibit 5 is an attorney-client communication.
8 Exhibit 6.
9 Id. Legalist’s counsel also contacted the undersigned regarding the supposed settlement conference. The undersigned
has never been informed about a settlement conference.
10 Id.
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
entityobservation
Alexander J. Pennetti
Read the anchor · page 11
33430530 - 11 -
Dated: June 30, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
By : /s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Douglas S. Lang
State Bar No. 11895500
Alexander J. Pennetti
State Bar No. 24110208
THOMPSON COBURN LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel Phone: (972) 629-7100
Fax: (972) 629-7171
dlang@thompsoncoburn.com
apennetti@thompsoncoburn.com
COUNSEL FOR
CYBERLUX CORPORATION AND
MARK D. SCHMIDT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 30, 2025, I had this document served on all counsel of record via
electronic service.
/s/ Alexander J. Pennetti
Alexander J. Pennetti
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
entityobservation
Robert Berleth
Read the anchor · page 1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO DEMAND FOR DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTION
COME NOW, Defendants Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively,
“Cyberlux” or “Defendants”), and file their Objections to Demand for Document Disclosure and
Motion for Protection (“Motion”). In support thereof, Defendants respectfully show:
INTRODUCTION
Robert Berleth (“Berleth”) was appointed pursuant to the Court’s TCPRC section 31.002
Turnover Order entered on May 22, 2025. Therefore, his appointment in the case, as outlined in
section 31.002, is limited to: “take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the
proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3). Although the initial judgment in that action was approximately
$1.572 million, the Court’s Turnover Order identified the judgment amount to be approximately
$2.1 million. The Turnover Order did not credit Cyberlux for several hundreds of thousands of
dollars in prior payments that Cyberlux had made to judgment creditors Atlantic Wave and Secure
Community.
6/30/2025 3:45 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 102603629
By: Jasmine Garner
Filed: 6/30/2025 3:45 PM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
inferenceinference
The dispute distinguishes money in the receiver’s account from adjudicated credits, authorised distribution and formal termination. The moti
The dispute distinguishes money in the receiver’s account from adjudicated credits, authorised distribution and formal termination. The motion treats tender as legally ending authority, while its quoted report still requests an entered termination order; the operative consequence requires the actual orders.
inferenceinference
Later broad-creditor outreach is materially different from awaiting the payment described in the June 9 excerpt, but the excerpt and quoted
Later broad-creditor outreach is materially different from awaiting the payment described in the June 9 excerpt, but the excerpt and quoted emails alone do not establish unlawful motive or the full scope of authority at each date.
omissiongap
Referenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image
Referenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Read the anchor · page 1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO DEMAND FOR DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTION
COME NOW, Defendants Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively,
“Cyberlux” or “Defendants”), and file their Objections to Demand for Document Disclosure and
Motion for Protection (“Motion”). In support thereof, Defendants respectfully show:
INTRODUCTION
Robert Berleth (“Berleth”) was appointed pursuant to the Court’s TCPRC section 31.002
Turnover Order entered on May 22, 2025. Therefore, his appointment in the case, as outlined in
section 31.002, is limited to: “take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the
proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3). Although the initial judgment in that action was approximately
$1.572 million, the Court’s Turnover Order identified the judgment amount to be approximately
$2.1 million. The Turnover Order did not credit Cyberlux for several hundreds of thousands of
dollars in prior payments that Cyberlux had made to judgment creditors Atlantic Wave and Secure
Community.
6/30/2025 3:45 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 102603629
By: Jasmine Garner
Filed: 6/30/2025 3:45 PM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
otherattribution
Complete supplied 13-page source reviewed at SHA-256 b3fc970c82c626c35f982c1e678a807e34d8867925f0738ca477bc92bdde109d. Source assertions, or
Complete supplied 13-page source reviewed at SHA-256 b3fc970c82c626c35f982c1e678a807e34d8867925f0738ca477bc92bdde109d. Source assertions, original visual features, filing/communication context and identified missing attachments are retained. All thirteen pages read, including the complete embedded transcript excerpt and external-case quotations. Version version_7d4ed1c692784e6d9666892a5ee0f797, SHA256 b3fc970c82c626c35f982c1e678a807e34d8867925f0738ca477bc92bdde109d; material image QA completed, original source and extraction retained.
Read the anchor · page 1
CAUSE NO. 2024-48085
ATLANTIC WAVE HOLDINGS, LLC § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
and SECURE COMMUNITY, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff/Judgment-Creditor §
§
v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
CYBERLUX CORPORATION and §
MARK D. SCHMIDT, Individually, §
§
Defendant/Judgment Debtors. § 129TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO DEMAND FOR DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTION
COME NOW, Defendants Cyberlux Corporation and Mark D. Schmidt (collectively,
“Cyberlux” or “Defendants”), and file their Objections to Demand for Document Disclosure and
Motion for Protection (“Motion”). In support thereof, Defendants respectfully show:
INTRODUCTION
Robert Berleth (“Berleth”) was appointed pursuant to the Court’s TCPRC section 31.002
Turnover Order entered on May 22, 2025. Therefore, his appointment in the case, as outlined in
section 31.002, is limited to: “take possession of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the
proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 31.002(b)(3). Although the initial judgment in that action was approximately
$1.572 million, the Court’s Turnover Order identified the judgment amount to be approximately
$2.1 million. The Turnover Order did not credit Cyberlux for several hundreds of thousands of
dollars in prior payments that Cyberlux had made to judgment creditors Atlantic Wave and Secure
Community.
6/30/2025 3:45 PM
Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County
Envelope No. 102603629
By: Jasmine Garner
Filed: 6/30/2025 3:45 PM
UnofficialCopyOfficeofMarilynBurgessDistrictClerk
questionquestion
What bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority a
What bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority after June 11?
questionquestion
Do the full ANPC/Legalist communications and June 27 demand support the alleged expansion of activity and its stated authority?
questionquestion
Which actual Montana decision corresponds to the described court and quoted passage, and what is the scope of the cited external disciplinar
Which actual Montana decision corresponds to the described court and quoted passage, and what is the scope of the cited external disciplinary findings?
distillatequestion
CONNECT
Reviewed relationships
The canvas follows the database: source to DISTIL record, DISTIL record to knowledge object, then reviewed relationship. Position alone means nothing.
The motion quotes Berleth’s June 25 approach to ANPC asserting approximately $65 million debt and less than half available, and offering $1.2 million for complete release including fees and expenses. This is an attributed settlement solicitation, not ANPC acceptance, actual total debt or a transfer. Exhibit 5 is referenced with a note that its redacted part is attorney-client communication, but is not embedded.supportsDo the full ANPC/Legalist communications and June 27 demand support the alleged expansion of activity and its stated authority?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The embedded June 9 hearing excerpt shows Pennetti asking for a stay until Wednesday at 8:30; the court says it will trust representations that the receiver will await payment. Berleth says the facility’s items have shipped and he is only awaiting Legalist or HII payment. This selected excerpt is not a comprehensive order terminating authority.supportsLater broad-creditor outreach is materially different from awaiting the payment described in the June 9 excerpt, but the excerpt and quoted emails alone do not establish unlawful motive or the full scope of authority at each date.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Quoted June 26 Legalist correspondence shows Berleth questioning participation in a settlement conference; Legalist counsel says none was known and understood the prior judgment satisfied by its wire while reserving collection rights. Berleth reportedly disputes paid-in-full status because disbursement was contested. The source preserves competing descriptions; Exhibit 6 is absent.supportsLater broad-creditor outreach is materially different from awaiting the payment described in the June 9 excerpt, but the excerpt and quoted emails alone do not establish unlawful motive or the full scope of authority at each date.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The text describes a Montana Supreme Court memorandum criticising factual/legal representations, but supplies a Rideg v. Berleth citation identifying D. Mont., August 9, 2021. The described tribunal and printed citation require source verification rather than silent correction or assuming they identify the same opinion.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding proceedings, continued broader creditor contacts and attempts to obtain an approximately $25 million HII receivable, and demanded documents June 27. Some ongoing-conduct assertions are expressly information and belief; appellate Exhibit 7 and demand Exhibit 8 are absent.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes the receiver’s final report as saying work is completed pending distribution and asking the court to order satisfaction and termination effective upon entry of a termination order. Defendants agree termination is appropriate but dispute credits and fees before disbursement. The quoted request and completion statement do not themselves establish that a termination order was entered.supportsDoes this motion establish that the receivership had formally terminated by June 30?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants challenge an approximately $2.1 million turnover-order balance compared with the original approximately $1.572 million judgment, alleging hundreds of thousands in uncredited payments. They say Berleth’s June 5 demand of $2,975,774.98 became $3,083,639.75 by June 9, an increase of $107,864.77. Supporting calculation exhibits are not included.supportsWhat bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority after June 11?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants challenge an approximately $2.1 million turnover-order balance compared with the original approximately $1.572 million judgment, alleging hundreds of thousands in uncredited payments. They say Berleth’s June 5 demand of $2,975,774.98 became $3,083,639.75 by June 9, an increase of $107,864.77. Supporting calculation exhibits are not included.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion invokes a 2020 In re Berleth reprimand quotation that expressly distinguishes professional-guideline violations from more serious violations had fraudulent intent been found, and says no further sanction was necessary. The quotation must not be converted into a fraud finding. The underlying opinion is not attached.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes Berleth’s June 25 approach to ANPC asserting approximately $65 million debt and less than half available, and offering $1.2 million for complete release including fees and expenses. This is an attributed settlement solicitation, not ANPC acceptance, actual total debt or a transfer. Exhibit 5 is referenced with a note that its redacted part is attorney-client communication, but is not embedded.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes the receiver’s final report as saying work is completed pending distribution and asking the court to order satisfaction and termination effective upon entry of a termination order. Defendants agree termination is appropriate but dispute credits and fees before disbursement. The quoted request and completion statement do not themselves establish that a termination order was entered.supportsWhat bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority after June 11?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding proceedings, continued broader creditor contacts and attempts to obtain an approximately $25 million HII receivable, and demanded documents June 27. Some ongoing-conduct assertions are expressly information and belief; appellate Exhibit 7 and demand Exhibit 8 are absent.supportsDoes this motion establish that the receivership had formally terminated by June 30?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding proceedings, continued broader creditor contacts and attempts to obtain an approximately $25 million HII receivable, and demanded documents June 27. Some ongoing-conduct assertions are expressly information and belief; appellate Exhibit 7 and demand Exhibit 8 are absent.supportsWhat bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority after June 11?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes the receiver’s final report as saying work is completed pending distribution and asking the court to order satisfaction and termination effective upon entry of a termination order. Defendants agree termination is appropriate but dispute credits and fees before disbursement. The quoted request and completion statement do not themselves establish that a termination order was entered.supportsThe dispute distinguishes money in the receiver’s account from adjudicated credits, authorised distribution and formal termination. The motion treats tender as legally ending authority, while its quoted report still requests an entered termination order; the operative consequence requires the actual orders.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding proceedings, continued broader creditor contacts and attempts to obtain an approximately $25 million HII receivable, and demanded documents June 27. Some ongoing-conduct assertions are expressly information and belief; appellate Exhibit 7 and demand Exhibit 8 are absent.supportsDo the full ANPC/Legalist communications and June 27 demand support the alleged expansion of activity and its stated authority?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants allege Berleth incorrectly said the trial court could not schedule termination despite appellate permission for concluding proceedings, continued broader creditor contacts and attempts to obtain an approximately $25 million HII receivable, and demanded documents June 27. Some ongoing-conduct assertions are expressly information and belief; appellate Exhibit 7 and demand Exhibit 8 are absent.supportsLater broad-creditor outreach is materially different from awaiting the payment described in the June 9 excerpt, but the excerpt and quoted emails alone do not establish unlawful motive or the full scope of authority at each date.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes a 2022 Preferred Ready-Mix bankruptcy finding of intentional stay violations and describes $10,000 punitive damages within $45,000 total, then says the Fifth Circuit upheld the opinion December 31, 2024. The quoted appellate account expressly says conversion was the claim not won. These reported findings concern that other dispute and do not adjudicate the Cyberlux motion.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The text describes a Montana Supreme Court memorandum criticising factual/legal representations, but supplies a Rideg v. Berleth citation identifying D. Mont., August 9, 2021. The described tribunal and printed citation require source verification rather than silent correction or assuming they identify the same opinion.supportsWhich actual Montana decision corresponds to the described court and quoted passage, and what is the scope of the cited external disciplinary findings?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes a 2022 Preferred Ready-Mix bankruptcy finding of intentional stay violations and describes $10,000 punitive damages within $45,000 total, then says the Fifth Circuit upheld the opinion December 31, 2024. The quoted appellate account expressly says conversion was the claim not won. These reported findings concern that other dispute and do not adjudicate the Cyberlux motion.supportsWhich actual Montana decision corresponds to the described court and quoted passage, and what is the scope of the cited external disciplinary findings?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion invokes a 2020 In re Berleth reprimand quotation that expressly distinguishes professional-guideline violations from more serious violations had fraudulent intent been found, and says no further sanction was necessary. The quotation must not be converted into a fraud finding. The underlying opinion is not attached.supportsWhich actual Montana decision corresponds to the described court and quoted passage, and what is the scope of the cited external disciplinary findings?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion distinguishes funds tendered by wire the afternoon of June 10, receipt confirmed June 11 and in-court confirmation June 12. It says the full $3,083,639.75 demanded was transferred despite contested credits and fees. These dates describe different steps, not necessarily conflicting payment dates; the bank record is absent.supportsThe dispute distinguishes money in the receiver’s account from adjudicated credits, authorised distribution and formal termination. The motion treats tender as legally ending authority, while its quoted report still requests an entered termination order; the operative consequence requires the actual orders.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants argue under section 31.002 and cited cases that payment made the turnover order moot and removed authority, so document demands need not be obeyed. They seek protection and fees on that basis. This is the requested legal outcome, not an entered declaration of no authority.supportsWhat bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority after June 11?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Quoted June 26 Legalist correspondence shows Berleth questioning participation in a settlement conference; Legalist counsel says none was known and understood the prior judgment satisfied by its wire while reserving collection rights. Berleth reportedly disputes paid-in-full status because disbursement was contested. The source preserves competing descriptions; Exhibit 6 is absent.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants argue under section 31.002 and cited cases that payment made the turnover order moot and removed authority, so document demands need not be obeyed. They seek protection and fees on that basis. This is the requested legal outcome, not an entered declaration of no authority.supportsThe dispute distinguishes money in the receiver’s account from adjudicated credits, authorised distribution and formal termination. The motion treats tender as legally ending authority, while its quoted report still requests an entered termination order; the operative consequence requires the actual orders.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion distinguishes funds tendered by wire the afternoon of June 10, receipt confirmed June 11 and in-court confirmation June 12. It says the full $3,083,639.75 demanded was transferred despite contested credits and fees. These dates describe different steps, not necessarily conflicting payment dates; the bank record is absent.supportsWhat bank receipt, ledger, fee records, appellate directive and entered orders establish satisfaction, distributable amounts and authority after June 11?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The motion quotes Berleth’s June 25 approach to ANPC asserting approximately $65 million debt and less than half available, and offering $1.2 million for complete release including fees and expenses. This is an attributed settlement solicitation, not ANPC acceptance, actual total debt or a transfer. Exhibit 5 is referenced with a note that its redacted part is attorney-client communication, but is not embedded.supportsLater broad-creditor outreach is materially different from awaiting the payment described in the June 9 excerpt, but the excerpt and quoted emails alone do not establish unlawful motive or the full scope of authority at each date.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
The embedded June 9 hearing excerpt shows Pennetti asking for a stay until Wednesday at 8:30; the court says it will trust representations that the receiver will await payment. Berleth says the facility’s items have shipped and he is only awaiting Legalist or HII payment. This selected excerpt is not a comprehensive order terminating authority.supportsReferenced Exhibits 1–8 and complete cited opinions are not embedded in this thirteen-page motion; only the selected June 9 transcript image is shown.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Quoted June 26 Legalist correspondence shows Berleth questioning participation in a settlement conference; Legalist counsel says none was known and understood the prior judgment satisfied by its wire while reserving collection rights. Berleth reportedly disputes paid-in-full status because disbursement was contested. The source preserves competing descriptions; Exhibit 6 is absent.supportsThe dispute distinguishes money in the receiver’s account from adjudicated credits, authorised distribution and formal termination. The motion treats tender as legally ending authority, while its quoted report still requests an entered termination order; the operative consequence requires the actual orders.
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Quoted June 26 Legalist correspondence shows Berleth questioning participation in a settlement conference; Legalist counsel says none was known and understood the prior judgment satisfied by its wire while reserving collection rights. Berleth reportedly disputes paid-in-full status because disbursement was contested. The source preserves competing descriptions; Exhibit 6 is absent.supportsDo the full ANPC/Legalist communications and June 27 demand support the alleged expansion of activity and its stated authority?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
Defendants argue under section 31.002 and cited cases that payment made the turnover order moot and removed authority, so document demands need not be obeyed. They seek protection and fees on that basis. This is the requested legal outcome, not an entered declaration of no authority.supportsDoes this motion establish that the receivership had formally terminated by June 30?
Specifically named source propositions support the bounded distinction or question.
WEIGH
Explained weighting
A score appears only when its components and change threshold are published.
No published WEIGH run
The active Website Edition contains no applied score snapshot for this source or its connected objects. That means not assessed—not zero.